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FBIS-SOV-90-042 CONTENTS *2 March 1990*

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

- Joint Study Suggests Strategic Nuclear Safeguards *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- Reportage on Gerasimov's 1 March Briefing 2
  - Iran-Iraq 'Conflict' *[TASS]* 2
  - Delays in Foreign Affairs Activities *[TASS]* 2
  - Shevardnadze Trip Postponed *[TASS]* 2
  - Nuclear Power Plant for DPRK *[TASS]* 3
  - Concern Over UNITA Actions *[TASS]* 3
  - Resumption of Military Ties With Iran *[TASS]* 3
  - Barre Remarks on Perestroyka *[TASS]* 3
  - TASS Summary 4
- Shevardnadze Briefs Media Representatives *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 4
- Shevardnadze on Relations With Council of Europe *[TASS]* 5

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

- Soviet 'Threat' Pretext for Military Plans *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Mar]* 6
- Bessmertnykh Holds Talks With U.S. Ambassador *[TASS]* 7
- Armenia Welcomes U.S. Consulate Proposal *[ARMENPRES]* 7
- Miners' Hold News Conference After U.S. Visit *[TRUD 30 Feb]* 8

Northeast Asia

- Mongolia Agrees to Complete Troop Withdrawal *[TASS]* 8
  - Batmonh Receives Delegation *[TASS]* 9
- Founding of Mongolian Democratic Union Viewed *[Moscow TV]* 9
- Commentaries on Defense Secretary Cheney's Tour 9
  - Japan Visit *[Kalinin on Moscow International]* 9
  - Seoul Visit *[(Brezhkov) on Moscow International]* 10

Southeast Asia & Pacific

- Commentators Examine Situation in Cambodia 11
  - Outcome of Jakarta Meeting Viewed *[Moscow International]* 11
  - Pre-Jakarta Meeting Hopes Expressed *[Moscow International]* 11
  - Sihanouk's Role, Actions Pondered *[Moscow International]* 11
  - ASEAN-EC Meeting Reviewed *[Moscow International]* 12

Near East & South Asia

- Commentary on Iran's Political Role in Near East *[Moscow International]* 12
- Commentary Views Antigovernment Protests in Iran *[Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]* 13
- Andreyev Comments on Demonstrations in Iran *[Andreyev on Moscow Radio]* 14
- Three New Political Parties Licensed in Tehran *[Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]* 15
- Iranian Leaders Urge Restraint for Soviet Muslims *[Moscow International]* 15
- Iranian Campaign Against Rushdie Condemned *[Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]* 16
- Reportage on Development of Soviet-Israeli Ties 17
  - Prokofyev Commentary *[Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]* 17
  - Zaltorunskiy Commentary *[Moscow International]* 17
- Commentary Compares Afghanistan, Tajik Incidents *[Moscow Radio Peace and Progress]* 18

- Soviet Delegation Visits Kabul, Discusses Trade *[TASS]* 19
- Sultan of Oman Expresses Thanks to Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 18 Feb]* 20

Sub-Saharan Africa

- Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Mozambique 20
    - Group Arrives 28 Feb *[TASS]* 20
    - Delegations Begin Talks *[Maputo Radio]* 20
    - Envoy on Reduced Cooperation *[Maputo Radio]* 20
    - Envoy on Cuban Ties, Chissano Visit *[Maputo International]* 20
- Commentary Views Strikes in Mozambique *[Moscow International]* 21
- Commentary Denies Namibia's Future 'Cloudless' *[Moscow International]* 21

East Europe

- GDR SPD Chairman Boehme, Delegation Visit 22
    - Shevardnadze Receives Boehme *[East Berlin ADN]* 22
    - Yakovlev Meets With Boehme *[PRAVDA 1 Mar]* 22
    - Boehme, Romberg Comment on Talks *[East Berlin ADN]* 22
    - TASS on Boehme News Conference 23
    - Economic 'Threat of Exclusion' Noted *[East Berlin ADN]* 23
    - Romberg, Akhromeyev Hold Talks *[East Berlin ADN]* 23
- PDS Leader Cited on Pace of German Union *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 24
- PDS Faces 'Difficult Path' to Rehabilitation *[PRAVDA 23 Feb]* 25
- PDS, SPD Policies Eyed as Elections Near *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* 26
- GDR People's Chamber President Arrives 2 Mar *[East Berlin ADN]* 28
- IZVESTIYA Summarizes GDR Organizations *[23 Feb]* 28
- Soviet Troop Withdrawal From CSSR Continues *[Moscow TV]* 29
- 'Druzhba-90' Exercises Begin in CSSR 1 Mar *[TASS]* 29
- CSSR President Describes Talks With Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 1 Mar]* 29
- Havel Talks at Supreme Soviet Committee Reported *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* 30
- Lithuanian Leaders Meet CSSR's President *[Vilnius International]* 30
- Prague Rally Protests 1948 Communist 'Putsch' *[IZVESTIYA 27 Feb]* 30
- IZVESTIYA Reports Calfa Assembly Speech *[1 Mar]* 31
- CPCZ Plenum Expels 'Normalization' Leadership *[PRAVDA 19 Feb]* 32
- MSZMP Notes Threat of Bourgeois Dictatorship *[TASS]* 32
- SFRY Presidency Session Imposes Kosovo Curfew *[IZVESTIYA 23 Feb]* 33
- Agreement With SFRY on Enterprises Signed *[TASS]* 33

West Europe

- United Germany Membership in NATO Opposed *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 33
- Kohl, Baker Cited on German Border Issue *[IZVESTIYA 2 Mar]* 35
- PRAVDA Interviews Belgian Premier Martens *[19 Feb]* 35
- Navy Staff Officer Hits Sub Intrusion Claims *[PRAVDA 21 Feb]* 38
- Swedish Objections to Plan To Admit Balts Noted *[PRAVDA 27 Feb]* 39

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

- Supreme Soviet Recesses; Schedule Outlined *[TASS]* 40
- Transcaucasus Closed Session Ends 1 Mar *[Moscow Radio]* 40
    - Gorbachev Comments on Debate *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* 40
    - Armenian Deputy Views Meeting *[AFP]* 40
- Parliament on 'Favorable' Transcaucasus Solution *[Moscow International]* 41
- Deputy Reports on Internal Troops Draft Law *[Moscow TV]* 41
- Draft Governing MVD Use of Weapons Explained *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Feb]* 42
- Further Ryzhkov Remarks on Presidency Issue *[Moscow International]* 43
- Yakovlev Discusses State of Emergency Draft *[Moscow TV]* 44
- Vilkas Reports on Economic, Social Draft Law *[Moscow TV]* 46

Political & Social

Gorbachev Meets With Baltic Deputies 28 Feb *[Vilnius International]* 47
    AFP Report 49
Jusice Minister Yakovlev on Presidential Power *[Moscow TV]* 49
Need for Stronger Presidency Argued *[NEW TIMES No 6]* 51
Cadre Policy Body Views CPSU Draft Statutes *[PRAVDA 4 Feb]* 53
Shishlin Says Party Will Persue Reform *[Tokyo NHK TV]* 54
Academician Sees Need for CPSU Changes *[Moscow Radio]* 54
CPSU Should Cede Power 'in Good Time' *[IZVESTIYA 10 Feb]* 54
Implications of Political Pluralism Viewed *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* 55
Readers' Responses to Debate on Power *[PRAVDA 4 Feb]* 57
Interior Minister Details Need for Law, Order *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 28 Feb]* 60
Shebarshin Outlines Main KGB Tasks *[TASS]* 61
Biryukova Attends Health Ministry Collegium *[PRAVDA 13 Feb]* 62
Yazov, Abalkin Address Seminar on War Lessons *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 3 Feb]* 62
Committee Examines Game Reserve Scandal *[PRAVDA 2 Feb]* 63
Lenin Defended Against Journalist's Attack *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 27 Feb]* 63

Economic

Economic Experts Discuss Foreign Trade Policy *[Moscow TV]* 64
Agroindustrial Foreign Trade Activity Discussed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Feb]* 67
Currency Auction Delivers 'Another Blow' at Ruble *[Moscow International]* 69
Ryzhkov Meets Fish Industry Union Representatives *[TRUD 4 Feb]* 69
Landslide Buries Unattended Service Station *[IZVESTIYA 5 Feb]* 69

Agricultural

Details on Weather, Crop Conditions Reported *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 25 Jan]* 70
    Mid-January Period *[25 Jan]* 70
    Early February Period *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 17 Feb]* 70
    Mid-February Period *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 25 Feb]* 71

Scientific

Journalists for Space Flight Aboard Mir Named *[TASS]* 72
Barnaul Reassured After Radiation Scare Rumors *[Moscow Radio]* 72
Doctor Calls for Nationwide AIDS Campaign *[TASS]* 72

Military

Structure, Flow Chart of Armed Forces Detailed *[IZVESTIYA 22 Feb]* 72

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Moscow Control Over Baltic Transactions Ordered *[Helsinki International]* 75
'Estonian Congress' Elections Under Way *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 25 Feb]* 75
Latvia Adopts Law on Alternative Military Service *[TASS]* 75
Newly Introduced Latvian State Symbols Described *[IZVESTIYA 28 Feb]* 76
Sajudis Urges Speedup of Second Round of Elections *[TASS]* 76
Lithuanian Run-Off Elections To Begin 4 Mar *[Vilnius International]* 77
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session Resumes *[Moscow Radio]* 77
Lithuanian Press Law Takes Effect 1 Mar *[TASS]* 77
Lithuanian Ruling on Army Service Criticized *[IZVESTIYA 23 Feb]* 77
Lithuanian Christian Democrats Group Re-Formed *[SOVETSKAYA LITVA 30 Jan]* 78
Democratic Forces Hold Forum in Vilnius *[Moscow TV]* 79

RSFSR

Ligachev Interviewed in Belgorod Oblast *[Moscow TV]* 79
Local Involvement in Platform Debate Urged *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Feb]* 80

Moscow Obkom Members Criticize Leadership *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* ... 81
RSFSR Deputy Premier Appointed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Feb]* ... 82
Fire on Nuclear-Powered Ship in Murmansk *[TASS]* ... 82
Uncontested Elections in Kaluga 'Orchestrated' *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 10 Feb]* ... 82
Kaluga Obkom Chief Elected in Secret Ballot *[PRAVDA 28 Feb]* ... 83
Karelian Officials Disciplined for Abuse *[Moscow Radio]* ... 83
Karelian Nuclear Power Project Suspended *[Moscow Radio]* ... 84
Comment on Election Meeting in Saratov *[TRUD 20 Feb]* ... 84
Saratov Officials Urged To Pull Out of Elections *[IZVESTIYA 15 Feb]* ... 84
Uncontested Elections in Saratov Oblast Deplored *[PRAVDA 5 Feb]* ... 85
Leningrad Komsomol Forum Reported *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 Feb]* ... 85
Ecological Association Formed in Leningrad *[Moscow Radio]* ... 87
Biryukova Visits Kostroma, Meets Workers *[Moscow Radio]* ... 87
More on Secretary Stroyev's Novosibirsk Visit *[IZVESTIYA 24 Feb]* ... 87
Ryazan Leaders To Lose Special Facilities, Cars *[IZVESTIYA 7 Feb]* ... 87
Resignation of Gorkiy Secretary Demanded *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 20 Feb]* ... 88
Tyumen Viewed in Wake of Obkom Resignations *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 6]* ... 88
Tomsk Party Obkom Rejects Calls To Resign *[IZVESTIYA 4 Feb]* ... 89
Call for Tatar, Kazan Party Resignations *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 20 Feb]* ... 89
Indigenous Northern, Amur Peoples Begin Association *[IZVESTIYA 18 Feb]* ... 89

Western Republics

Belorussian Communist Party Finances Made Public *[TASS]* ... 90
Belorussian Electoral Commission Defended *[Moscow Radio]* ... 90
Belorussia Election Campaign in 'Final Stage' *[Moscow Radio]* ... 91
Moldavian Party Supports 'Open Dialogue' *[TASS]* ... 91
Ukrainian Candidates for People's Deputies Named *[IZVESTIYA 18 Feb]* ... 91
    Writers Nominated *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 6]* ... 92
Donetsk Roundtable Dissatisfied With Obkom Plenum ... 92
    Bureau Resignations Considered *[Moscow International]* ... 92
    Miners Plan To Strike 2 March *[Moscow Radio]* ... 92
    1-Day Warning Strike Urged *[Moscow TV]* ... 93
Donetsk Law Violations Mar Democracy Quest *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* ... 93
Citizens Protest Radar Station in Transcarpathia *[Kiev International]* ... 94

Caucasus

Russian Nationalists Call for Peace in Caucasus *[LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 4]* ... 94
Azerbaijani Intellectuals Call for End to Strikes *[Baku Radio]* ... 95
Deputies Comment on Solutions to NKAO Conflicts *[ARMENPRES]* ... 95
Gradual Normalization Occurring in NKAO Rayons *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 28 Feb]* ... 96
NKAO Paper Placed Under 'Military Jurisdiction' *[ARMENPRES]* ... 96
Economic Consequences of Baku Strikes Discussed *[Baku Radio]* ... 97
Claims of Military 'Atrocities' in Baku Deplored *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Feb]* ... 97
Update on Industrial Situation in Nakhichevan *[Moscow Radio]* ... 97
Figures for Transcaucasus Freight, Train Movement *[Yerevan Radio]* ... 98
Trains Begin To Arrive Regularly in Armenia *[Moscow TV]* ... 98

Central Asia

Kazakh Government-Cooperatives Dialogue Cited *[IZVESTIYA 22 Feb]* ... 98
New Kazakh KGB Chief Appointed *[Alma-Ata Radio]* ... 99
Further Reportage on Dushanbe Pogroms ... 99
    Situation Normalizing *[Moscow TV]* ... 99
    Ongoing Curfew *[IZVESTIYA 26 Feb]* ... 100
    Investigative Action *[Moscow Radio]* ... 100
    Polling Places Open *[PRAVDA 26 Feb]* ... 100
Possible Afghan Border Infiltration Cited *[Moscow International]* ... 101
Drug Interdiction on Afghan Border Viewed *[Moscow TV]* ... 101
Uzbek Meeting Condemns 'Demagogues,' 'Intriguers' *[IZVESTIYA 25 Feb]* ... 101
Procurator Dismisses Uzbek Genocide Claim *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 8]* ... 102

Joint Study Suggests Strategic Nuclear Safeguards

PM0103161790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Blinov dispatch under the "IZVESTIYA Correspondents Comment" rubric: "United States: Nuclear Weapons Safeguards"]

[Text] Washington—Are the "safeguards" for the nuclear countries' strategic systems sufficiently reliable—that was the question asked by Soviet and American experts tackling nuclear security questions. Their report, whose compilation was initiated by the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Mankind, recommends improving "the system of nuclear safeguards" and ensuring the stability of the nuclear equilibrium.

The main findings of the report compiled by both countries' scientists were announced at a press conference at the National Press Club in Washington. Prominent experts propose that we do not confine ourselves to existing potential for averting a nuclear conflict, which may arise, among other things, as a result of the accidental or unauthorized launching of nuclear missiles. They deem it necessary to equip all strategic launchers with "coded locks" precluding the combat utilization of nuclear weapons without proper authorization from national centers.

Another of the scientists' proposed measures is for all missiles to be equipped with devices enabling them to be destroyed in flight by transfer of a signal from the command center; this could avert a tragedy caused by the unintentional or unauthorized launch of a missile.

The report points out the danger of improving nuclear arms by creating a "counterforce"—systems capable of disabling the enemy at one blow. "Competition between 'counterforce' systems and the measures directed against them threatens to disrupt the nuclear balance," the report says. Attempts to counterbalance offensive arms in the form of space defense are ruinous and ineffective.

As for a limited space defense system, it could not fulfill its prescribed role of averting "nuclear terrorism"—several missiles equipped with additional "decoy warheads" would have no difficulty in penetrating this shield.

Scientists believe that removing the sources of instability by joint efforts is a more reliable solution. They say that the most destabilizing strategic weapons systems must be eliminated and attempts to create new "counterforce" systems must cease. We must also "take our fingers" off the trigger and renounce the principle of a "preemptive launch" and our readiness to inflict a nuclear strike should we receive signals that the other side is supposedly preparing to attack.

Another recommendation made by the scientists is for sensors to be installed on USSR and U.S. territory controlled by the other side. They could record missile launches for certain and thus rule out mistaken signals given out by national systems (there are more than enough examples of such mistakes, which have generated false alarm), the report says.

The experts' report has been handed over to the appropriate USSR Supreme Soviet and U.S. Congress committees. The International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Mankind proposes that the scientists' findings be discussed at a joint session involving representatives of both countries' legislative bodies.

Reportage on Gerasimov's 1 March Briefing

Iran-Iraq 'Conflict'

LD0103152790 Moscow TASS in English 1456 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—The Soviet Union welcomes another round of meetings in Baghdad and Teheran to settle the Iranian-Iraqi conflict planned by U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar and announced in the February 27 statement of the chairman of the U.N. Security Council, said Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov at a briefing here today.

He pointed out that the adopted statement falls in line with the Soviet Union's consistent policy aimed at rendering effective assistance to Perez de Cuellar's efforts to put into effect Resolution 598 of the Security Council.

The Soviet Union highly appreciates the consistency and persistence of the U.N. secretary-general in the quest to establish durable peace between Iran and Iraq. The USSR has invariably worked to supplement these efforts with its own practical steps. Gerasimov recalled that the Soviet Union's proposal to organise a tripartite meeting of Soviet, Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers remains in force and is now being considered by the parties concerned. He stressed that the meeting is not intended to counter or substitute the U.N. secretary-general's mission. "We proceed from the assumption that the meeting will be organised in such a way as not to interfere with the mission of the U.N. secretary-general. On the contrary, it will seek to promote its success and to become an integral part of the Iranian-Iraqi negotiating process under the aegis of Perez de Cuellar," Gerasimov said.

Delays in Foreign Affairs Activities

LD0103160790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, 1 March (TASS)—In connection with the need that has arisen for holding a number of major events in March, including the extraordinary Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt are considering new dates for the visit to the USSR by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak. This was stated at a briefing today by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry. He stated that there had been an earlier agreement in principle for a visit to the USSR by the Egyptian president, which had been planned to take place in March.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman also stated that for the same reasons the dates for a visit to Japan by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, which also had been previously scheduled for March, are being changed. The postponement of the visit, he said, is not connected with bilateral relations, but only with the USSR's internal affairs.

Gennadiy Gerasimov noted that further preparations for a visit to Japan by Mikhail Gorbachev depend on the success of this visit. Eduard Shevardnadze's visit, he said, "is regarded as a stage in the preparations for a Soviet-Japanese summit meeting."

Answering a question from an Irish correspondent about the timing of a visit to the USSR by Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey, Gennadiy Gerasimov noted that at the end of last year the prime minister expressed in a fairly general way a wish to make an official visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1990, that is, during Ireland's chairmanship of the European Community. Since then, he said, the Irish side has in various ways raised the issue with the USSR of possible specific dates for such a visit. The Irish ambassador to the USSR, Gennadiy Gerasimov noted, had been informed that the delay in responding to Charles Haughey's request regarding his visit to the USSR has nothing to do with the bilateral political situation and is linked with purely internal affairs, primarily the extraordinary USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the 28th CPSU Congress, the preparations for and holding of which will require the full involvement of the country's leadership. The date for the visit, Gennadiy Gerasimov said, will be agreed on through diplomatic channels.

Shevardnadze Trip Postponed

LD0103163790 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—"In view of the need to hold several important events in the USSR in March, including the extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) are considering new terms for the visit by President Husni Mubarak to the USSR," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

He said that, under the earlier accord, the Egyptian president's visit to the USSR was planned in March.

Gerasimov said that the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Japan, which was also tentatively scheduled for March, was put off for the same reasons. He explained that the postponement of the visit was not linked to bilateral relations, but only to the USSR's internal affairs.

Gerasimov noted that the preparation of Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan hinged on the success of this visit. Shevardnadze's visit is "viewed as one stage in preparations for a Soviet-Japanese summit meeting", he said.

Answering a question on the timing of Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey's visit to the USSR, Gerasimov noted that late last year the prime minister expressed in a rather general form the wish to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1990, i.e. during Ireland's presidency in the European Community.

Since then the Irish side has proposed to the USSR possible specific terms for the visit. The Irish ambassador to the USSR was told that the delay in the reply to Haughey's inquiry did not have any bilateral political reason behind it. It was linked with totally internal affairs, primarily with the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the 28th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the preparation and holding of which would require the full attention of the country's leaders.

Gerasimov said that the date of the visit would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

Nuclear Power Plant for DPRK

LD0103161490 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—An intergovernmental agreement between the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concluded on December 26, 1985, provides for the rendering of technical assistance by the Soviet Union to the DPRK in construction of a nuclear power plant with four reactors, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today, commenting on reports to the effect that the DPRK began the construction of four nuclear power plants with Soviet assistance.

At present a site for the nuclear power plant is being selected, Gerasimov said. This work will be completed early in 1992. It is planned to draw up and transfer the technical design of the power plant after 1994.

"In developing cooperation with the DPRK in the nuclear sphere, the Soviet Union will naturally take into account the situation with the signing of an agreement between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency on guarantees connected with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Gerasimov stressed.

Concern Over UNITA Actions

LD0103164490 Moscow TASS in English 1628 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—"The intensification of terrorist actions by the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] anti-government group in Angola concerns the Soviet Union," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said at a briefing here today.

He said that recent acts of subversion under the slogan "All-out war" are acquiring an increasingly dangerous and inhuman nature.

Gerasimov quoted UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi as saying that the whole country would be involved in the war and that Luanda would become the major target, with all the ensuing consequences.

The UNITA group is mounting terrorist and subversive acts against civilians and foreign specialists working in Angola. Gerasimov put a considerable share of responsibility for such actions on the United States. Without the United States' direct moral, political and military backing, the UNITA could hardly have been able to conduct such punitive operations.

These actions do not contribute to the quest for a political settlement of the internal Angolan conflict, speakers at the briefing stressed. In the Soviet Union they believe that an end should be put to this kind of activity.

Resumption of Military Ties With Iran

LD0103173790 Moscow TASS in English 1638 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—The Soviet-Iranian declaration, signed in Moscow in June last year, says that the Soviet side agrees to cooperate with Iran in strengthening its defence capability, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

"The point at issue is the resumption of military ties with Iran, ties that existed before 1982," he remarked.

The Soviet spokesman emphasised, however, that these issues are not on the agenda of the 12th session of the standing commission for economic cooperation between the USSR and Iran. A Soviet delegation today left for Tehran to take part in the meeting.

In connection with the forthcoming session of the Soviet-Iranian standing commission, Gerasimov recalled that during Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's visit to the USSR in June 1989, the sides signed a long-term programme for trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation until 2000.

This important document determines the framework of active bilateral cooperation in 15 economic branches, Gerasimov said.

Barre Remarks on Perestroyka

LD0103174290 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—Recent remarks by former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre about "the total collapse of perestroika" "clash" with the West's overall course towards a broader dialogue with the Soviet Union, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Addressing leading industrialists and financiers in Luxembourg, Barre warned the West against making capital investments in the Soviet economy.

Gerasimov said that such ideas, contradicting new political thinking and seeking to declare a "cold war" on the Soviet Union in the economic sphere, "sound like an anachronism, like a call to put back the clock of history."

"Raymond Barre has always been regarded in the USSR as a serious politician with an analytical mind, who realises the Soviet Union's role and place in world politics and who backs the development of Soviet-French ties," Gerasimov said.

"It is apparent that the mask of Cassandra, predicting our collapse and calling for an investment blockade of the USSR, does not suit Raymond Barre," he pointed out.

TASS Summary

LD0103190890 Moscow TASS in English 1853 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—"In view of the need to hold several important events in the USSR in March, including the extraordinary Third Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, the Soviet Union and the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) are considering new terms for the visit by President Husni Mubarak to the USSR," Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told a briefing here today.

Gerasimov said that the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Japan, which was also tentatively scheduled for March, was put off for the same reasons. He explained that the postponement of the visit was not linked to bilateral relations, but only to the USSR's internal affairs.

On the timing of Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey's visit to the USSR, Gerasimov noted that late last year the prime minister expressed in a rather general form the wish to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1990.

The Irish ambassador to the USSR was told that the delay in the reply to Haughey's inquiry did not have any bilateral political reason behind it and was linked totally with our internal affairs.

The Soviet Union positively evaluates interest in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the respective treaty, which was expressed by the overwhelming majority of participants in the Vienna session of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, Gerasimov said.

In this context, the USSR's attention was attracted by speeches by representatives of China and India, which are not parties to the treaty. The representatives emphasised their countries' commitment to the ideas of the treaty.

Commenting on reports that the USSR allegedly intends to conduct underground nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya because of the planned closure of the test range in the area of Semipalatinsk, Gerasimov said:

"As to further nuclear testing, this issue will be addressed by the USSR Supreme Soviet."

Gerasimov recalled that the USSR's stance on nuclear tests remained invariable—"we favour their total halt and are ready to cooperate with all countries to achieve this goal."

"The launching of the Palestinian-Israeli dialogue is not seen by the Soviet Union, nor by the United States, as a plan for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East," Gerasimov said answering a question on whether the USSR had an alternative plan for bringing peace to the Middle East.

The USSR believes that the potential of the whole of the international community, first and foremost of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, should be used, in parallel with the dialogue, to work to convene an international conference on the Middle East, Gerasimov stressed.

Shevardnadze Briefs Media Representatives

PM2702160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[G. Charodeyev report: "Minister's 'Monday' Briefing"]

[Text] USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze has held his first "Monday" briefing, as journalists at once nicknamed it. He told the representatives of the Soviet mass media what the Foreign Ministry has been doing over the past three days. Among many other questions, the situation in the Republic of South Africa was examined in the ministry collegium.

"In that country," the minister said, "processes have begun in the direction of democratic transformations. It is understandable, therefore, that some reaction is expected of us. A reaction is necessary, including from the political viewpoint."

E.A. Shevardnadze reported that a visit by the British foreign secretary to the Soviet Union is planned. The Foreign Ministry has decided to set up a working group to prepare for it. After this it is possible that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher will also visit us in the summer. A British exhibition will open in Kiev in June, and Mrs. Thatcher will participate in it.

During these days, E.A. Shevardnadze continued, we also discussed the changes which have occurred recently in the countries of East Europe and our steps to establish ties with their new political structures. This is the fundamental question. You know how we used to build relations with our allies—through the leading parties, which determined both the policies and the nature of interstate relations.

Now the emphases are shifting. We build relations through state organs, where not only communist but also other parties are represented. These relations must be equitable. We regard everything now happening in East Europe as democratic revolutions, and they accord with our national interests. It is necessary to help democratic processes and make them irreversible.

When the events began in Romania, the idea came into being of gathering foreign ministers for a conference. Our allies disagreed with us. For people in the world might have thought that the Warsaw Pact was again planning something against Romania. They know that this was the case several decades ago before the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We did not insist on holding the conference. But previously it was quite a simple matter to call each other, and we were ready to meet anywhere.

We must comprehend the new situations, get accustomed to surprises in politics, and build our policy accordingly.

The question of work with expatriates was discussed in the collegium. It was decided to mobilize the entire potential of our embassies, general consulates, and missions to organize relations with more than 20 million Russians, Armenians, Lithuanians, Jews, and people of other nationalities living outside the Soviet Union. They have a tremendous interest in our country. Many need help and support. I believe that we must cease looking on them as enemies of Soviet power. And we have been past masters at this: Remember Rostropovich. This great Russian musician recently sent M.S. Gorbachev an emotional letter in which he writes that he is grateful to the Soviet leadership for the warm welcome given him during his visit to the motherland....

Journalists asked a question about possible upcoming trips abroad by the leader of the Foreign Ministry.

"A visit to Japan is planned," the minister said. "We must prepare for it thoroughly. I believe that in the new round of Soviet-Japanese talks we must discuss questions of reducing military confrontation and the situation in the Pacific region. Apparently, the Japanese side will also broach the problem of the so-called 'northern territories.' It now seems that the Soviet Union must not make any corrections to this question. Its legal, historical, and ethical aspects enable us to uphold our positions," E.A. Shevardnadze emphasized.

Shevardnadze on Relations With Council of Europe

LD2802112690 Moscow TASS in English 1105 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—The Soviet Union is prepared to forge broad cooperation with the Council of Europe, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in an article published in the latest issue of the MOSCOW NEWS weekly.

"We consider our relations with the Council of Europe to be directly linked to the task of overcoming the rift in Europe, which has been a Soviet foreign policy priority since April 1985, Shevardnadze said, in advance of the forthcoming visit to Moscow by Council of Europe Ministers' Committee Chairman Joao de Deus Pinheiro and the council's Secretary General Catherine Lalumiere.

Several European forums, whose results were to a great extent predetermined by the policy of new thinking and the corresponding stance of the Soviet Union, gave cooperation on the continent new substance, Shevardnadze said.

There has been marked progress on a broad range of European security issues. However, developments in Central and Eastern Europe, mainly the new state of the German question, require a more intensive search for European cooperation and security structures, he writes.

"We appreciate the efforts of the Council of Europe in improving relations and mutual adaption between Eastern and Western Europe and becoming a bridge between East and West, Shevardnadze writes.

Having underlined the council of Europe's potential for building a "common European home," the minister said it is necessary to coordinate cooperation mechanisms developed and tested by the council with the future institutions of the European processes.

Shevardnadze believes the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly could well become a future European parliamentary forum, while its foreign ministers' committee could serve as a basis for a corresponding body in the unified Europe.

In order to achieve this, the Council of Europe will have to expand the sphere of its activities and cover both the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia who got "special invitation" status last summer and other East European countries, according to Shevardnadze.

Every state should be free to choose its political, economic, social and cultural system and preserve its national identity, he writes.

Generally accepted universal legal values, devoid of any ideological bias, should serve as a common denominator, he writes.

The Soviet Union is working on several issues linked with its signing a whole package of conventions and accords of the Council of Europe, the minister said.

The Soviet Union is prepared to raise the status of relations with the Council of Europe to a higher level and believes there are no obstacles preventing it from becoming a full member of the council, he said.

United States & Canada

Soviet 'Threat' Pretext for Military Plans

PM0103172990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General S. Orlov and Colonel M. Kolpakov: "Still Trying To Intimidate. Why the Pentagon Needs Fabrications About the 'Soviet Military Threat'"]

[Text] The rapid perestroyka processes in the Soviet Union and the tumultuous changes in the countries of East Europe have considerably lowered the level of confrontation between the two opposing military political alliances—the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The USSR is consistently carrying out unilateral reductions of its own Armed Forces. The Soviet Government Statement reaffirmed our dedication to the idea of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from other countries' territories and the elimination of all military bases on foreign territories.

At the Vienna seminar in January to compare Warsaw Pact and NATO military doctrines, Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, noted that 50,320 men, 3,188 tanks, 768 guns, and 350 combat aircraft had been withdrawn from groups of forces in Mongolia. Three tank divisions, strike aircraft units, ground assault, river-crossing, and other units have been withdrawn from Warsaw Pact countries together with their armaments and combat equipment.

But some officials in the West are continuing to think in confrontational cliches. They view the prospects of easing military confrontation from the standpoint of gaining one-sided advantages and military superiority. Why else would General J. Galvin, supreme allied commander, Europe, need to brandish the "Soviet military threat" again, delivering a report "on the situation in Europe" in the U.S. Congress?

In his speech the general claimed that the Soviet Union is producing twice as much military equipment, including armor, as the United States and has not reduced its supplies of modern weapon systems to the forces. He voiced "concern and alarm" that the USSR is supposedly reducing only "insignificantly" the combat potential of its Armed Forces, which still possess the mobility and capability to move quickly over great distances. J. Galvin said that it was necessary to have adequate nuclear forces in the theater of war because the Soviet Union has many times more of this type of armaments.

General J. Galvin is not alone in his views. U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney, addressing the Senate Armed Services Committee, said: "...The foundation of U.S. strategy must be long-term. We do not believe that radical changes are required or justified at the present stage." This thinking, which continues to be based on the theses of the NATO "flexible response" strategy and the "forward defense" concept, fails to take account of the changes in the military-political situation in Europe and the realities of a changing world.

These realities are visible in many spheres in the Soviet Union, including the military sphere. It would be naive to say the least for the Soviet Union, while unilaterally cutting the tank and artillery pools in Europe by 10,000 and 8,500 units respectively, to increase their production and delivery to the forces. The reduction in overall expenditure on defense in 1990 was 8.2 percent compared with last year. Purchases of armaments and military equipment fell by 4.8 percent. Compared with the figures planned earlier, in 1990 the production of weapons and equipment will be reduced by 19.5 percent, supplies of tanks will be more than halved, and ammunition supplies will be cut by 20 percent.

The course of reducing armaments, particularly limiting new weapon developments, has made it possible to halt the implementation of more than 100 planning and design and around 50 scientific research studies. As a result it has been possible to cut expenditure on scientific research and planning and design work by 15 percent in 1990.

We appreciated the West's concern about the Warsaw Pact's superiority in tactical missiles. In order to eliminate this concern the Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew 500 tactical nuclear warheads from the territories of its allies and confirmed its willingness to withdraw them all if the United States took a similar step.

In our military activity we are strictly guided by the demands of a defensive doctrine. The operational training of our Armed Forces is strictly defensive. Since the announcement of the unilateral reduction of Armed Forces we have reduced the number of operational-tactical exercises of all types by more than two-thirds. In 1989 we did not carry out a single operational exercise involving coalition forces on the territory of East Europe.

The NATO command knows all this, and so does the U.S. Administration. During the Vienna discussion of Warsaw Pact and NATO military doctrines our military delegation reported in detail on the work we are doing to reduce the Armed Forces, on their structure, aims, training, and military expenditure.

At the same time, the Soviet military delegation noted that we are concerned about the war danger resulting from the annual NATO "Autumn Forge" exercises. It includes 20 major exercises, involving mopre than 200,000 personnel, around 2,000 tanks and aircraft, and over 500 ships. These exercises are not just a show of strength; they are also a form of covert deployment of NATO armed forces. And what is the reason for the regular major transfer of reinforcements from the United States to Europe by air and sea? What is the danger posed by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact? In fact, it is these maneuvers by troops and forces that are dangerous and cannot always be correctly identified. It is hard to distinguish them from actual deployment of NATO combined armed forces. Indeed, strategic aircraft and naval groupings are involved in these exercises.

In an interview for NBC television last December, Defense Secretary R. Cheney said: "...I believe it is necessary to maintain combat-capable forces, even if there is no need to worry about the Soviet threat." So, as we can see, it is not a matter of the mythical "Soviet military threat" at all.

Assuming the role of guarantor of "freedom and democracy" in the world arena, Washington is trying to use the "Soviet military threat" fabrication as an argument in favor of the major military appropriations requested by the administration. While welcoming the process of arms limitation and even declaring its willingness to "significantly" reduce military expenditure, the administration is proposing a draft military budget for Fiscal Year 1991 which shows a reduction of only 1.3 percent compared with the previous fiscal year. And that at a time when our country is planning to cut its military budget by 14 percent in the next two years.

The main feature of the draft new U.S. military budget is backing for the most expensive military programs ensuring the rapid growth of the country's military potential through the development of qualitatively new weapon systems and military technology. The plan is to increase funds for the development of the triad of strategic nuclear forces which are the foundation for the "deterrence" strategy. Expenditure on SDI will increase by nearly $1 billion. The trivial reduction in the budget section concerned really only affects the ground forces, where it is planned to cut the program for purchases of certain models of armaments and military equipment and channel the funds into the development of the weapon systems of the future.

Significant funds go to the naval forces, which constitute one-third of the U.S. Armed Forces' potential, as the least subject to the risk of control and reduction. But why does the United States need such a large naval combat potential? The answer to this question can be found in U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney's speech at the Senate Armed Services Committee in February: "We have always tried and, I believe, we are still trying to stress the importance of superiority at sea and control of the oceans. And, of course, we have demanded and sought to ensure that our forces can react to various situations in various parts of the world."

It is perfectly clear that the "deterrent force," the buildup of the combat potential of forces to be air- and sea-lifted, the military bases outside the United States with stocks of material and technical facilities, and the powerful navy are needed in order to implement these designs. That is why the myth of the "Soviet military threat" is being employed again.

Bessmertnykh Holds Talks With U.S. Ambassador

LD2302213590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1802 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 23 Feb (TASS)—Today Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, received U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock at his request.

Their conversation touched on specific aspects of the further development of the Soviet-U.S. political dialogue, and also certain international problems, in particular the prospects of holding a number of European forums, in the first place a meeting in 1990 of the leaders of the participating countries of the common European process.

Armenia Welcomes U.S. Consulate Proposal

NC2202132690 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 19 Feb (ARMENPRES)—Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, has received U.S. Congressman Wayne Owens, a member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, who is on a visit to Armenia.

Vaagn Ovanesyan, a director of the "Armenian Association of the United States," and Daniel Abramyan, public activist and businessman, are accompanying W. Owens during his visit to Armenia. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Markaryants, chairman of the Armenian SSR Council of Ministers, also received Wayne Owens, Vaagn Ovanesyan, and Daniel Abramyan.

The economic situation in the republic in the aftermath of the earthquake, the mass deportation of the Armenian population from Azerbaijan, and issues related to the blockade organized by that neighboring republic were discussed.

Wayne Owens, who also visited Leninakan and Spitak, said that he was shocked not only by the extent of the natural disaster but also by the particularly monstrous acts committed by Azerbaijan at such a calamitous times for Armenia. He said that he was convinced the assistance provided to Armenia by the United States was insufficient and that he would work to make that assistance more productive upon his return home.

V. Markaryants expressed sincere thanks to the American people, their President, Mr. G. Bush, and U.S Ambassador Mr. Jack Matlock for the concern shown over the fate of Armenia and its people.

He briefed the guests on the prevailing situation in the republic, the serious shortcomings in the implementation of plans as a result of the blockade of transportation routes by the Azerbaijani extremists, and ways to overcome the grave situation.

The American congressman spoke in extremely positive manner about the Armenians with many of whose representatives he maintains cordial relations.

He said that hundreds of thousands of Armenians live in the United States and are engaged in productive activity; many of them have relatives in Armenia. Therefore, we would like to open a consulate in Yerevan which help consolidate ties among the dispersed Armenian people and play a positive role in reviving the earthquake-devastated national economy and organizing productive assistance to Armenia.

The proposal was received with satisfaction.

While in Yerevan Wayne Owens placed flowers at the 1915 genocide monument and saw the exhibition at the Matenadaran ancient manuscripts depository.

The guest also visited Edzhmiatsin where he was received by Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians Vazgen I.

Anatoliy Mkrtchyan, foreign affairs minister of Armenian SSR, also held a meeting with the congressman.

Wayne Owens has left Yerevan.

Miners' Hold News Conference After U.S. Visit

904F0076A Moscow TRUD in Russian
30 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by V. Sisnev: "Press Conference at the AFL-CIO"]

[Text] At the end of a month-long visit by a group of Soviet miners invited to the United States by the state information agency (USIA) and the AFL-CIO, the American trade-union center, a press conference was held for American and foreign journalists in the Washington office of the latter organization. But like everything involving the visit of the nine mining engineers, who were representing the strike committees of a number of coal basins, this rather common event took on, I would say, an almost mystical character.

In any case, this TRUD correspondent ended up at it thanks only to his own intuition. From the very beginning of the miners' visit to the United States, the information department of the AFL-CIO began as a rule to answer "we do not know" to questions from Soviet journalists or to escape to unannounced meetings. But when I asked for the time of the press conference, I was given an exact answer: Friday, 26 January at 10:30 am.

But something urged me to drive to the AFL-CIO 30 minutes early. And I entered the hall for the press conference just as L. Kirkland, president of the trade-union center, had begun to make his opening remarks.

What then, in the opinion of the leadership of the American trade-union center, are the results of this unique visit? The AFL-CIO, which for many years has refused to invite not only official trade union delegations from the USSR but even groups of ordinary working people, on this occasion stepped into the role of gracious host: It organized a trip to several states and numerous meetings for our mining engineers.

The communique received by journalists said that the Soviet mining engineers would be going home "having initiated the aid that they had requested and received from the AFL-CIO—various technical means and equipment for accounting, planning, and analysis of operations. At the same time the AFL-CIO allotted $25,000 to establish an 'Aid fund for the workers of Eastern Europe' and called upon the branch trade unions and all of their members to make contributions to that fund." In addition, the communique cited the following words from Kirkland: "We have helped to make history with our 'Fund to help the Polish workers,' which provided material aid to Lech Walesa and 'Solidarity.' Now after the success of 'Solidarity' comes the development of a free trade-union movement in a vitally important part of the world."

It is also reported that, apart from collecting and presenting funds, the AFL-CIO intended to grant aid for the purpose of training cadres, designing special programs for communication between trade unions, and, in general, for everything necessary "to independent trade unions in Eastern Europe and the USSR." As for the speech that took place at the press conference, the leader of the AFL-CIO declared that the organization had taken "a historic responsibility" upon itself by stimulating the development of "genuine trade unions." "The Soviet mining engineers," he said, "asked us for aid, and we intend to fulfill their request at the maximum possible levels."

It must be noted that only five of the nine members of the mining engineers' group were present at the press conference.

In answer to a question of mine at the end of the official press conference, L. Kirkland said that the AFL-CIO would maintain its negative stance on the issue of ties to trade unions belonging to the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions].

Northeast Asia

Mongolia Agrees to Complete Troop Withdrawal

LD0203043190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0405 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 2 March. (TASS)—By agreement between the USSR Government and the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic] Government, the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia will be effected in 1991-1992. Moreover, the main combat strength of the Soviet troops will be withdrawn in 1991, and the military units ensuring the removal of materiel in 1992.

Batmonh Receives Delegation

LD0203050290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0425 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Ulaanbaatar 2 March (TASS)—Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP [Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party] Central Committee and chairman of the presidium of the MPR People's Great Hural, has received the Soviet delegation that attended the Soviet-Mongolian talks on the time scale and procedures for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia. The talks were completed today in Ulaanbaatar.

By agreement between the USSR Government and the MPR Government, the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Mongolia will be effected in 1991-1992.

Founding of Mongolian Democratic Union Viewed

LD2202204290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 22 Feb 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent T. Lordkipanidze in Ulaanbaatar]

[Text] [Announcer Aleksandr Krutov] Our next reportage comes from Mongolia, where a new independent political movement, the Mongolian Democratic Union [MDU], has been set up. Our correspondent reports on the constituent congress of the Union:

[Lordkipanidze] The delegates approved the rules and program of the Union, and greeted with stormy applause the news of the formation of the Mongolian Democratic Party, whose main aim is to establish a multiparty system in the country.

I listened to ardent speeches of passionate conviction by the congress delegates and made selective entries in my notebook: Our revolution is mortally dangerous for bureaucracy. It is a powerful popular wave which will sweep away unjust set-ups and unlawful privileges. We have ardently supported the restructuring put forward by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, but life has shown that the ways and methods by which it is being pursued will not bring about revolutionary changes in socioeconomic policy. This is undermining the people's trust and hopes. We proceed from the position that true socialism is, in comparison with capitalism, a higher level of civilization capable of providing the individual with a fitting life, political liberty and an opportunity for all-round development and spiritual flourishing. [video shows congress delegates, speakers at rostrum and panning shot of those on platform]

[Begin recording of S. Dzorig, Mongolian Democratic Union coordinator, in Mongolian with superimposed Russian translation] We are aware that in the majority of districts and towns working people's rallies are being held in support of our congress and the goals that the MDU is setting itself; and these are being pursued by perestroyka in your country, too. This is stated in a telegram that we have dispatched to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. [end recording]

[Krutov] I would add to that reportage from Mongolia that in accordance with insistent requests from the Mongolian public, the last monument to Stalin was today dismantled in Ulaanbaatar. The same day a thematic display opened at the Museum of the Revolution entitled "History Will Not Forget Their Names." It is dedicated to the memory of the victims of the repressions in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s.

Commentaries on Defense Secretary Cheney's Tour

Japan Visit

OW2602152890 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Commentary by Moscow Radio military commentator Kalinin on visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney to Japan—read by announcer]

[Text] The visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney to Japan is drawing attention because he is making the visit under the circumstance that tensions in East-West relations are conspicuously relaxing. The question is: How will forward-looking changes in East-West relations affect Japan-U.S. military cooperation? In view of reports obtained, however, we feel even wary of raising such a question. Participants to talks in Tokyo appeared frozen solid at times and gave the impression that they were still in the cold war era. Discussing the world's military and strategic situation, for example, they expressed the view that the Soviet threat in Asia remains unchanged. Defense Agency Director General Matsumoto proposed that Western nations should put pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in the Far East. We cannot but be puzzled at this appraisal and proposal. It is well known that the Soviet Union has unilaterally reduced 40,000 troops in the Far East and reorganized the remaining troops in the region to give them only a defensive assignment. The Soviet Union has also reduced the number of ships assigned to the Pacific Fleet and restricted the size of and frequency of maneuvers. At the same time, it has largely scaled down its military presence in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and almost completed abolishing intermediate and short range nuclear missiles.

If they talk about the Soviet threat despite their knowledge of this fact, it represents nothing but their aim to justify their military buildup against public opinion. Perhaps, U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney and Defense Agency Director General Matsumoto have this fact in mind. The two talked about the issue of further expanding military cooperation between Japan and the United States. For example, the two agreed positively to use Japan's science and technology for the development of modern weapons. In this connection, what draws our attention is that a governmental committee meeting on military technology was held in Tokyo during Defense Secretary Cheney's visit to Japan. At the meeting, a decision was made to provide Japan's military technology to the United States for the joint Japan-U.S. development of the next-generation support fighter, the FSX. In the future, Japan will supply the United States with 23 items of advanced technology to that end.

Japan expressed its intent to increase burden sharing for the maintenance of U.S. military bases in Japan, and we cannot overlook this. Japan previously had taken the burden of half of total wages for Japanese employees working at the bases, but it currently takes the burden of all of their wages, amounting to $2.8 billion. However, the U.S. side is asking Japan to take the burden of all maintenance costs for U.S. military bases in Japan except for salaries of American soldiers. If Japan takes the burden of these maintenance costs, it will amount to $4.5 billion. Therefore, Japan's military spending is expected to sharply increase in the near future.

What I want to call your attention to before closing my commentary is the issue of reducing U.S. troops in Japan. Regarding this issue, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that U.S. troops in Japan would be cut by between 5,000 and 6,000. However, we should pay attention to the fact that troops to be cut are mainly those working at public affairs units; it is not planned to dismantle any military bases and substantially cut combat troops. As Defense Agency Director General Matsumoto has previously stated, the planned cuts in U.S. troops in Japan will not lead to weakening combat strength of U.S. forces in Japan. Rather, the United States plans to make qualitative improvement in U.S. forces in Japan. All of these aspects provide the ground for arguing that the visit by Defense Secretary Cheney to Japan represents a step toward deepening military cooperation between the two countries. To be sure, these moves run against the trend of relaxing tensions in the Asia and Pacific region.

Seoul Visit

SK2502004790 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Text] In the course of his visit to the Asian and Pacific area, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney stopped in Seoul, Korea.

Station military commentator (Sergey Brezhkov) notes some new aspects resulting from U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney's talks with South Korean President No Tae-u and Defense Minister Yi Sang-hun.

The South Korean Administration has showed an affirmative response, for the first time, to the plan of the United States to partly reduce its (?43,000 troops) in the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

What is referred to in this plan is the question of withdrawing only (?2,000) support servicemen and the question of discontinuing the operations of three air force bases. What is more, this decision, which will begin to be implemented this October, will be delayed until July 1992.

With regard to the consequences of reduction, the Pentagon leader promised without delay to also supply South Korea with F-16 fighter-bombers and new aircraft.

Pragmatism is clearly perceptible in this stand of the Pentagon. This can be fully understood.

When the majority of the U.S. congressmen view the reduction of U.S. military spending as necessary, the Pentagon can do nothing but cut expenditures in carrying out its strategy toward Asia and the Pacific.

The Pentagon spends $50 billion in maintaining 330,000 U.S. troops in this area.

In the course of his visit to Seoul, U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney demanded that Seoul take on a considerable share of the financial burden of maintaining U.S. troops in the southern half of the Korean peninsula.

According to (?Cheney's) views, this share amounts to from $300 million to $680 million. This amount is in additional to $2 billion of rent which the South Korean Government [words indistinct].

The cutting of U.S. troops in South Korea is not only caused by a material factor, but also by changes in relations between the East and the West.

This measure of Washington is never a [word indistinct] gambling in connection with Soviet reduction of its troops by more than 200,000 in the Asian area.

Secretary Cheney's remarks that the United States has no intention of giving up its [words indistinct] on Air Force bases in the Pacific area should not be forgotten. How well this stand conforms to the demands of the current situation is a different question.

In the magazine [name indistinct], (Jellis Andrey), who works at the University of California, said that just because tens of thousands of U.S. troops are stationed in Seoul or Manila, security in Asia is not necessarily solidified. An attempt to challenge this [words indistinct] fuels anti-U.S. sentiments and [words indistinct].

Though the conditions for withdrawing the U.S. troops at once from South Korea have not yet matured, thinking of drastically cutting them absolutely makes sense.

As shown by the visit to South Korea by the U.S. secretary of defense, neither Washington nor Seoul thinks of this point.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentators Examine Situation in Cambodia

Outcome of Jakarta Meeting Viewed

BK0203064590 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1500 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] Many observers view the informal meeting on Cambodia in Jakarta, which ended on the last day of February, as having produced no significant results. We agree to such view. A final document was not issued, and, in this connection, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas voiced his regrets at a press conference.

The cause of this situation was the differences of opinion among the four Cambodian factions who were unable to reach a compromise during the sessions. As was evident outside the conference hall in Jakarta, conflicting views prevailed over a 17-clause draft final document on the UN role in solving the Cambodian problem.

Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who initiated the proposal on the UN role, voiced his views in a straightforward manner. During an interview with Radio Australia, Evans said the Khmer Rouge had played a major destructive role at the informal meeting. In addition, the differences of opinion, which had thwarted the issuance of a final document, concerned primarily with secondary issues, not primary ones. However, a conclusion can be made that the Jakarta meeting was not held in vain. He pointed out that the mechanism of talks, stalled since the Paris conference, had been reactivated for the time being. This enabled the warring factions to explain their views and seek mutual understanding on certain issues. There are reasons to hope that dialogues will continue and the Paris international conference on Cambodia, stalled since last August, will resume.

Nobody doubts the fact that the Cambodian problem cannot be solved in the battlefields. We want to recall the time when preparations for the Jakarta meeting were still under way, the Cambodian factions had agreed to the presence of an interim UN administration, which will monitor and supervise the implementation of agreements as well as holding free and democratic elections. These key issues can be discussed again if dialogues should resume again in Paris or any other venue.

Careful attention should also be given to the issue of maintaining the two Cambodian governments during the transition period. Under no circumstances should the evil genocidal clique be allowed to return to power. The issue of the Cambodian seat at the United Nations should also demand our attention. There are simply too many problems, both minor and major ones, to be solved now. There are indeed well-meaning people who want to help in the negotiation process, for example Indonesia, which has exerted so much efforts that concrete progress can be made.

At present, the Cambodian factions must present their views, but unfortunately some of their representatives are not in a hurry to make compromises while, in fact, the solution to the conflict, which has affected the region for the last 11 years, solely depends on their actions.

Pre-Jakarta Meeting Hopes Expressed

BK2502150890 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Text] On Monday, 26 February, the representatives of the Cambodian Government, the three Cambodian resistance groups, Vietnam, ASEAN countries, and Australia will meet in Jakarta in order to discuss the prospects of the peaceful solution to the Cambodian conflict. Our commentator, Oleg Shchedrov has the following comments:

We want to be optimistic. There has been a detailed plan for involving the United Nations in the solution to the Cambodian problem. This plan was initiated by Australian Foreign Minister Evans and has been generally supported by all parties concerned. The recent exchange of views among the five standing members of the UN Security Council showed that the world community is officially prepared to stimulate the process for peace in Cambodia.

Talks held between Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, and Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Bangkok on Wednesday are regarded as a step forward. The joint communique they signed defined, if not the nearness of their attitudes, at least the desire to listen to each other's opinions. However, we should be patient and careful in appraising the prospects of the coming meeting.

The Khmer Rouge, who have been condemned for genocidal crimes committed during their rule in Cambodia, remain the obstacle to a peaceful settlement. The Khmer Rouge have demanded an equal right to share power in the future Cambodia. Even their allies in the opposition do not want to promise to give them such a right. In response, the Khmer Rouge have threatened to kindle the flames of civil war.

Let me express my opinion that the success of the Jakarta meeting depends mostly on whether or not there will be a solution to these contrasting, complex positions. Judging from current developments, the other problems should be solved naturally through the working process.

Sihanouk's Role, Actions Pondered

OW1402114590 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Alekseyev commentary from the "Current Events and Commentaries" program]

[Text] You might have heard that Prince Sihanouk recently announced in Beijing that he plans to change the country's name from the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea to the Cambodian National Government. He has also decided to use Cambodia's traditional symbols. For example, the so-called Democratic Kampuchean national flag has been changed into a red and blue flag bearing the Khmer national victory symbol and the ancient Angkor Wat Temple. The old national anthem has also been readopted. What is behind all he has done? Alekseyev, our station observer, has the following comments:

The name Democratic Kampuchea prompts people who know the modern history of Cambodia to think of the bloody rule of the Khmer Rouge. The name was used by the Khmer Rouge regime that existed in the later half of the 1970's. The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which has been under Sihanouk's leadership for many years, has adopted that name and the Khmer Rouge regime's national banner. Now Sihanouk has decided to discard the name and banner. The reason that I said that Sihanouk was the leader of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea is that he formally resigned as head of the Coalition Government on 24 January. However, he still calls himself the leader of his country. Sihanouk's signature, as president of Cambodia, appeared on the statement he issued in Beijing. Sihanouk also announced that he plans to return to Cambodia in the near future in order to show his [words indistinct] to lead his country. Considering all this, how should we assess his decision to abandon the political powers and signs he has borrowed from the Khmer Rouge? How do we assess his decision to sever ties with the people who committed genocidal crimes in Cambodia? If he really does this, it would be a wise step. However, a new problem would arise: Will Sihanouk take part in settling the Cambodia issue? I am referring to implementing the proposal recently put forward by Australian Foreign Minister Evans. Evans proposes that, during the interim period, UN administrative organs perform a supervisory role in Cambodia. For example, under UN supervision, an election was held in Cambodia recently, and a new government was formed on the basis of election results.

ASEAN-EC Meeting Reviewed

BK2502050290 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Text] Following the ASEAN-EC meeting in Kuching, Malaysia, the member countries of the European Economic Community decided to stop supporting the Cambodian opposition coalition at the United Nations. Our commentator, Comrade Igor Lebedev, wrote the following article:

I wish to remind listeners that from 1979 to 1982, Cambodia's seat at this international body was occupied by the Pol Pot clique which was condemned for killing more than three million people. Since 1982, this seat has been given to the coalition government of the Cambodian opposition groups which have all along been under the Khmer Rouge. The UN representatives of this coalition have been recognized until now by the UN General Assembly.

At present, the situation in Cambodia has changed tremendously. All Vietnamese troops were withdrawn from Cambodia last September. The prestige of the government of the State of Cambodia has been enhanced appropriately. This explains why the European Parliament proposed in November 1989 that its members give de facto recognition to this government.

European Parliament's resolution which was adopted by majority vote also appealed to the EC foreign ministers to do anything possible to deprive the Pol Pot clique of its right to represent Cambodia at the United Nations and to take additional measures to isolate the Khmer Rouge diplomatically and militarily.

Mr. Hun Sen's government has been vigorously stabilized. His government has done much to restore the economy and improve the people's living standards. This is the opinion of 90 members of the Thai Parliament who recently sent a letter to their prime minister. In this letter, members of the Thai Parliament pointed out the measures to seek a solution to the Cambodian problem. In their opinion, the time has come for Thailand to adapt its policy on Cambodia to the realities.

In my opinion, this is a timely appeal in response to the goals of the search for a solution to the conflict in Cambodia. Pol Pot and his men must be mistaken to think that aid will flow to them profusely and unendingly. More people have dissociated themselves with the Pol Pot clique and turned to expand their relations with the State of Cambodia. Not long ago, representatives from Great Britain, France, and, later on, Australia, Canada, and Japan visited Phnom Penh. Many Asian countries have expressed their desire to give economic, technical, and financial aid to Cambodia.

All of this clearly shows that Phnom Penh's policy toward achieving national reconciliation and restoring peace in the country has helped enhance trust among the donor countries whose cooperation is promising.

Near East & South Asia

Commentary on Iran's Political Role in Near East

NC0902124690 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 9 Feb 90

[Unattributed political commentary]

[Text] Dear listeners, the Soviet Union's recent decision to transform the PLO representation in Moscow into the embassy of the Palestinian Government solved many problems on the outlook of Moscow's policy on the Near East. These problems emerged after the extensive reforms in East European countries and the Soviet

Union, which also had their effects on these countries' relations with countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, the process of reconstruction in the Soviet Union is making domestic exit-entry regulations conform to international standards. The Soviet Jews who wanted to go to the Soviet Union took advantage of this situation. Meanwhile, a doctrine of new political thought has been declared and is being implemented in the Soviet Union's foreign policy, and the objective of this doctrine is to seek peaceful ways to overcome regional conflicts on the basis of compromises acceptable to those involved.

This is very true as far as the Near East is concerned. The developments in the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies are extraordinary. Thus, some people in foreign countries want to exploit developments politically. For example, they claim that Moscow is deviating from its permanent and decisive support for a just struggle by the Palestinian nation. The transformation of the PLO representation in Moscow into the embassy of the Palestine Government is an answer to this. This decision was adopted after the Palestine Government was officially recognized by the Soviet Union last year.

Great value was attached to the Soviet Union's diplomatic initiative. In the message to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev from Yasir 'Arafat, Palestine's president and head of the PLO Executive Committee, it is stated that this important political step is fresh proof of the Soviet Union's continuous solidarity with the Palestinian nation in its just struggle to end Israeli occupation and to create an independent Palestinian Government.

The unaltered basic policy of the Soviet Union on the Near East was confirmed in talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi in Moscow. The Soviets emphasized that the basic path toward solving the Near East problem continues, as before, to be through forming a world conference with the participation of all the interested parties and the members of the UN Security Council.

Last year showed that it is now far more practical than it was a couple of years ago to hold such a conference amid the positive changes taking place in the world.

Numerous peace-seeking intiatives have been propounded such as the Palestinians' proposals, Shamir's plan, Husni Mubarak's 10-point plan, Eduard Shevardnadze's proposals, and Baker's plan.

We think that the decision by the Palestine National Council which has officially recognized Israel's right of existence, was the most interesting of all. The Council expressed its readiness to hold talks with Israel and to seek ways to form an independent Palestinian Government within the framework of a just and comprehensive solution of the Near East problem.

Unfortunately, Israel's officials did not react suitably to the Palestinians' constructive proposals. Nevertheless, active diplomatic efforts to facilitate solving the Near East problem are being carried out by the UN Security Council members such as the Soviet Union and some Arab countries. These efforts make some hope that Israel will alter its stand. Otherwise, the favorable conditions that have now been created to overcome the many years of conflicts in the Near East may be destroyed. For example, in some Palestinian circles in some Islamic countries, the wish to return to the former policy—that is, a firm policy—on Israel has increased, while returning to this policy has no future because the former firm policy only led to the exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Under the current conditions, the direct participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict should show more restraint than ever before so that the process of overcoming this conflict, signs of which have emerged, will not be delayed. Along with this is the need for the active and constructive participation of all countries that can help to solve the Near East problem. Undoubtedly Iran is one of these countries. Iran's large population, its potential economic strength, its strong traditional ties with some Arab countries, and its influence on many Islamic organizations are all important elements for the normalization of the Near East situation, especially since the Iranian leadership supports the return of all the territories occupied by Israel to the Arabs and the formation of an independent Palestinian Government. In other words, its stand is within the context of the basic principles of the normalization of the Near East situation, which the Arab countries are pursuing.

Possibilities for cooperation with Arab countries are becoming easier to envision after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire and the gradual mitigation of negative effects from the Iran-Iraq war on Iran's relations with Arab countries.

The normalization of Soviet-Iranian relations also plays a significant role in consolidating the process of normalizing the Near East situation. The normalization of the two countries' relations has not only led to the expansion of bilateral economic-commercial cooperation, but it has also led to increased talks on urgent international and regional problems, one of which is the Middle East problem.

The recent visit by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Mahmud Va'ezi to the Soviet Union is yet another proof of this. There is no doubt that Soviet-Iranian talks, which have always had a marked effect on the Near East problem, should bear good fruit.

Commentary Views Antigovernment Protests in Iran

NC2402132990 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 23 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Antiregime demonstrations which began in Tehran some days ago have spread to other Iranian cities. Citing sources linked to Iran's opposition circles, REUTER reported that demonstrators burned portraits of Iranian Government leaders. In Tabriz, Shiraz, and Hamadan, clashes took place between demonstrators and the security forces. In Esfahan the demonstrators set up barricades and dug trenches.

It has been observed that the disturbances in several Iranian cities occurred at a time when the country's media had launched an extensive propaganda campaign in support of the decree calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie, the British author of "The Satanic Verses" promulgated by the late Ayatollah Khomeyni. This campaign seeks to give the impression that the real dangers to Iranians stem from this book and that Iranians should have no cause for concern apart from the psychological war against this writer and his publishers.

However, the fires of agitation that have been lit prove that this is not the case and that the people's discontent stems from the absence of democracy, the low standard of living, and the lack of public safety, which are tangible and real problems. It is the inability to resolve these problems which is responsible for the domestic instability in Iran and which has sparked the violence and disorder in this country.

Who are the people obstructing the solution of the country's real and tangible problems? Some of them are avid supporters of the clergy's monopoly of power and of the rule of the (?oppressed) in Iranian society. The new Iranian leadership has adopted certain measures to draw clearer lines of demarcation among the centers of power in the country. It has been said that the clerics will provide moral guidance while control of economic and political matters will be left to technocratic experts.

Even this small step to modernize and liberalize Iran encountered vehement opposition from the fundamentalists. Moral leadership does not seem to be enough for them. In other words, they want to strenghten their control of the thoughts and deeds of the people to safeguard their own privileges and enhance their material comfort. This appears to be the reason that the movement by those who advocate the export of the Islamic revolution is gaining momentum. They are resorting to various pretexts which can take the form of the anti-Islamic contents of a book or events in Transcaucasia or Central Asia. Sometimes the pretext is the situation in Afghanistan, India, or Turkey.

At the same time they banish an intelligent thinker like Ayatollah Montazeri from their midst. This intelligent man considers Islam an instrument for consolidating peace and social equilibrium. By dangling imaginary dangers before the people and inspiring fear in them, by fanning the flames of prejudice and contention, the fundamentalists seek to evade responsibility for the deep economic and social crises in the country and obstruct positive developments in the life of Iran.

However, the recent protests by the people show that these efforts will only end in failure.

Andreyev Comments on Demonstrations in Iran

NC2502092190 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Respectable listeners, the antistate demonstrations that started in Tehran a few days ago spread to Iran's various cities this week. Clashes took place in Tabriz, Shiraz, and Hamadan between demonstrators and security forces that had been sent there to disperse them. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes on this:

Reports downplaying antistate demonstrations in Iran have been published for some time now. Late last year, all the world's news agencies reported on bloody clashes between Iranian students and police. At that time, Iran's Supreme Council for National Security met to discuss ways to crush the student demonstrations. In January this year, the situation in Najafabad and Esfahan was seriously exacerbated, and a general campaign calling for civil disobedience was organized in these cities. Bazaar merchants and shopowners closed down their shops for four hours for some days and thus expressed their support for Ayatollah Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri. This religious dignitary was stripped of all his governmental positions some time before Imam Khomeyni's death. He is well-known as a supporter of political liberalism and constantly criticizes Iran's current leadership very strongly. It is sufficient to say that he describes Iran as a country of murderers, and the country's leaders as traitors.

In mid-February, antistate spirit was rekindled in Iran. Reports by opposition organizations indicated that bloody clashes took place on 16 February in Tehran between security forces and tens of thousands of antiregime demonstrators who started to set fire to cars and buses once the security forces opened fire on them.

The unrest in the streets of central and west Tehran started in the morning and continued until six in the afternoon. The antistate demonstrators were calling for the current leadership to resign. Armed forces used arms and tear gas to disperse the demonstrations.

It is interesting to note that the Islamic Republic's Government confirmed that demonstrations had taken place in Tehran on 16 February but said that they were a protest by soccer fans about the cancellation of two soccer games. However, this allegation is seriously doubted. Suffice it to say that two days after the unrest in Tehran, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, head of the Islamic Republic's judiciary branch, held special consultations with the general prosecutor, the justice minister, and several high-ranking judiciary officials. During these consultations it was pointed out that the Iranian Government will adopt the most decisive and severe measures against those who threaten the country's national security. Meanwhile, it was explicitly stated that the Tehran unrest inflicts blows on national security.

However, the antistate demonstrations spread to other cities from Tehran. Clashes took place in Tabriz, Shiraz, and Hamadan between demonstrators and security forces that had been sent there to disperse them. REUTER reported that the participants in the demonstrations and massive rallies set fire to the pictures of government leaders. The demonstrators set up barricades in the center of Esfahan and confronted the government officials' efforts to suppress the protests.

It is very clear today that the unrest in Iran is of a political nature. The demonstrators voice anti-state slogans and demand democratic freedoms. As we know, political life in Iran today is under strict state control. A program for Islamic growth has been introduced in the country, while other social trends are being suppressed.

However, as the recent incidents showed, Islamic unity is ephemeral, and the political alternative before the current Iranian regime is gradually finding its own way. A variety of forces—from the supporters of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization to monarchists—are reportedly participating in the recent agitation in Iran. All of them are demanding freedom and oppose political and religious rules that have been imposed by force.

Possibly, in these sensitive moments, the Majlis deputies—who were issuing directives to the Soviet Government only a few days ago—are remembering the words in their letter. In this letter they said that the time when the suppression of masses was a policy ended a long time ago.

Three New Political Parties Licensed in Tehran

NC2102135790 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Iranian Interior MInistry officially issued licenses for three new political parties. These parties are the Islamic Association of Graduates from the Indo-Pakistani Sub-Continent, the Islamic Guidance Party, and the Society of Zoroastrians.

Our commentator writes: The licenses for these three new political parties were issued 24 hours after Islamic Revolution Guards opened fire on antistate demonstrators. REUTER, citing a statement from Iran's (?opposition) organization, said the demonstrations started during a soccer game at one of Tehran's stadiums and then spread to the streets. Because of the use of arms by the Islamic Revolution Guards, dozens including an 11-year old boy, were wounded and a large number of people were arrested.

These two incidents illustrate the Inran's complicated political situation, caused by the clergy's monopoly on rulership. The [word indistinct] has to take into account the people's desire for political democracy, which is echoed by many generations of Iranians.

Only a year or so ago, the Iranian interior minister presented a decision on the conditions for activities of political parties. The Interior Ministry's statement said that people and groups wanting to form new parties and organizations were requested to submit their requests by a given deadline so that these requests could be studied and assessed by the competent organs. (?A similar request) was also addressed to parties and organizations which had existed unoffcially for a long time. This was taken by the mass media as a turn by the regime toward the true democratization of the country. But they could not see that democratization cannot be limited to the licensing of puppet parties and organizations which can never play the role of opposition against the regime.

The Iranian officials promised the people that they sincerely want to rennovate Iran's political life and, according to them, a multiparty system would ensure the people's alertness and would improve society. They even went so far as to say that they accepted a nonconformity of the views of specific parties with the views of the Islamic Republic within the framework of the new political system. However, in practice, the suppression of people with differing views continued.

I think that the contradiction of the leaders' promises with the people's expectations is the motive behind the [word indistinct] of tension in the Iranian society. The absence of true political freedom gives rise to dissatisfaction and rage among the people which can (?explode) with the smallest excuse.

This is what happened on Friday after the soccer game in the stadium. Another similar incident took place recently with the arrival of Galindo Pohl, expert in international law. However, we will not go into other similar incidents.

Only a policy aimed at democratizing the society can truly ease the domestic tension.

Iranian Leaders Urge Restraint for Soviet Muslims

TA2102193490 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan 1500 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Sergey Viktorov commentary from "The World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners: A report from Tehran indicates that some 180 deputies of the Iranian Majlis called on the Soviet Union to show restraint toward what they claimed are the natural demands of Soviet Muslims. We now draw your attention to a commentary in this connection by our analyst, Sergey Viktorov:

Dear Afghan friends, greetings to you. The message by Iranian parliamentarians addressed to the Soviet leadership, the text of which has been published in Tehran, contains such a call. Moreover, they also want Soviet officials to view with understanding the demands of Muslims throughout the Soviet Union.

All this is incomprehensible. For example, what does the call for a correct attitude toward the demands of Soviet Muslims mean? What sort of demands are they? Has the legitimate right of Muslims to observe Islam been violated in the Soviet Union? On the contrary, in the current climate of perestroyka, Soviet Muslims enjoy more facilities in this regard. New mosques and schools are being opened. Reference is not only to Transcaucasia and Central Asia, which are regarded as traditionally Islamic areas, but also to Russia. Even in Moscow and around the city of Gorkiy, situated in the central part of Russia, where the number of Muslims is very small, new mosques will be built. But there is a strong possibility that the recent events in Baku and Dushanbe, the capital of Soviet Tajikistan, were probably taken into consideration in the letter of the Iranian parliamentarians, and can be found behind such general terms as the natural demands of Muslims. If this is in fact the case, then it is necessary to discuss the matter.

For example, one must ask: Against whom did army units and internal forces act in Baku, and last week in Dushanbe? Did they act against Muslims? No. If one speaks specifically about Dushanbe, it can be said that the troops acted only against killers and looters. It should be pointed out that no Islamic slogans were observed in the rallies there. Of course, in my opinion the slogan about the establishment of a certain Islamic state between Baghdad and Samarkand, broadcast by a foreign radio, is not serious. In our country this was not regarded as a serious slogan by [words indistinct]. Instead, the unbridled masses set fire to public buildings, looted shops, and set ablaze hospitals and transportation facilities. Therefore, which demands of Muslims can one talk about?

Moreover, Ghazi Haj Akbar Turajanzadeh, leader of the Muslims of Tajikistan, in an interview with Soviet television said frankly that Islam and the (?inhabitants) of Tajikistan have no connection with the recent events in Dushanbe. As is common knowledge, killers, looters, and arsonists, irrespective of their religious affiliations, are regarded as criminals in the countries of the world.

Thus it can be said that the call by Iranian parliamentarians on showing restraint has not been sent to the right address. Should it be necessary to call on someone to show restraint, then such a call should be addressed to those whose minds have been blurred by (?corruption) and radical slogans.

Iranian Campaign Against Rushdie Condemned

NC2202112490 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 21 Feb 90

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The matter of Iran and Salman Rushdie has now entered its second year. The war being waged with obstinacy and obduracy by the leadership of a large country against one person is truly amazing. It makes it seem as though there were no other important problems in Iran requiring immediate attention.

This time, all Iranian publications carried a message from Ayatollah Yazdi, head of the Iranian judiciary, to all the Muslims of the world. Yazdi once again endorsed the legitimacy and justification of the late Imam Khomeyni's decree on killing Salman Rushdie for his work "The Satanic Verses." Had this decree not been issued, it is likely that (?most) Muslims and Christians would not even have aware of the book's existence. However, Rushdie can now be considered the best-known author, if not the most widely read.

The (?Iranian) propaganda has had the most extraordinary effect. Had there been no mention of the killing of a human being, this entire campaign against Rushdie could have been regarded as merely astonishing and strange. However (?in practice), the late Khomeyni was not given to (?jesting) and he left a request that the decree not be taken lightly. He decreed that the writer should be killed and considered this imperative for certain reasons, especially as the decree was publicized with great fanfare and pomposity and raisied an uproar all over the world through the superstitious worshippers who were seized by paranoia.

We must ask ourselves: Who gave the head of a government the right to condemn or impeach a citizen of another country, even if he was guilty of committing a crime? In seats of Islamic learning, such as the Al-Azhar, both the nature and form of Ayatollah Khomeyni's decree were condemned.

The campaign against Rushdie had less to do with literature or religion than with politics. Such a campaign could not have been initiated earlier, when the war was in progress and it was possible to blame all Iran's woes and problems on it. However, once the war ended and the schemes of the satanic Saddam lost their popularity and were relegated to secondary importance, the need for a new political opiate for the masses and a new image for the enemy emerged. It was easier to call for crushing Rushdie than it was to revitalize the Iranian economy and fill the people's stomachs by curbing inflation.

The Muslims thus placed all responsibility for this disarray on the shoulders of the satanic Rushdie. It is because of his "Satanic Verses" that they shivered in the cold of winter, that they could not fill their children's stomachs. It is because of him that fathers, sons, and husbands cannot return from the fronts.

However, this only concerns Rushdie from the internal point of view in Iran. On the international scene, a few pro-Iranian groups, such as the Lebanese Hizballahis and the fundamentalists in Egypt, Kuwait, Algeria, and Tunisia, who clamor noisily and indulge in sporadic sniping, also needed a pretext to continue their activities. The Rushdie issue could not have provided a better—or worse—pretext. The issue, in fact, is one of expansionism and domineering on the part of the fundamentalists, who seek to establish an Islamic caliphate with its capital in Tehran.

Is there any need for asserting that this objective, whether in theory or practice, is inaccessible [word indistinct]? All this activity only does immense harm to Islam's credibility all over the world. There are many in the West who now identify Islam with pomposity and intransigence, when actually the entire course of Islamic history is an example of the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and the adherents of other faiths. It is interesting to wonder who gave the Islamic fundamentalists the right to speak on behalf of 1 billion Muslims.

Reportage on Development of Soviet-Israeli Ties

Prokofyev Commentary

TA1602174890 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Hebrew 1600 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Commentary by Dimitriy Prokofyev]

[Text] International news agencies have reported that Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov told reporters in Australia that the Soviet Union will be ready to resume diplomatic relations with Israel when the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is launched. The agencies regarded these remarks as a significant development in the Soviet stance on the issue of diplomatic ties with Israel.

It appears, therefore, that quite a number of new factors have emerged recently in the official Soviet approach, writes our commentator Dimitriy Prokofyev. Until very recently, Moscow made the resumption of ties contingent on the convening of a Middle East international conference, which it saw as the starting point of the Middle East process. Recently it became apparent, however, that while the concept of an international conference has remained a dream, the political process has reached a dead end.

In this context, an important development was noted in last week's Shevardnadze-Baker talks. In the news conference held after his talks with the U.S. secretary of state, Minister Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union unequivocally supports the U.S. proposals and the Egyptian mediation efforts aimed at promoting a direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

Undoubtedly, the international conference idea is still valid. To create a situation in which such a conference can be convened, however, an interim phase—that of direct negotiations—is apparently required in order to create an atmosphere of trust between the sides and to eliminate the problems which have so far prevented Israel from sitting at the international negotiating table.

Until recently, Jerusalem's well-known argument against participation in this forum has been the contention that the Soviet Union, along with the United States, would cochair such an international conference, although the Soviet Union does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Jewish state.

The situation seemed deadlocked. Due to several international circumstances, the Soviet Union was unable to resume its diplomatic relations with Israel before the political process was launched, while the political process could not be launched because the convening of an international conference was precluded by the absence of USSR-Israeli diplomatic relations.

I believe that the new Soviet approach reflected in Nikolay Ryzhkov's remarks in Australia and elsewhere opens new roads toward overcoming this problem. This means that the Middle East solution will be achieved in stages. The first stage will include a direct Israeli-Palestinian dialogue for the solution of bilateral problems. The second stage will be the resumption of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel and the creation of conditions for pursuing the political process in an international framework. In my opinion, this phase—the third—is inevitable, because at a certain stage, parties directly involved in the conflict will require international assurances.

Zaltorunskiy Commentary

LD2002230190 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Aleksiy Zaltorunskiy commentary: "Fruits of the Irresponsible Policies"]

[Text] How many times did the Arab media recently write with concern and even with condemnation about the so-called Soviet-Israeli rapprochement? The excuse for this was the consular contacts between the two countries and the arts and sports tours. There were some people who attached great political importance to these things. There were also rumors about restoring full political relations between the Soviet Union and Israel very soon. They even fixed the date for that as next March.

Aleksiy Zlatorunskiy says: It is significant that the source of these rumors is Israel itself or some Zionist organizations in the West. The reason is that the current Israeli administration is clearly trying to plant suspicion and distrust of Soviet policies, especially in the Arab countries. It is a well-known fact that one such attempt was the statement by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir about settling emigrants, including Soviet emigrants, in the occupied Arab territories. This political provocation led to huge reactions in the Arab world, which is completely natural.

The Soviet representatives presented the issue of Israeli illegal behavior to the UN Security Council, presented a memorandum to the head of the Israeli consular group in Moscow, and explained the Soviet stance to the Arab ambassadors to the Soviet Union.

However, it seems that Tel Aviv was not affected by these steps. There are still rumors crawling [as heard] from the Israeli capital saying the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union will take place soon. It was not by accident that the correspondent for the Soviet Government IZVESTIYA asked Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, whether there was any basis for such rumors. Eduard Shevardnadze replied that they were completely unfounded. It is true that we have taken some steps towards normalizing the situation, as we established consular, commercial, and economic relations with Israel. However the Israelis themselves have recently complicated the situation. By this I mean, Eduard Shevardnadze said, settling the emigrants from the Soviet Union in the occupied territories. These are completely unreasonable and irresponsible policies by Tel Aviv.

In conclusion, Aleksiy Zlatorunskiy says: We would like to draw the attention of listeners to the recent words of the Soviet foreign minister. He described the Israeli policies as unreasonable and irresponsible. In actual fact, whatever way we look at the aspects of Israeli policies in the Middle East, we will find this unreasonable and irresponsible character has always been in them. In spite of the emergence of circumstances suitable for achieving a firm and permanent peace in the region, a peace which secures the security of Israel itself, Israel is obstinately marching toward increasing the tension and rejects the reasonable proposals whatever their source might be. We can safely consider that any sign of goodwill from the Palestinians, or any other side, is considered in Israel as an invitation to continue the hardline policies or to make another political provocation.

However, such a road will never lead to anything good, as it only contains a danger threatening Israel before anybody else. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reminded us of this fact again.

Commentary Compares Afghanistan, Tajik Incidents

NC2202203690 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 22 Feb 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] After last week's tragic events, the situation in Dushanbe, the capital of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], is gradually getting back to normal. Steps are being taken to repair damages, identify persons responsible for the unrest, and prevent the repetition of such incidents.

Reactions to the Dushanbe incidents were interesting. The TEHRAN TIMES claimed that the Tajik problem was the outcome of the long years of suppression by the central government of the interests of the republic's residents. This newspaper sees the impact of the Afghanistan (?problem) on the explosion of rage in the Tajik capital and warns against the use of force to establish order. It says that a policy based on political talks and a peaceful solution of existing problems meets the interests of the Soviet Union. Our commentator writes on this:

I think that a healthy approach can be seen in the Tehran newspaper's reaction. However, at the same time, this reaction is coupled with empty views. I consider the warning that the problems between the central government and republics, and especially the social and economic problems of the Tajik SSR, should not be solved by force to be a correct and healthy view, even though this does not automatically ensure the success of the process of reconstruction. Here the important thing is not to confuse the steps that should be taken to stop arbitrariness and injustice by extremists who are trying to harm the process of reconstruction with the suppression of the national interests of Soviet republics. Actually, forces of the former era—that is, representatives of the illegal economy and clans—are trying to preserve a system that is obstructing the expression of the will of the Tajiks and other nationalities in the implementation of fruitful developments in the life of Tajikistan. The pattern of mutual relations among republics which took shape during the Stalin era is much favored by forces of the former era. This is why they instigate acts of violence.

The question that arises here is: What does the TEHRAN TIMES mean by Afghanistan's influence on the incidents in Dushanbe? The paper might be referring to the example of the armed Afghan opposition which is trying to overthrow Dr. Najibullah's government under the slogan of defending Islam. But, after all, no one in Afghanistan is threatening Islam. This applies to the Tajik SSR too. If this was not so, then (Haji Akbar Tajianzadeh), leader of the Tajik Muslims, would not have called on the masses in the capital, who had been urged on by the extremists, to maintain calm.

The TEHRAN TIMES might be wanting to play a role in spreading rumors on the readiness of the so-called Afghan Mujahidin to cross the Afghanistan border with the Soviet Union to help the arbitrary and cruel extremists. If this is so, then the commentary published in this newspaper can only be assessed as an act of adventurism and a provocation—a provocation designed to harm the good-neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Iran. But I want to assume that this was not the intention of the TEHRAN TIMES.

As for the hostile intentions of the so-called Mujahidin, it was because of such rumors that General (Markevitskiy), deputy commander of the Central Asian Border District, emphasized that increased activities have actually been seen on the part of the Afghan opposition on the other side of the border river. He said: We have enough military equipment and forces to guard the national border.

Soviet Delegation Visits Kabul, Discusses Trade

LD0103165890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1525 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Press release on "The Results of a Visit by a Soviet Delegation to Afghanistan"—TASS headline]

[Text] Kabul, 1 Mar (TASS)—At the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan a Soviet delegation led by I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Soviet section of the Soviet-Afghan standing intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, was in Kabul from 27 February to 1 March 1990.

The delegation was received by Dr. Najibullah, president of the Republic of Afghanistan and general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] Central Committee. During a conversation that took place in a warm, friendly, and businesslike atmosphere there was a discussion of matters relating to the situation in and concerning Afghanistan and the state of and prospects for Soviet-Afghan trade and economic relation.

The Afghan leader spoke in detail about the large amount of work being carried out by the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan in various areas for the purposes of halting the fratricidal war, achieving a political settlement, and creating conditions for the Afghan people's transition to a peaceful and creative toil. He noted that in the course of the year since the completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in exact compliance with the Geneva accords, the republican regime, combining consistency in implementing the policy of national reconciliation with firmness in repulsing the opposition's military onslaught, has convincingly demonstrated its stability and viability. As a result there is increasing support for the government from broad sections of Afghanistan's population and the process whereby many field commanders of the armed opposition are giving up their fight against state power is intensifying. The president stressed that Afghanistan's leadership intends to go on steadfastly pursuing its profoundly well-considered course of striving for a peaceful solution of the protracted conflict and the start of an all-Afghan dialogue involving all political forces without exception for the sake of the prosperity of an Afghanistan that is independent, nonaligned, friendly toward our neighbors, and neutral.

President Najibullah expressed gratitude for the constant attention that is being paid in the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, and for the disinterested assistance that is being given to the Afghan people at a difficult period of its history. He urged further development of mutually beneficial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Such cooperation, he said, is playing a decisive role in maintaining the industrial potential which has been created.

The Soviet side praised the political course of the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan headed by President Najibullah, which is directed toward achieving peace on Afghan soil as quickly as possible through mutually acceptable compromises and national unity. A firm foundation for initiating a broad intra-Afghan dialogue is provided by the package of constructive and flexible proposals put forward by the leadership of Afghanistan with the aim of finding a just political solution of the Afghan problem. It was also confirmed that the Soviet Union, true to its principled stand in relation to Afghanistan, will continue to give political and moral support to the Afghan people and to develop cooperation with that country in accordance with the bilateral agreements and obligations.

At talks with S.A. Keshtmand, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Afghanistan, and with S. Mangal, deputy prime minister of the Republic of Afghanistan and chairman of the Afghan part of the permanent intergovernmental Soviet-Afghan Commission on Economic Cooperation, comprehensive consideration was given to issues of the state and prospects of Soviet-Afghan commercial and economic cooperation and proposals for stepping it up. In particular, emphasis was laid on the great importance of such cooperation in intensifying at the present time the work of the road transportation enterprises in carrying economic and foreign- trade freight and in speeding up the construction of a number of installations at the port of Heiraton [name as received] and in Kabul, as well as in northern regions of Afghanistan.

It was noted that particular attention is being devoted by the sides to the development of cooperation in the Afghan private sector, as well as the deepening of mutually advantageous relations established between Afghan provinces and the Soviet republics.

The prospects for and long-term nature of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan have been set out in a long-term program of economic, technical, and commercial cooperation up to the year 2000, which provides for the setting up of such important projects for the country's economy and the development of its export potential as gasfields and gas pipelines, the Aynak and Sangilyan mine-enrichment combines, a potassium fertilizer factory, agricultural cooperatives, railway construction, and many others.

The Afghan side made it known that it will embark in the very near future on preparing an idea for rebuilding and developing the Afghan national economy which bearing in mind the long-term program, will provide for a section on mutually advantageous Afghan-Soviet trade and economic cooperation. On the basis of this idea it is planned to work out specific programs for the development of various branches of the country's national economy.

During its stay in the Afghan republic the Soviet delegation visited certain Soviet-Afghan cooperation projects in Kabul and acquainted itself with their work, and had conversations with the enterprise staff.

During the visit a number of important intergovernmental documents concerning trade and economic relations between the USSR and the Afghan republic and the education of Afghan specialists in the Soviet Union were signed.

Sultan of Oman Expresses Thanks to Gorbachev

PM2202144990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Thanks for the Greetings"]

[Text] Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id of Oman has sent a telegram to M.S. Gorbachev in which, on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council heads of state, he expresses thanks for the greetings sent to them on the occasion of this organization's summit conference held in Muscat in December 1989.

The telegram expresses gratitude for the high appraisal of the prestige and influence of the Cooperation Council, which acts within the framework of the Arabs natural striving for integration and joint development and for broad collaboration in the international arena.

We were gratified, the sultan's telegram says, by your expression of hope that the conference decisions would help untangle the conflicts in the Near and Middle East on the basis of balance of interests and of ensuring equal security and peace for all peoples in the region. The decisions which were adopted really promote the attainment of the goal that we all pursue and which consists of ensuring that the region in question and all parts of the world enjoy the benefits of peace and stability in conditions of detente and international cooperation.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Supreme Soviet Delegation Visits Mozambique

Group Arrives 28 Feb

LD2802161290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0943 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Maputo, 28 Feb (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by Yu.I. Borodin, member of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee on people's health care, arrived here today at the invitation of the People's Assembly of Mozambique.

During the visit the Soviet parliamentarians will hold talks with a delegation from the Mozambique People's Assembly and will meet representatives of the leadership of Mozambique as well as activists from the Mozambique Association for Friendship and Solidarity with Peoples of Foreign Countries. The delegation will also visit the northern province of Nampula.

Delegations Begin Talks

MB0103085090 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1730 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Talks between delegations of the Mozambican People's Assembly and the USSR Supreme Soviet began in Maputo this afternoon.

The Mozambican delegation is led by Samuel Chambuca, member of the People's Assembly Standing Commission, while the visiting delegation is led by (Yuriy Borodzinze), member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet's Health and Social Security Commission.

The Soviet delegation's visit comes within the framework of bilateral relations existing between the two countries' supreme organs of state power.

Envoy on Reduced Cooperation

MB2402130890 Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] The wave of change sweeping through Eastern Europe has significantly reduced, in some cases to a minimum, cooperation with the People's Republic of Mozambique, USSR Ambassador to Mozambique Nikolay Dybenko told a news conference yesterday.

The Soviet diplomat said East European change will not encourage increased cooperation but will aggravate the situation before reforms were introduced.

The Soviet diplomat said basic cooperation between Mozambique and the USSR will not be significantly affected. Accordingly, the two sides are drafting cooperation proposals for the next five years.

Ambassador Nikolay Dybenko wished to stress his country's economic difficulties:

[Begin Dybenko recording in Russian with passage-by-passage translation into Portuguese] I wish to state very clearly that we must consider our country's (?serious) economic situation. We think likely changes will aim to increase mutually advantageous cooperation between our countries.

Moreover, we believe the question of Mozambique's debt to our country should also be addressed. It's quite a huge debt. [end recording]

The Soviet diplomat did not disclose figures on Mozambique's debt to the USSR but did compare it to Cuba's debt, saying our debt was five times less than Cuba's debt to the USSR.

Envoy on Cuban Ties, Chissano Visit

MB2402190590 Maputo in English to Southern Africa 1800 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet ambassador in Maputo, Nikolay Dybenko, has dismissed as provocative rumors reports that the Soviet Union is about to abandon Cuba and its other traditional Third World allies because of the country's current economic difficulties.

He said at a news conference in the Mozambican capital that the Soviet Union will never abandon Cuba to the imperialists.

The ambassador said the Soviet Union's relations with Cuba have not undergone any change. Mr. Dybenko also said there had been no significant changes in the main direction of the Soviet Union cooperation with Mozambique. However, the various contracts between Mozambique and the Soviet Union ran out this year, and the two sides are working on proposals for the next five-year plan.

President Joaquim Chissano is to visit the Soviet Union soon, and the ambassador said he expects more agreements to be signed during that visit.

Commentary Views Strikes in Mozambique

LD2402233690 Moscow in Portuguese to Africa 1800 GMT 24 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Among the events currently capturing the headlines in Mozambique is the wave of strikes affecting practically all enterprises, hospitals, and even newsrooms of newspapers and magazines. Given the apparent backcloth of positive steps by the country's leaders in domestic and foreign policy, why should this be happening? Yelena Olgina writes:

[Olgina] The economic recovery program has been in effect for several years now. An amnesty law applicable to Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] members was promulgated and remains in force. Steps are being taken toward a peaceful settlement, even if without results so far. In spite of all this, a wave of dissatisfaction is sweeping the country.

There is no doubt that this is the direct consequence of the economic program being impelemented by the Frelimo party. It is true that it did rouse some people out of their apathy in Maputo and other cities, but at the same time it caused price rises, a sudden drop in living standards, and a division of society.

Life was already difficult in Mozambique before, but the economic recovery program recommended by the IMF suggests that belts must be tightened even further, and the state is in no position to provide social safeguards, subsidies or buffers against the crisis. The state of ruin is much too advanced already.

Whereas in the past the Mozambicans were to some extent united by the hope for a better life soon to come, promised by the program for the construction of socialism and, later, by the economic recovery program, now the signs are that all hope is lost. Skepticism is beginning to give way to cynicism. Having dropped Marxism-Leninism from its ideological armory, the ruling party failed to replace it with a rallying ideal. In effect, the construction of socialism in Mozambique lacked both theoretical and practical foundations. It was a kind of dream. Now they have given up the dream and have nothing to put in its place. [passage omitted]

The USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe are no longer models to emulate. The ousting from power of several communist parties, their decision to change their names, the state of crisis in the USSR, none of this inspires in the young Mozambicians any confidence or a desire to follow the same path. And yet it will be impossible for Mozambique to acquire prosperity in the short-term future by following Western prescriptions. Moreover, the party and state machines were unable to prevent the emergence of corruption.

All these factors, both internal and external, cannot but cause dissatisfaction among the sections of the population hardest hit by the drop in living standards and unable to improve them in the near future. The strikes are just an external manifestation of the inner unhappiness that has taken root in the most varied sectors of Mozambican society. [passage omitted]

One can hardly expect an end to the strikes, since the economic and social causes of the dissatisfaction have not been eliminated. But it is clear that their consequences can be mitigated through the continuing democratisation of life in Mozambique and the workers' broad participation in the running of the country's affairs

Commentary Denies Namibia's Future 'Cloudless'

MB1102103490 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 10 Feb 90

[Igor Potovskiy commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Namibia's Constituent Assembly has unanimously adopted the country's new Constitution, clearing the last obstacle to its independence, to be formally announced on 21 March.

Reports from Windhoek speak of the official ceremony held outside the building of a former colonial parliament under Germany and of the speech by SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] President Sam Nujoma, who described the event as a milestone of history and a large stride forward, and so it must be, given the long SWAPO-led independence struggle and the painstaking process of the peace settlement that followed it.

The unanimous adoption of the constitution by the 72-man Constituent Assembly may have seemed as incredible as the [word indistinct] brass band performing the anthem of the independence movement, God Save Africa. It took all of 80 days for a seven-party assembly to agree on the constitution's final text. It is not without flaws, but is seen by many as an example of democracy and the basis for a most democratic society on the continent. Under the Constitution, Namibia is to become a multiparty democratic republic with an independent judiciary and executive Presidency. It also provides for basic human rights, including freedom of movement, expression, and reporting; the repeal of the death penalty; and detention without trial.

Its immediate impact came after the leader of the white right wing party, the Action Christian National's Janie de Wet, spoke of the intention by his party members to stay in Namibia, pledging loyalty to the country and its constitution. Observers say the general mood for national reconciliation, brought to the fore during the drafting of the constitution, is still there.

In his speech at the official ceremony, Mr. Nujoma gave due credit to what he described as political maturity and the sense of patriotic duty by minority parties. Substantial credit also goes to SWAPO, which displayed an unusual flare for compromise, despite its 57-percent majority in the Assembly.

However, this does not mean Namibia's future is cloudless. There remain a range of issues requiring unequivocal solution, such as prisoners of war presumably held at SWAPO bases. Difficulties will inevitably emerge over land ownership and the economic front, as a whole. Differences on these already exist, and general attention is now glued to who will fill government posts.

The cabinet makeup is almost clear. Mr Gerard Hanekom, a white businessman, is in charge of the country's agricultural ministry. A range of key government jobs went both to whites and other opposition members under the appointment by the would-be president which SWAPO sees as a way to unity and to dispel fears among the 75,000-strong white community concerning its future.

East Europe

GDR SPD Chairman Boehme, Delegation Visit

Shevardnadze Receives Boehme

LD0203082890 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0720 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—Chairman of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] of the GDR, Ibrahim Boehme, was received in Moscow today by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Their talk focused on issues relating to German unity and European security.

After the talk, the SPD delegation laid a wreath at the grave of the unknown soldier in the Aleksandr Garden in the Kremlin.

Yakovlev Meets With Boehme

PM0103171190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Conversations at the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A.N. Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, met with I. Boehme, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (GDR), 28 February.

During the conversation they discussed topical questions of international development, above all on the European Continent, and the prospects for GDR-FRG relations. They stressed the significance of the ties between the USSR and the GDR, which have taken shape over the decades, for the further development of cooperation. I. Boehme noted that Social Democrats in the GDR have an understanding attitude to the USSR's stance on these questions.

W. Romberg, prominent member of the SPD, and V.M. Falin, head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department, took part in the conversation.

Boehme, Romberg Comment on Talks

LD0103234790 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1809 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Moscow (ADN)—Speaking to GDR correspondents in Moscow this evening, Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the SPD in the GDR, is "extremely satisfied" with his talks with leading CPSU politicians. It has been agreed to stage more meetings between representatives of the two parties in an open manner and at specific intervals and to expand contacts. They also agreed to compile a program of cooperation in which other East European partners are to be included.

Referring to the German question, Boehme stressed that the aim should not be the GDR's annexation with the FRG but unification with good grace and dignity. A necessary monetary and economic union between the two German states must be supported by social measures. This union should, if possible, not merely take place in the German-German framework but with the inclusion of numerous small West and East European states. Otherwise one would run the risk of harming rather than promoting the European confederation process. The GDR can be a real economic mediator between East and West. In Boehme's view the "two plus four" talks and the CSCE process must provide a framework for controlling these processes. [passage omitted]

Referring to economic issues, Dr. Walter Romberg said that the division of labor between the Soviet Union and the GDR has been programmed beyond the year 2000. The new developments will lead to "immense tasks." The Social Democrats in the GDR want to try everything to ensure that the growth in economic links will be preserved and continued despite the numerous adjustments which will have to be made. The adjustment processes, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, can assume a form which makes possible stability in the long-term and spares the GDR some problems.

Romberg said the two sides agreed that a united Germany cannot be a member of NATO. He added that the SPD assumes that the alliances will acquire an increasingly political character, that the German armed forces in the two states will be considerably reduced, and that the presence of the four allies will gradually diminish. The aim is to have symbolic armed forces of the four states, for example with a troop strength of 30,000 each. Romberg said German armed forces could in the distant future total 100,000 men on the West German side and about 30,000 men on the present-day territory of the GDR. He said be believes a "supra-national and pan-European" umbrella is a possibility for the Germans and the Allied contingents.

Stating that they were dealt with fairly, Ibrahim Boehme gave a positive view of relations between the CPSU and SPD in the GDR this afternoon. He also stated that the GDR-SPD has already established contacts with the Social-Democratic parties in the Baltic Soviet republics, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

TASS on Boehme News Conference

LD0103223790 Moscow TASS in English 1639 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—Ibrahim Boehme, chairman of the Social Democratic Party of the German Democratic Republic, and Walter Romberg, minister without portfolio from this party in the GDR coalition government, expressed satisfaction with the results of the Moscow talks.

In Moscow they held the talks with Aleksandr Yakovlev, member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Valentin Falin, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, and other Soviet politicians.

Representatives of the GDR Social Democratic Party spoke at a news conference in Moscow for the first time. They came to the USSR on a private visit on Wednesday [28 February].

"We are grateful for the frank talks," Boehme said. Speaking of developments in central Europe, he noted that Germany's unification should be implemented within the European process.

The task is to agree upon structures in Europe that would protect the peace and mutual security not only of the GDR and West Germany but also of their neighbours, above all the Soviet Union.

Boehme opposed a future Germany's membership in NATO.

He noted that the reunification of the two German states should be gradual, although the present stormy events seem to have a schedule of their own.

Speaking of close economic relations between the USSR and the GDR, Romberg said that these questions featured prominently at the Moscow talks.

He stressed that the two countries should do their best to preserve and develop economic relations, which developed over decades.

Economic 'Threat of Exclusion' Noted

LD0103164590 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1509 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Moscow (ADN)—The talks held between the delegation of the GDR Social Democratic Party under the leadership of chairman Ibrahim Boehme and leading CPSU politicians were open. This was stated by Minister Dr. Walter Romberg (SPD) to the international press in Moscow today. In discussions concerning German unification, the SPD has become very much aware of the Soviet side's concern that the two German states could lose control of this process. Every effort must be made to achieve an orderly pace in unification between the GDR and FRG.

This agenda for unification has to be agreed between the two German governments after the 18 March election in the GDR, and in the "four plus two" talks and with other states. A central issue is security in Europe, and not only for the Germans, but also for their neighbors.

Romberg added that economic relations between the GDR and USSR were also discussed in the talks in Moscow. The GDR has a considerable interest in continuing these relations.

Ibrahim Boehme told journalists in Red Square that he thought the Soviet Union is worried that a Europe with a dominant German-German economic association could take shape. He said: "The Soviet Union believes there is a threat of exclusion in economic cooperation in Europe." [passage omitted]

Romberg, Akhromeyev Hold Talks

LD0103211390 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 2004 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—The security and disarmament expert of the GDR's Social Democratic Party [SPD], Minister Dr. Walter Romberg, today met Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, an advisor to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

As Minister Romberg told ADN, during this [meeting] security policy and military aspects of the process of German unification were discussed. They agreed that a membership of NATO on the part of a unified Germany was not acceptable. The talks were good, Minister Romberg said. There was the desire on both sides to continue these contacts.

PDS Leader Cited on Pace of German Union

PM0103174990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own special correspondents V. Lapskiy and B. Rodionov: "GDR: In Favor of the Country's Renewal"]

[Text] Berlin—The First PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] Congress, in which 600 delegates from every district of the GDR took part, completed its work in Berlin on Sunday.

Party Chairman Gregor Gysi delivered a major speech devoted to the election campaign under way in the country. The speaker touched on very important problems for the GDR and, among other things, criticized the intentions of leading West German politicians to annex the GDR. Chancellor Kohl, he said, wants to speed up the GDR's collapse so that he can pick it up for nothing. Addressing official Bonn, Gysi said to applause from the hall: "Follow the GDR's example and bring forward the date of the Bundestag elections." The GDR is sick to the teeth of the election campaign launched on its territory by West German parties. Gysi decisively dissociated himself from the conservative parties in the GDR, saying that the PDS supports partnership relations with the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany].

In his speech the party chairman came out against overhasty monetary union with the FRG. In the competitive struggle GDR enterprises would be defenseless. This would in turn produce mass redundancies and the closure of enterprises and would also be detrimental to citizens' savings and cause a price explosion. In Gysi's opinion, the gradual unification of the two countries should proceed on the basis of equality and partnership. He supported the scheduled conference of the four allied powers and the two German states and endorsed Poland's desire to take part in it. Gysi's speech was followed by debate.

Hans Modrow spoke from the congress rostrum on Sunday. Throughout the previous day there had been persistent rumors circulating that he would refuse to stand as a leading PDS candidate in the Volkskammer elections. His speech was therefore listened to with special attention. He asked delegates to show understanding of what he would say.

Back at the extraordinary congress and also in the goverment statement Modrow had left not the slightest doubt that as head of government he represents the interests of the whole people rather than one party. It was only thanks to this that the coalition government had been able to exist. He would not change this rule in the runup to the elections.

Our country, Hans Modrow said, found itself in a difficult position precisely because one party had run everything in the past. The PDS in its program and election prospectus has moved away from such a view of things. Modrow firmly intends to complete his work as head of government, maintaining an atmosphere of prudence and restraint in the country.

Those who are to be nominated as PDS candidates for the Volkskammer elections, Modrow went on, should not have his length of parliamentary service—more than 30 years. Only new PDS deputies would be able to effectively pursue the new party policy. He was doing and would do everything in his power with respect to democratic renewal as a whole and renewal of the party. Now, however, in the period prior to the elections right up to the handover of power to the new head of government, he was ready to make his contribution to stabilizing the situation in the country, achieving cooperation, and preserving the GDR. On the basis of its program and election prospectus and thanks to the new forces in parliament the PDS would be waging an energetic struggle to renew the country and fuse the two German states as part of the all-European process.

Hans Modrow also gave his state of health as grounds for his reflection and hesitation. At the end of his speech, which journalists decsribed as the most dramatic at the congress, Hans Modrow announced that he had accepted an offer to run as a PDS candidate in the parliamentary elections. His words were greeted by tumultuous applause in the hall.

At the suggestion of Gregor Gysi, Hans Modrow was unanimously elected honorary chairman of the party. The congress delegates adopted the PDS election platform. The party statement "For an honest election contest" was approved. The statement defines, if one may put it that way, the ethical standards which the PDS will adhere to during the election campaign that is under way. A youth policy program and women's movement program were endorsed.

PDS Board members were elected to replace those who had left in the period since the extraordinary congress in December.

The concluding remarks were delivered by Gregor Gysi. Every vote given to the PDS, he said, winding up his speech, is a vote for GDR autonomy as part of the European and German process of unification, a vote for those who represent the interests of all citizens.

The First Congress of the Social Democratic Party of [East] Germany ended almost at the same time in Leipzig. The party's program and election program were adopted. The Social Democrats favor the creation and development of pan-German political institutions, which will facilitate the well-organized fusion of the two German states. In the Social Democrats' opinion, the first steps toward German unity should be taken in March (after the elections to the GDR Volkskammer): Both parliaments could issue a joint statement recognizing the borders in Europe. The subsequent stages could be the convening in April of a "four plus two" conference—the four allied powers and the two German states—together with representatives of neighboring countries, and, finally, the all-European summit conference scheduled for the end of the year.

Forty-five-years-old Ibrahim Boehme was elected party chairman. Willy Brandt, prominent FRG political figure and chairman of the Socialist International, who was a guest of the congress, was elected honorary chairman. Incidentally, a large group of Social Democratic leaders from West Germany, including Oskar Lafontaine, Hans-Jochen Vogel, and Egon Bahr, was invited to Leipzig. According to the newspapers, the two Social Democratic parties have essentially merged.

PDS Faces 'Difficult Path' to Rehabilitation

PM0103153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondents S. Baygarov and M. Podklyuchnikov dispatch: "Difficult Path. Party of Democratic Socialism Before Its First Congress"]

[Text] Berlin, 22 Feb—The huge emblem of the former SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] has been removed from the facade of the building in which the Party of Democratic Socialism [PDS] Board is located. There are no armed guards at the entrance. In the evenings hundreds of people cram both the large and small halls to take part in the discussion meetings, together looking for answers to painful questions.

In the foyer on a stand there are handwritten sheets telling about primary organizations' affairs. The PDS is getting ready for its first congress. All around Berlin is buzzing. There are many signs indicating that the political situation in the GDR has changed radically recently. The checkpoints near the Brandenburg Gates are crowded with people. In the streets there are masses of cars with West Berlin number plates. Some owners of local "Wartburgs" and "Trabants" have plastered on the sides of them stickers saying: "We are one people."

The new parties are holding their constituent congresses; their number is increasing daily. They and the social organizations are setting up their blocs for the elections to the People's Chamber to be held 18 March.

On the eve of its congress the PDS finds itself in a difficult position. The SED left it a burdensome legacy. The swift changes in the GDR's life began in October last year when mass demonstrations took to the streets of Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden. They resolutely protested against the policy of the SED's and the country's leadership, a leadership which is to blame for the political and economic crisis in the GDR which caused the flow of migrants to the West. There began the period of fierce political struggle which is called the "fall revolution" here.

During this struggle the SED was dealt a series of heavy blows. Its extraordinary congress was held in mid-December. The main achievement of its delegates was the preservation both of the party itself and the unity of its ranks. After formulating its goals anew, it started calling itself the SED-PDS.

In the two months since then the party has moved to a new stage. This is what Wolfgang Pohl, deputy chairman of the PDS Board, told us:

"We have come through a complex period. The party is moving along the path of renewal. It no longer has the leading role in society. Its structures are changing. They must accord with the tasks of the political struggle. But this is not the most complex task. It is necessary to learn the new thinking, abandoning obsolete dogmas and stereotypes. Sometimes it seems that it would be easier to create a new party than to cope with the load left by the SED."

The fierce attacks on the part of political opponents, open persecution, threats of physical violence, and abuse from children in schools—difficult ordeals have fallen to the lot of party members. Not all of them can take it. Instances of suicide on the part of former party workers have become known.

There have been several waves of people leaving the party. It is notable that the first of them fell in May-November last year, that is at the time when the SED retained its former features and old work style. Among those who left the party then, 70 percent were workers. They were moved by a sense of disappointment that the leadership was cutting itself off from perestroyka, that its words were diverging from its actions and that it refused to see reality.

The second wave of party card surrendering occurred in December. It was a response to facts that became known about the abuse of power by and the privileges and corruption of a number of members of the former SED leadership.

And, finally, the third wave began in January this year. The reason for it was that the hopes connected with the extraordinary congress were not justified. The party's renewal has been slow, and its prestige continues to fall. Once again, as before the extraordinary congress, the opinion has been voiced that the party should be disbanded. Many people have been uncertain what the SED-PDS would represent. It had still not proposed a new program. Fear of persecution also played its part.

Such facts as the demonstrative departure from the party of W. Berghofer, deputy chairman of the PDS and ruling mayor of Dresden, or the attempt in Magdeburg to ban party organizations' activity on the city's territory also pushed the waverers into handing in their party cards. State and economic officials started to leave the party, and officers of the National People's Army whose political departments had been eliminated also left its ranks.

Various currents in the party had made themselves felt. Each of them proposed its own platform. They were published in the press. There have been five of them—

democratic socialism, the social democratic platform, the "Third Path," the "VF" television electronics plant party organization, and the communist platform. The intellectual ferment was reflected in the diversity of platforms. In mid-January 60 representatives of these currents gathered at the board's premises and voted for the party's disbandment. The threat that it would disappear from the political scene once again became a reality. It is easy to leave but it is harder to return... The board rejected the idea of disbandment. And, stressing its desire to speed up renewal, it decided to get rid of the hyphenated name and to delete the abbreviation SED. Henceforth the Party of Democratic Socialism—the PDS—will be participating in the country's political life; the name contains its goal.

"We formulated three most important documents for the congress," Pohl said. "The draft program, the draft statutes and the PDS election platform. Talk of the need to disband the party has ceased. The cohesion of the party ranks is possible on the basis of these documents."

The new thinking, the dogma-free approach to fundamental contemporary issues, and liberation from sectarian narrowness can be clearly seen in the documents prepared for the congress. The PDS, the draft program says, regards itself as a German socialist party which together with other left-wing and democratic forces is moving toward its goal—democratic socialism. It is not a class party and is open to all forces of the people, but it feels itself to be particularly responsible for the interests of the working people; the PDS feels closely associated with the concept of perestroyka and glasnost.

The draft PDS program is based on reality. A special section is devoted to the problem of the unification of the two German states. It is stressed that the solution of the German question is possible only in the channel of the all-European process.

The draft statutes also contain much that is new. The main point is that genuinely democratic conditions are being created in the party. Such that every party member knows that his experience and opinion are needed. That he both can and must actively, creatively participate in working out a solution and be the coauthor of PDS policy.

"Now," Pohl said, "the party members' mood is changing. The shock of the first months has been overcome. The SED had 2.3 million members, now we have about 700,000. PDS members are receiving new party cards. Of course, further losses are also possible. But even if we have 500,000, all the same it is a strong force. It can be said that those who remain are trustworthy and reliable."

The changes of mood in the party were the topic of our conversation at the headquarters of the PDS action movement. Our interlocutors were Peter Batke, leader of the staff, Helga Adler, press officer, and Horst Junghans, leader of the contacts bureau. They acquainted us with what this unusual form of party work represents.

The action movement did not appear on orders from above, it emerged from below. It was the ordinary party members' answer to the panic which gripped some of the party's leading cadres—those same people who retired, abandoned their work, and fled. As happened, for example, in Leipzig, Erfurt, Magdeburg, Weimar, and many regions. But rank-and-file PDS members had no intention of following their example. They—young people of 25-30 as a rule—took the initiative. They set up interim commissions to revitalize the party organization. With the aid of these they convened party conferences and elected a new board and a new chairman.

An important innovation in the PDS' work is the party's departure from enterprises and establishments. Party members are registering at their place of residence. Major primary party organizations are being set up here.

We attended a meeting at one of the new primary party organizations in downtown Berlin. After work, 45 PDS members from three nearby apartment blocks arrived at the small club building. School and VUZ [higher educational institution] teachers, doctors, and staffers from various establishments. As it turned out, this was their first organizational meeting, a kind of review of their forces. About 60 percent of those registered were there.

After the meeting Lothar Roland commented on its results. He works in the health ministry.

"The very fact that we met has great significance for party members," he said. "Imagine the state in which people who possibly for many years of their life assumed that things were getting better in our country found themselves. They have nothing to do with the mistakes of the former SED leadership. Yet now people are trying to make almost social outcasts of them. So the feeling of comradeship is a not insignificant factor."

"We," our interlocutor continued, "have a lot of work to do. We don't intend to sit things out at home prior to the People's Chamber elections. We will prove that the PDS is not a change of decor but really a new party of democratic socialism."

The members of the PDS Board and its Presidium are constantly on the move right now. They are helping party organizations at local level to organize their work, they are addressing numerous gatherings and meetings and acquainting them with the party's position on the most important positions of concern to the people. G. Gysi, chairman of the PDS, joked at one of the meetings: "I thought we would now be able to make do with small premises, but it turns out that large halls are needed for our meetings." Interest is growing in what the PDS is saying to the people at the present stage.

PDS, SPD Policies Eyed as Elections Near

PM2802113590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondents V. Lapskiy and B. Rodionov dispatch: "On the Homestretch"]

[Text] Berlin—This demonstration, like many others in Berlin, started in Alexanderplatz, where huge clocks resembling millstones show the time in all capitals in the world. It was organized by left-wing organizations, the trade unions, and the Independent Women's League. It differed from most previous ones by its organization and the calm restraint shown by its thousands of participants. The demonstrators marched along the central streets to the Lustgarten. A rally was held outside the Museum of German History.

The square applauded orators who demanded the preservation of the GDR's independence, the prevention of it being swallowed by West Germany, and the preservation of social gains and cultural values. We have no intention of claiming that the demonstrators were representative of the majority of GDR population. According to the latest poll data, three-fourths of the republic's citizens said "yes" to unification and many demand it immediately. But this demonstration in Berlin was yet another reminder of those who hold different views about the German states' future. Obviously the politicians who will take their seats in the GDR parliament and government following the 18 March elections will have to take both into account and seek compromises.

Young people mingled with the demonstrators, distributing leaflets signed "PDS" [Party of Democratic Socialism]. Let us cite one of them: "Confidently toward German unity! European, rather than Great German. Demilitarization. No NATO along the Oder-Neisse line... Move toward one another with utmost confidence, and adopt FRG models. Economic community, rather than a sellout of the GDR." The stance taken on unification by the PDS, whose congress opens Saturday, is clear and realistic, and it takes into account the feelings and interests of broad social strata. It must be said that the PDS is no longer trailing in the wake of events. In these most complex and at times dramatic conditions it has managed to break the old mold of its work and adapt it to the fast development of sociopolitical life in the GDR.

PDS Chairman Gregor Gysi declared that his party aims for "the emergence of a European Germany, rather than a German Europe." The question today is whether the GDR would capitulate to H. Kohl's conditions or would gradually, step by step, move toward German unity within the European framework. The GDR would bring in the experience it has accumulated as a sovereign partner.

And so the First PDS Congress will open tomorrow to adopt a new program and a new statute for a modern socialist party and to ratify its election program and candidates for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Incidentally, Western newspapers have recently been spreading a rumor that H. Modrow supposedly does not intend to stand as PDS candidate at the parliamentary elections. Andre Brie, leader of the Party Bureau for Elections to the People's Chamber, refutes the finality of such a decision by H. Modrow in today's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.

A congress of social democrats was held for the first time after a break of 44 years on GDR territory last Thursday. They assembled in Leipzig. Their party will claim power after the March elections—this was declared by its leaders from the congress rostrum. Let us note that, according to data from that selfsame poll, more than half of voters (53 percent) would vote for the GDR SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] today. Party leadership representative Angelika Barbe remarked at the opening of the congress that nobody in the GDR should be afraid of the SPD. The party does not intend to review the results of the land reform or to abolish the right to labor and some other social rights.

An 11-point program was presented on the first day of the congress by Party Secretary Ibrahim Boehme, who, as he has repeatedly declared, hopes to head the future GDR government. His party advocates the rapid creation of currency, economic, and social union with the FRG. It is specifically envisaged that the FRG mark should be introduced as a medium of exchange in the GDR not later than 1 July this year. Citizens' savings should be exchanged at the rate of one-to-one. Appropriate decisions on a transition to a market economy would be made at the same time. Boehme advocated measures against unemployment. He reassured those GDR citizens whose land and real estate are claimed by their former owners now living in the West. As a matter of fact, the situation regarding these claims has recently become absurd. One of the FRG's large insurance companies announced that it allegedly owns... half of the land on which Berlin's famous television tower is built. A West Berlin pensioner claims the land occupied by the "Metropol" Hotel and the International Trade Center. There are plenty of similar claims, and therefore the anxiety of Germans in the GDR is not altogether groundless.

But let us turn back to the Leipzig congress. Its delegates criticized H. Modrow for going to Bonn to meet Chancellor H. Kohl supposedly without a clear concept of the GDR economy's transition to market lines. In the delegates' opinion, any future talks on these lines ought to conducted on an equal basis. Let us recall that I. Boehme, who was a member of the GDR delegation, expressed his disappointment with the stance taken by the FRG chancellor whose government has not lifted a finger for the sake of stabilizing the GDR economy.

In the words of the SPD secretary, the process of Germany's unification ought to be "professionally and socially considered." Individual steps toward it can be taken right away. Boehme said just before the congress that the question of the GDR joining the FRG unconditionally cannot arise for his party. A united Germany will not become an associate member of NATO even "in Mr. Genscher's modified concept." Boehme made another interesting statement regarding the Bonn government's wait-and-see stance toward the GDR: The Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union is striving to prevent the Social Democrats dominating the future FRG Bundestag (the Bundestag elections are scheduled for the end of this year). It is to be feared that, in the event of a Social Democratic government coming to power in the GDR, Kohl would again opt for a policy of procrastination and delays, Boehme said.

The First SPD Congress, attended by 500 delegates representing 100,000 party members, is continuing its work. The first congress of the PDS, a party which still remains the largest in the GDR, will open in Berlin's Central Party School Saturday. Political life is fast gathering pace on the homestretch before the elections which are perhaps the most important in the republic's history.

GDR People's Chamber President Arrives 2 Mar

LD0203094190 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0915 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—GDR People's Chamber President Guenther Maleuda arrived in Moscow on Friday morning for a one-day visit. He will meet Anatoliy Lukyanov, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Yevgeniy Primakov chairman of the Soviet of the union.

On his arrival, Maleuda spoke to ADN about the great responsibility of the parliaments, particularly in the continuation of the peace process and in securing further disarmament. "What we are particularly concerned about are issues relating to the process of unification in Europe, particularly under the conditions of the process of unification between the two German states," the president of the parliament said.

His visit to Moscow will serve to deepen further good relations between the GDR People's Chamber and the USSR Supreme Soviet. His talks will also focus on the further shaping of relations between the two parliaments.

IZVESTIYA Summarizes GDR Organizations

90UI0396A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning p 5

[Survey by S. Guk]

[Text] Among the many parties, organizations, and groupings that have joined in the preelection campaign in the GDR, those that are discussed below attract the most attention. It is significant that a "golden rain" from Bonn has fallen today, in the literal sense of the word, in the form of financial and material aid, advice, and consultation, on those that have "close ties" with political parties in the FRG. Without exception, all of the aspirants support recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. They just as unanimously reject coalition with the PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] (the former rightist SED). Many of them, who earlier had come out for the renewal of socialism, prefer to talk today about "German unity" and a "social market economy." The short survey presented below, because of a lack of data, does not indicate the numerical strength of some organizations.

"ALLIANCE FOR GERMANY": A bloc of conservative parties, formed on 5 February in the presence of H. Kohl, chancellor of the FRG. It consists of the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] (140,000 members), the "Democratic Breakthrough" (55,000), and the "German Social Union" (50,000). It has the solid financial and material support of the West German CDU, which views its "cousins" as a counterweight to the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]—the party that is considered to be the unquestionable leader. "Alliance" is for the quickest possible unification of Germany, a mechanical adoption of the constitution and all legislation of the FRG, the restoration of the old land structure in the GDR, and the formation of a monetary union with the FRG. Despite the single program of aims, each party will run in the elections with its own list of candidates.

"UNION OF FREE DEMOCRATS": Bloc of three liberal parties formed on 12 February—Liberal Democratic (110,000 members), Free Democratic (2,500), and the German Forum Party. All three receive financial subsidies from the SvDP [Free Democratic Party] of the FRG. It plans to vote a single list of candidates. They support the quickest possible unification of Germany—by the end of 1990—through the formation of an economic and monetary union with the FRG, and also private property in land and the means of production.

PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (PDS): About 700,000 members (up until the well-known events in the GDR—2.3 million). The supporter of a reasonable road to the unification of the two German states, in which the GDR should not be deprived of its own social gains (community property in land, the absence of mass unemployment, "bans on professions," etc.). It is for a united demilitarized Europe.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY (SPD): Formed in October 1989, about 100,000 members. Enjoys the complete support of the SPD of the FRG. Both parties coordinate their activity through a joint committee. The SPD of the GDR is for the quickest possible unification of Germany on a federal basis, and, as a first step, it welcomes the formation of an economic and monetary union with the FRG, and the creation of an ecologically clean market economy.

UNION-90: Formed on 7 February on the basis of three movements for civil rights—the "New Forum" (30,000 members and about 100,000 supporters), "Democracy Now," and "Initiative for Peace and Individual Rights." It rejects financial support from the FRG on principle. It places the problem of the protection of the rights of social minorities in the GDR in first place. It is for a cautious rapprochement of the two German states, and it warns against a hasty creation of a monetary union with the FRG (although a majority of the "New Forum" is for a quick reunification).

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY (NDP): About 100,000 members, previously in the bloc of parties with the SED. Today it is for German unity within the framework of a neutral "German Republic" (economic and monetary union with the FRG, entry into the EC [European Community], a market economy with social and ecological guarantees). It rejects cooperation with the West German ultra-right "republicans" and the neo-Nazi NDP.

DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN PARTY OF GERMANY (DKPG): About 117,000 members, previously also in the bloc with the SED. Supporter of a phased implementation of German unity, and a review of the legislation concerning agricultural cooperatives, land ownership, and environmental protection.

"UNITED LEFTISTS": A union of leftist organizations and groups, it is for the idea of a contractual association with the FRG (two states—one nation), and for "socialism under conditions of freedom and democracy."

"CARNATIONS": A supporter of strengthening and improving the quality of life of the workers and broadening their participation in running the state.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY (KPD): About 5,000 members, stands for the independence of the GDR as an alternative to the FRG. Against the idea of a monetary union. The process of unification—only within the framework of general European development, simultaneously with accompanying disarmament.

"UNION OF THE PARTY OF 'GREENS'—INDEPENDENT WOMEN": Supporters of real equality of women and ecological restructuring in the GDR, in particular, the repudiation of nuclear electric power stations; opponents of a mechanical joining of the country to the FRG (instead of this, the idea of two German states is supported).

INDEPENDENT SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY: Declared itself the successor of the left wing of German social democracy. Supports democratic socialism in the GDR, and aspires to the "establishment of ties with leftist parties, first and foremost with the SPD."

UNION OF PENSIONERS "GRAY PANTHERS": About 1,400 members. "Highlight" of the program is the social protection of the elderly (raising the minimal level of pensions, the payment of compensation for increasing prices, inviolability of the home and savings of pensioners, and fair pension legislation.

Soviet Troop Withdrawal From CSSR Continues

LD0103203990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia is continuing. The loading of military equipment is proceeding at the station of the northern Moravian city of Bruntal. The first train has already left the territory of Czechoslovakia via the border post of Cierna nad Tisou.

The withdrawal of the Soviet troops will take place in three stages and will end by the middle of next year. [Video shows armored personnel carriers being loaded onto railcars; troops, trucks; railcars already loaded with military vehicles]

'Druzhba-90' Exercises Begin in CSSR 1 Mar

LD0103161690 Moscow TASS in English 1555 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Prague March 1 TASS—The joint military exercise "Druzhba-90" began in the Western Military District of Czechoslovakia today. The exercise involves units of the Czechoslovak People's Army and of the Central Group of the Soviet Army.

Lieutenant-General M. Zacharias, commander of the Western Military District, directs the exercise. Its aim is to improve cooperation of staffs and to check skills of commanders to organise defence.

CSSR President Describes Talks With Gorbachev

PM0103163190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "For Realistic Relations"]

[Text] Prague, 28 Feb—At a press conference here today, CSSR President Havel talked about the results of his working visit to Moscow.

He called the 6 hours of conversation with M.S. Gorbachev the most important part of it. We discussed many important problems but we could not cover everything, of course, the president noted. It was a discussion between people interested in the future of Europe. The declaration signed in Moscow lays down a new quality of relations between the two states.

Answering journalists' questions on his impression of M.S. Gorbachev and how he sees future Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, V. Havel said that the Soviet leader struck him as a likeable man able to listen attentively to other people's ideas and understand them, which is rare in politicians. The CSSR president expressed the conviction that the USSR's path toward democracy and real pluralism will be calm and swift.

The CSSR leader broached a number of topical international problems. On the prospects for convening a Helsinki-2 conference, he stressed that this forum should complete the process of postwar development in Europe. It is necessary to legalize the process of German unification, definitively confirm it, and include it in broader mutual ties. A new security system must be formed in Europe.

Havel Talks at Supreme Soviet Committee Reported

PM0103093590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Meetings in Moscow"]

[Text] CSSR President V. Havel had talks 27 February at the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee. Committee Chairman A.S. Dzasokhov noted that the content of the previous day's talks between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders and the atmosphere of mutual understanding and openness in which they were held provide grounds for hoping that there will be a considerable intensification of interparliamentary ties as well—all the more so as the democratization processes in both states are conducive to this.

V. Havel supported the idea of invigorating parliamentary contacts, noting that the exchange in the very near future of delegations from the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and the USSR Supreme Soviet would be a concrete step in this direction.

A notable part of the discussion was taken up by the subject of democratic change in the activities of the two countries' top legislative organs. In particular, there was a detailed and interesting discussion on the presidency issue—which is currently being debated in the Soviet parliament. In V. Havel's opinion, a presidency essentially eliminates the anonymity of state rule—unlike a collegial organ whose existence allows its individual members to avoid personal responsibility for their mistakes and shortcomings. Thus, the presidential form of rule not only does not infringe the principles of democracy but, on the contrary, makes it substantially easier for the people to control the head of state's activity, he pointed out.

Lithuanian Leaders Meet CSSR's President

LD2802132390 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] On Tuesday Prof Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Reform Movement Sajudis Council; Virgilejus Cepaitis, its executive secretary; and Prof Kasimiera Prunskiene, vice premier of Lithuania and member of the Sajudis [word indistinct] council, met with the Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, who has come on an official visit to Moscow.

Virgilejus Cepaitis has been on the line with Radio Vilnius from Moscow. He said that a reception of representatives of Soviet progressive forces had been held in the Czechoslovak Embassy on the initiative of President Havel. According to Virgilejus Cepaitis the president of Czechoslovakia (?had invited people), rather unusual for a diplomatic reception. Among the guests were Boris Yeltsin and other Russian radicals and representatives of popular fronts, including Sajudis. Democratization processes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were discussed at the meeting.

Virgilejus Cepaitis said that it was decided to hold an official meeting between the representatives of Lithuania and President Vaclav Havel after Lithuania's parliament is elected democratically and a new government of Lithuania is formed.

The Lithuanian popular movement Sajudis has already invited Vaclav Havel to visit Lithuania on his way to Moscow this time. However, the Czechlovak president was short of time. He expressed hope to come to Lithuania some other time.

According to Virgilejus Cepaitis this meeting was a useful start for future Lithuanian-Czechoslovak contacts.

Prague Rally Protests 1948 Communist 'Putsch'

PM2802163790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own unidentified correspondent report: "Disputes Surrounding February"]

[Text] Two major rallies were held on that warm, sunny Sunday in Prague. One of them—on the Old Town Square—was addressed by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel. His major speech was devoted to Czechoslovakia's domestic political situation. Havel criticized the Federal Assembly for working slowly on new laws.

The other rally was held on Wenceslas Square. It was a rally to protest the events of February 1948, when power in Czecholsovakia passed into the hands of the communist government headed by K. Gottwald. Speeches by eyewitnesses and young people alternated with the performance of popular songs. Then tens of thousands of citizens, in response to the call of J. Skoda, chairman of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, made their way to Prague Castle to meet the president. This program, described for some reason as "impromptu" in the newspaper SVOBODNE SLOVO, was in fact announced five days beforehand and kept precisely to schedule. Havel came out to welcome the demonstrators on the castle's so-called third courtyard and then received a delegation of students and citizens.

Yes, 25 February—Victorious February as it has been called here for the last four decades—is being marked in its own special way. I would say that, in terms of the number of articles published in the press, the extreme attention paid it, and the upsurge of emotions, this modest 42d anniversary has left way behind many lavish "round-figure" jubilees of the past. And, of course, in terms of the polemical pitch, too.

Everything started with a Czechoslovak Socialist Party Central Committee statement which described Victorious February as a "communist putsch." One of the party's publicists wrote: "We have been told that 'the working people triumphed' in February 1948, but in the name of that 'victory' people died on the scaffold, were tormented in prisons and camps, and lived in fear. All democratic-minded citizens, members of other political parties, nonparty people, and ultimately members of the Communist Party themselves suffered grievously under the communist oligarchy's yoke."

In recent days "exposes of the legends" of the February events have appeared one after another in the newspapers. It was previously unconditionally asserted that crowds of many thousands of Prague inhabitants and delegates from all over the country expressed unanimous support for the policy of Gottwald and his associates. Now it is said: No, other crowds numbering many thousands opposed Gottwald's Stalin-inspired methods. Previously the important role played by the People's Militia in support of the public movement was stressed, now this is regarded as the sole feature that determined the outcome of the "putsch" (here, as reader J. Vrana from Brno writes in RUDE PRAVO, it is forgotten that the People's Militia itself emerged from the ranks of ordinary working people).

The differences are, of course, more substantial on the fundamental evaluations rather than the individual facts. As people know, the essence of the February events was that "reactionary ministers" resigned and Gottwald formed a "revived National Front" government (I cite the descriptive terms from the canonical text, Studies in the History of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCZ), 1985). But why did the ministers resign? Because—as documents now published claim—they protested against the exclusion of representatives of noncommunist parties from state and public security organs, the occupation of all leading posts in those organs by communists alone, and the reluctance of Gottwald and the internal affairs minister, also a communist of course, to change the situation in spite of categoric government decisions.

So was there a putsch or not?

The CPCZ adopts an unambiguous stance: There is absolutely no question of a conspiracy. A politically motivated power struggle took place and February 1948 represented the height of that struggle, the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committtee recently stated. With some exceptions it constituted above all a step of social progress and of the "most sincere desire to build socialism in Czechoslovakia as a historically more just and freer society than that in which people had lived thus far." At the same time the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee states that the party is now resolutely dissociating itself from the undemocratic distortions of that period and stresses that the February events should be regarded as an integral part of the complex postwar development in Europe.

"An end to totalitarianism. February will never be repeated!"—it was under such a slogan that last Sunday's demonstration in Prague was held.

IZVESTIYA Reports Calfa Assembly Speech

PM0103160890 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov report: "Deputies Hear the Truth: M. Calfa's Speech at the CSSR Federal Assembly Session"]

[Text] The latest session of the CSSR Federal Assembly has begun. On the first day the deputies adopted a law on elections which stipulates, in particular, that the new body of deputies will be elected for only two years (instead of five). One argument is that this will be the first time that free elections have been held, so it is a transitional time, and the term is being shortened to alleviate possible errors.

The main event at the session was the report by M. Calfa, head of the CSSR Government. He was awaited with great interest, especially since at a rally on Sunday President V. Havel described it beforehand as an important statement. The report was devoted to domestic policy problems and the government's concrete plans.

RUDE PRAVO described the premier's speech as "cheerless, revealing the full depth of fundamental problems that exist in society and the complexity of the tasks that are to be resolved." The headlines in other newspapers are equally categorical: "List of Debts," "Deputies Hear the Truth," "We Will Reap What We Did Not Sow."

M. Calfa began by describing the legacy inherited by the government of national consensus. Thus, the indicator of national per capita income in Czechoslovakia is 40-60 percent of the level in the FRG. The proportion of funds in the national income that are invested in production is more than 30 percent, which could be regarded as a "world record." One-third of Czechoslovakia's forests are damaged—the ecological situation is assessed as disastrous. In terms of the number of servicemen and tanks per 100,000 of the population, the CSSR holds first place, besides the fact that there are foreign troops on its territory. Inflation is today reaching 2.5-3.5 percent a year. Labor productivity is 25-50 percent lower than in the United States. Some 400,000 applications for housing have accumulated at national committees and housing cooperatives. In the CSSR there are 195 prisoners per 100,000 people, whereas in Britain, France, and Sweden there are only 65 (which not only tells you about the scale of crime, but also shows that the state has overestimated the role of repressive punitive measures).

And so forth. The structure of the national economy is one-sided, materials-intensiveness is high, the choice of goods is poor, quality is not high—all this and much more must be taken into account in the new budget that the deputies are to approve in March.

We want to become an equal, desirable partner in the world market, M. Calfa stated, moving on to the government's concrete intentions. A concrete program broken down over time, including the necessary legislative measures, was presented to deputies. One measure, for instance, is to permit individual enterprise without restricting the number of workers hired and the scale of production. This cannot be postponed indefinitely. Here a long series of legal measures will have to be changed—from the Constitution to the criminal code. It is proposed to create new departments—for taxation and for craftsmen's affairs. At the same time the state committee analogous to our State Committee for Science and Technology will become a small state organ on questions of the environment. It is time to put an end to the rapid turnover of leading cadres in production, who are voted in and voted out again. An enterprise's founder will have the right to appoint and change directors, amalgamate or break up enterprises, and so forth. The weakening of enterprises' leadership cannot be allowed, on the contrary, strong teams should be concentrated there. The government proposes to reduce defense spending by 6 billion korunas, reduce certain kinds of subsidies, and abolish them entirely for the extraction industry. An additional 1 billion korunas will be appropriated for the maintenance of the new political parties—the government considers it its duty to help to develop a new political system by not only paying subsidies to parties and movements, but also issuing them with paper for their press organs, assigning air time on radio and television, and so forth.

"We know that the path ahead does not lie through heaven-sent prosperity for everyone," M. Calfa said, "but we want to do everything to enable as many people as possible to enjoy the benefits of civilization in our state. And we are convinced that everyone can have a worthy life, offered by a modern, welfare, rule-of-law state."

The Federal Assembly session is expected to end 28 February, but it is not ruled out that it could last another day.

CPCZ Plenum Expels 'Normalization' Leadership

PM2602143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Discussion Held, Decisions Made"]

[Text] Prague, 18 Feb—A Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee plenum has taken place here whose participants considered the situation in the party and the political situation in the country. CPCZ Chairman L. Adamec spoke at the plenum.

It was noted in the discussion that the party condemns instances of the persecution of Communists. Grave concern is caused by the increasingly frequent instances of skilled workers being dismissed merely because of their party membership. Participants in the plenum demanded that cadre changes be carried out in strict accordance with the laws and that people be assessed not on their political convictions but on the degree of their professionalism. "All we want is equal rights with everyone else," Adamec stressed in his speech.

The conclusions of the commission for assessing the political responsibility of former CPCZ leaders in the period of "normalization" were discussed.

It was decided to expel from the party G. Husak, L. Strougal, M. Beno, P. Colotka, J. Fojtik, J. Hajn, J. Havlin, K. Hoffmann, M. Hruskovic, A. Indra, I. Janak, A. Kapek, M. Kabrhelova, J. Kempny, J. Korcak, J. Lenart, V. Marek, M. Muller, Z. Sojak, F. Tesar, M. Zavadil, and J. Pirc. The plenum's resolution on this question emphasized that they are responsible for major political mistakes and undermining the party's authority. By their activities they have discredited socialist concepts.

The plenum considered and approved questions regarding the preparation of an organizational congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia.

The theses of the CPCZ campaign program were approved.

MSZMP Notes Threat of Bourgeois Dictatorship

LD2002090190 Moscow TASS in English 0811 GMT 20 Feb 90

[Text] Budapest February 20 TASS—After March elections to the Hungarian state assembly right-wing parties may come to power, and the country will face the threat of a reactionary petty bourgeois dictatorship under the guise of a parliamentary democracy, Laszlo Udvarheji, chairman of the Electoral Commission of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [MSZMP], said at an electoral meeting of the party here today.

If a bourgeois regime is restored, a Western-type democracy will not be formed in the country. It will be an ugly Balkan caricature of the capitalist system. Hopes for foreign investments, which can allegedly help Hungary improve its economic situation, are an illusion. At the present level of Hungary's economic development, foreign investments will involve selling national wealth and becoming a semi-colonial country.

Speaking about the electoral struggle, Udvarheji pointed to a propaganda campaign against the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, which is based on slander. In the past four decades it is this party that promoted Hungary's progress towards modern Europe and the creation of new living standards for hundreds of thousands of people in a war-ravaged country, he said.

He denounced the economic policy of the present government, which has led to deteriorating living standards. He expressed an equally negative attitude towards the Hungarian Socialist Party, which calls itself a left-wing party, but pursues a right-wing policy.

SFRY Presidency Session Imposes Kosovo Curfew

PM2702133590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent Ye. Vostrukhov: "Kosovo: Curfew Introduced"]

[Text] Belgrade—In connection with the new wave of extremist demonstrations in Kosovo and the threat of the escalation of violence a curfew has been introduced throughout the territory of the autonomous province. It operates from 2100 hours to 0400 hours. The situation here remains complex and unpredictable.

In fulfilling the resolution of the extraordinary session of the SFRY Presidency, the military mechanized formations are patrolling the important highways and clearing them of obstacles and barricades. Bus communications have now been broken off in many directions. Tank drivers of the Yugoslav People's Army have started to guard streets in the cities of Podujevo, Titova-Mitrovica, Urosevac, and other "centers" where extremists are concentrated. Military aircraft and helicopters are on airborne alert in the sky over Pristina, the province's capital, where demonstrations by students of Albanian nationality are continuing.

The leaders of the "union of free albanian students" have claimed that "bloody Tuesday" and other acts of violences did not take place because they appealed to those who think like them to refrain from disorders for the time being since they have presented the federal organs with an ultimatum on behalf of the union: satisfying the students' demand within a deadline set by them and repealing the state of emergency on the province's territory. But despite this appeal the separatists are continuing their excesses. On 21 February several unexpected fires broke out. Thus, in Pec City, the central post office building caught fire and the city's telephone and telegraph communications with the outside world suffered as a result. In many settlements the separatists are erecting barricades on the streets.

Life in the kray has been completely paralyzed and the majority of enterprises are standing idle. The Albanians are holding meetings and erecting barricades while the Serbs and Montenegrins are protecting their families from the demonstrators. There are no classes in schools and educational establishments.

A new rally of Serbs and Montenegrins from all over the province has been held in Kosovo Polje. The 15,000 people gathered appealed once again but, it was stated, for the last time, to the supreme organs of Serbia and the SFRY demanding that urgent measures be taken and that the violence by the extremists be halted.

Agreement With SFRY on Enterprises Signed

LD1702113890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2021 GMT 16 Feb 90

[Text] Belgrade, 16 Feb (TASS)—An agreement was signed here today on cooperation between a number of Soviet machine-building enterprises and the Yugoslav "Ivo Lola Ribar" Association.

The document envisages the creation of a share company in Belgrade in the first half of this year and also joint activities in development of new models, manufacture, and marketing of machine-building products in the SFRY, USSR, and other countries. Accord was reached on opening enterprises in Moscow to produce electronic components for machine-tool control and on establishing coproduction ties with the aim of making equipment to produce building materials.

The agreement was signed by Nikolay Panichev, USSR minister of the machine-tool and tool building industry, and Mihajlo Milojevic, chairman of the "Ivo Lola Ribar" Association.

West Europe

United Germany Membership in NATO Opposed

PM0203094190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Korionov "Observer's Reflections on the German Question": "Curtain Raised..."]

[Text] Last century C. Metternich, leader of Austria's foreign policy department, once made the following comment: "Politics is like a play with many acts which is enacted inexorably once the curtain is raised. It is pointless to then say that the performance will not go on. The play is finished either by the actors or by the audience, who will get up on stage." These words involuntarily come to mind now, when we can see a real hullabaloo over the problem of German reunification. The curtain has certainly been raised and there are many characters on the political stage. The problem is how they will perform their roles.

The German question has become a topical one in contemporary world politics. Naturally, it concerns the Germans above all. There are few people now who would cast doubts on the German people's right to self-determination. But it is equally obvious that this question vitally concerns all Europeans and, what is more, peoples throughout the world. The result is a great range of opinions as to how to resolve this topical issue and what procedure to choose for this.

Two approaches have clearly emerged. The supporters of one advocate a well thought-out, well-considered approach that takes all aspects of the problem into consideration, primarily the safeguarding of reliable security for the peoples of Europe. Others are clearly in a hurry, displaying excessive haste. This nervousness is particularly evident in Bonn, where the chancellor is obviously spurred on by December's upcoming elections.

As is well known, foreign ministers agreed in Ottawa on a mechanism for discussing the German question involving the USSR, the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, and the GDR. This accord proceeds on the basis of acknowledging two factors—the four powers' responsibility for Germany's future role in the world and consideration of the major changes that have taken place in Europe, the world, and the two German states since then.

Hence the emergence of the "two plus four" formula. Bonn's diplomatic circles set it out as follows: First the leaders of the FRG and the GDR ("two") elaborate a package of agreements on achieving German unity and only after this agreement is signed will the question arise of convening an international conference involving the victorious powers of World War II—the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France—("plus four").

The FRG Foreign Ministry stresses that the formula must by no means look like "four plus two." Unlike mathematics, representatives of the Bonn department note, a transposition of the terms in politics could result in "miscalculations." In this case the "two" must, in their opinion, take first place. But H. Modrow, chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, believes that "the final solution of the German question can only be achieved in conditions of free self-determination for the Germans in both states, in cooperation with the four powers, and with consideration for the interests of all European states."

Bonn is clearly spurring on its "diplomatic blitzkrieg." But this haste is not shared by other countries. Thus Britain's Prime Minister M. Thatcher believes there must be no rush to solve the question of German unification. "We have agreed on the inviolability of European borders," she said. "So any change in these borders requires careful discussion of this question by the signatory states to the Helsinki Final Act." There is no obvious rapture in Paris. Alarmed voices can also be heard in other countries of Europe.

Secretary of State Baker, speaking recently on television, said: "The U.S. stance consists of the idea that a united Germany must be a member of NATO." However, obviously taking account of world opinion's attitude toward that, he tried to somehow draw a veil over Washington's aspiration and said: "At the same time I believe—and most people have acknowledged this—that various guarantees of security or assurances to the East are necessary to give the countries of Eastern Europe and, of course, the Soviet Union some comfort in connection with a united Germany's membership in NATO." No, the Soviet Union and other countries that experienced the horror of the Hitlerite invasion do not need "comfort" but firm guarantees that the threat of war will never again emanate from German soil. Against anyone ever!

As for the plan being hatched in certain Western circles to incorporate a united Germany into NATO, there must be complete clarity on this point: This option is unacceptable to the Soviet people. And the idea that NATO armed forces will not be sited on the territory of the GDR will not lessen their disquiet. The unconstructive nature of this plan is obvious.

Today Bonn can be heard uttering a good many assurances that there will be no "national arbitrariness" and unification will be implemented "sensibly and reasonably." Still, the fact remains that the following kind of slogans are appearing with increasing frequency on the streets of West German cities: "We have become ourselves again." What might follow in the future? Will the "fourth reich" be tempted to flex more than economic muscle?

You could read the following lines in THE NEW YORK TIMES on 8 February: "Western leaders say there is no need to be concerned; a United Germany will be attached to NATO and contained within the framework of the Western economic system. Is there really anyone," the newspaper inquired, "who believes such rubbish—that in 10 or 13 years, if the Germans want to take the path of political or economic expansionism, they will submit to ties with an outmoded alliance or be contained by Western economists who will by then be dependent on the new united reich?" Typically, a cartoon appeared in NEWSWEEK 19 February symbolizing a united Germany: A huge "kid" spinning the earth in his hands and above the cartoon the words "Baby want Czechoslovakia"...

Reckless statements can already be heard in that country today. After all H. Koschik, general secretary of the "Union of Expellees," recently proclaimed: "Germans cannot simply surrender a third of their territory and give up their 800-year history." N. Gansel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] (FRG) Council, notes: "The specter of the revision of postwar borders, which has appeared out of the past and is roaming around Europe, could do terrible and quite real damage today." And what about tomorrow? Naturally, Bonn's refusal to issue a clear unconditional statement regarding the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border attracts extremely suspicious attention. People realize that a change in the existing borders in one area could entail a chain reaction of territorial claims in Europe.

The Polish leadership's stance is understandable. Referring to the four powers' upcoming talks on the German question, President W. Jaruzelski said: "No one discusses us without us." "We want to attend all meetings where the question of our neighbor Germany's security is discussed," T. Mazowiecki, chairman of the Polish Council of Ministers, said. "Questions of our security must not be resolved behind our back. Germany's incorporation into the all-European system would be the best approach."

Can Europeans be delivered from their fears? Yes, if the question of German reunification is resolved in step with the creation of a Europe based on trust, harmony, openness, and stability. "European states," the joint statement signed by M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl in Bonn 13 July 1989 says, "can and should live together without fear of one another, with peaceful rivalry among themselves." In following this path we can strive to ensure that the feeling of threat gradually gives way to an atmosphere of mutual trust.

The road is obvious—the development and deepening of the common European process. The FRG, the GDR, and the four powers are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act. The USSR, the United States, Britain, and France have not only rights but also duties stemming from the Potsdam agreements. The peoples expect them to elaborate a clear coordinated stance concerning their intention to settle all issues arising as a result of World War II and the postwar period after the formation of a united German state. The building of a united Germany could at the same time be a process of completing the new interaction between the two military alliances.

The question of the presence of foreign troops on German soil is being discussed animatedly. There are a host of viewpoints on this question. W. Brandt, honorary chairman of the SPD, voiced a curious idea, in particular, in an interview with DER SPIEGEL. Broaching the idea of a neutral united Germany, he said: "It must not be assumed that the Federal Republic of Germany will leave NATO like a soccer league; I am opposed to that. Just as it must not be supposed that NATO's sphere of influence could be extended to cover the whole of a united Germany." He went on to say: "It is conceivable that the part of Germany which hitherto belonged to the Warsaw Pact could receive a different military status from that of the current Federal Republic. Second, it is quite possible that we will see Soviet troops remaining there; after all, a considerable proportion of them will have been cut back on the basis of U.S.-Soviet accords."

The building of German unity is now on the agenda. And the peoples' aspiration to ensure that Germans take a worthy place in European and world structures is all the more necessary. Contemporary European realities must, of course, be taken into consideration here. Responsibility, circumspection, and a well-considered approach are what the peoples expect of European and world political leaders.

Kohl, Baker Cited on German Border Issue

PM0203121590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "On the Inviolability of European Borders"]

[Text] In an interview with GDR TV FRG Chancellor H. Kohl stressed that "nobody wants to link German unification to the redrawing of existing borders." He added, however, that only the sovereign government of a united Germany can sign a treaty officially enshrining borders in their current form.

Speaking in the Senate Budget Committee, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker noted that the established European borders are "inviolable, and should only be changed by peaceful means." He added at the same time that the United States "understands" H. Kohl's view on the border question, which will "still have to be resolved." J. Baker opposed including Poland as one of the direct participants in talks on the German reunification problem.

PRAVDA Interviews Belgian Premier Martens

PM2802154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7

[Interview in Brussels with Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens by correspondent Vladimir Peresada: "This Is Impossible Without Lasting Peace..."; date not specified; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] PRAVDA's own correspondent Vladimir Peresada has begun work in Brussels. Today we publish his interview with Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.

Brussels, February—[Peresada] Mr. Prime Minister, I have worked in a number of countries as a PRAVDA correspondent, but this is my first time in Belgium. And your advice would be very useful to me. To which processes and special features of life in the country today should I pay the greatest attention?

[Martens] I would draw your attention to the process of improving the economy and to the political reform. These are two significant evolutions, which will continue in the nineties too.

At the beginning of the last decade people were calling Belgium the "sick man" of West Europe, bearing in mind the economy. But toward the end of it we had substantial economic growth (more than five percent last year), and the level of inflation had become one of the lowest in Europe—less than three percent. This is the impressive result of improving the economy, of seven years of the "austerity" policy which we implemented from 1982.

[Peresada] What is meant by political reform?

[Martens] Belgium's transition from a unitarian to a federal state. Carried out stage by stage, it had been implemented in the main by the end of the eighties. The concluding stage of this reform is now under way, when, in particular, the national parliament is to be restructured.

I would like to say the following in connection with Belgium's conversion into a federal state. I hope that what I call our country's "ambition" on a European scale will be realized in the nineties. And I will do everything possible for this. I will explain what I mean. The cultures and languages of all three groups of our population—French-speaking, Dutch-speaking (Flemish), and German-speaking—have now been recognized. This form of cooperation in a federal state can be an example for the EC too, which also recognizes a diversity of languages and cultures. As you know, its political institutions—the EC Commission and a number of establishments of the European Parliament—are located in Brussels, and the Council of Ministers meets here.

[Peresada] In West Europe M. Thatcher alone can compare with you in terms of length of office as head of government—more than 10 years. How do you yourself assess the results of this period, which people here call "the Martens decade"?

[Martens] The chief thing is precisely what I mentioned when answering the first question—the improvement of the economy and the political reform. We are now seeing the results. Of course, they are more noticeable in the economy, but the political reform is more important, particularly with regard to its significance for our country's new "ambition."

I must mention Belgium's contribution to the evolution of the EC. The Belgian Government plays an important role in its activity. Perhaps we do this without pomp but, I believe, we do it efficiently and, I wish to emphasize, we always support the proposals of the EC Commission, which has the right to advance initiatives.

[Peresada] I would like to return to the economy. What specific measures were taken in Belgium to improve the economic situation?

[Martens] This was mainly done by means of combating inflation and matching the Belgian franc to the European monetary system. In February 1982 we agreed to devalue it by 8.5 percent. But, in order to resolutely curb inflation, we temporarily froze the growth in wages and social increments. The population thereby made a contribution to restoring the competitiveness of enterprises. Their capital was regrouped by means of various tax measures. We modernized sectors which were in a particularly difficult situation—metallurgy, coal extraction, textile production. And, as I have already said, we improved the national budget.

We have a market economy, but social adjustments have been made to it. The system of social security in Belgium is probably the most developed in the EC. And I do not think we made a mistake by not subordinating the economy to the social factor. The economy is the foundation.

Belgium's economy is founded on autonomous enterprises. I believe that you too should decentralize your economy. Of course, the government must participate in managing it, but the chief thing is enterprises' competitiveness, independence, and responsibility.

[Peresada] As far as I understand it, the political reform in Belgium is aimed at creating the optimum conditions for cohabitation among the various national communities and eliminating interethnic friction. On what principles is it being carried out?

[Martens] We have adopted a system which I call "union federalism." Under this system federative formations—in our case regions and communes—are granted great autonomy, but at the same time federal, i.e. central, power is retained with the Chamber of Representatives elected by universal suffrage throughout the country's territory and with the Senate representing the regions and communes. The latter were gradually given powers in those spheres which are particularly close to people's everyday life—culture, housing, education, health care, the local economy, and others. But spheres such as foreign relations, security, defense, tax policy, and justice remain the prerogative of the central power. In other words, it is a question of autonomy within the framework of a federal state.

At the same time we have many so-called "federalists," who are, in fact, separatists and think only of seceding. Under these conditions it has to be explained to the population that federalism is not separatism and that the necessary equilibrium must exist between the federative formations and the unified federal state, which, moreover, belongs to the EC.

I believe that the prospect of the community's development along the path of integration rules out full autonomy.

[Peresada] Slogans of a separatist trend are sometimes advanced in our country too...

[Martens] Yes, what I have said is probably applicable in some ways to the Soviet Union, too. I am convinced that it is illusory to think of total autonomy.

[Peresada] Peace, concord, and cooperation are particularly important in relations between states, particularly if they belong to different social systems. What do you think, Mr. Prime Minister? Is the "cold war" over?

[Martens] We used to employ the expression the "cold war" and we use it now to characterize East-West relations from the postwar times until the "Gorbachev era." It is perfectly obvious to me that we now live not just in a period of easing tension in these relations but in an epoch of genuine changes in the international arena—not just detente but, I repeat, genuine changes. The heads of the EC member states have repeatedly declared that the two alliances—the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO—must hold talks on disarmament and are factors for stability in the interests of ensuring disarmament and developing the processes of democratization in Europe. And we hope that, thanks to the current disarmament talks and, in particular, the reforms being undertaken in the countries of East and Central Europe, a situation will take shape on the continent in which the "cold war" will be no more than a "bad memory."

[Peresada] Belgium was one of the pioneers of West European integration. How do you see the "Europe of the 12" after 1992?

[Martens] Moving toward political union. I have already said that the creation of the currency and economic union after 1992 will entail a transfer of political power to the European level. This will, of course, require institutional reforms. In my view, the EC Commission must become a kind of European government responsible to the European Parliament. This in turn must have broader rights than now, including the right to control this government. I believe that if currency and economic union is created after 1992, the new elections to the European Parliament, which are to be held in June 1994, must be crowned with the granting of such rights to it.

[Peresada] There are different views on a "united Europe." Some people voice fears that a kind of "fortress" will emerge, while others speak of a union open to interaction and cooperation with other countries, including East European ones.

[Martens] The EC Commission recently expressed a very clear opinion on the formula for future relations with East European countries. This is a specific association with broad cooperation. It is not foreseen that new members will join the community before the full creation of the single market, for it needs to deepen its own integration. Its openness will be expressed precisely in the signing of an agreement on association with certain countries, while after 1992, if the present processes continue, an opportunity will be opened up to admit new members.

[Peresada] The level of military confrontation is still high in Europe. What, in your view, must be the priority area for disarmament and confidence-building measures in the immediate future?

[Martens] The first priority is an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe, which is being called the CFE-1 agreement. We hope that it will be concluded in Vienna in the very near future together with a new agreement on confidence- and security-building measures. It is already proposed that it could be followed by another agreement—CFE-2. Belgium believes that, after the signing of the CFE-1 agreement, measures must also be provided for to reduce short-range nuclear weapons, i.e. an agreement on these weapons must emerge.

Belgium is very interested in an agreement on a total chemical weapons ban, talks on concluding which are now being held in Geneva, as well as an agreement on reducing strategic nuclear arms. We hope that it too will be signed in the very near future—by, I believe, M. Gorbachev and G. Bush during a meeting in the United States.

[Peresada] In one of your speeches, when speaking of the present rapprochement between the East and West of the continent, you broached the idea of the "institutionalization" of the all-European process. I remember that you linked it to the idea of building a common European home. What is Belgium's position here?

[Martens] Voices in favor of giving the CSCE process a permanent institutional basis are now being heard from different sides. Belgium is open to this proposal, the merits and possibilities of whose implementation must be carefully weighed. It is ready to participate constructively in the debate. The EC is also increasingly becoming an interlocutor in the European arena. Belgium is in favor of everything that can enable Europe to flourish in an atmosphere of peace and cooperation. This is why we have made a positive assessment of a number of the elements of what President Gorbachev called the "common European home."

[Peresada] How do you assess the present state of Soviet-Belgian political relations and their development prospects?

[Martens] You know that since the postwar period Belgium has been a member of NATO and is a member of the EC. It has always played its role in these organizations. We have also maintained contacts with a number of central European countries. In the past, as chairman of my party, I have made many trips to those countries, including during difficult times. I must honestly say that such contacts have been far less frequent with the Soviet Union. Perhaps because we have our role in the EC, while the Soviet Union has contacts with the United States at the "superpower" level.

But I recently had an opportunity to meet with USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze in Brussels. These were talks in a spirit of extraordinary openness, and I came away from them with the impression that bilateral relations between a country such as Belgium, which has a population of just 10 million but occupies a prominent place in the "European concert," and your country are important.

[Peresada] An agreement was signed in Brussels recently between the Soviet Union and the EC on broad cooperation in the trade and economic sphere. What, in your view, is its significance in the general context of East-West relations?

[Martens] The signing of the agreement was an event of tremendous importance. The foundations were laid for a new era in relations between the USSR and the EC, and their remoteness from each other will be reduced. We in the community are of a mind to ensure that this agreement, which will soon come into force, is of the maximum mutual benefit.

In addition, the agreement with the USSR fits within the framework of the declaration of the EC member countries' heads of state and government on the events in central and East Europe, which they adopted at the

December meeting in Strasbourg. A dual thrust is characteristic of that declaration: the strengthening of European integration and openness to the East. On talking with Mr. E. Shevardnadze I was convinced that the Soviet leadership has understood well the sense of the declaration. I am pleased at this, for I draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union wants the community, while gradually being strengthened, to open up also for increasingly broad cooperation on the continent.

[Peresada] The final decade of the present century has arrived. How would Belgian Prime Minister Wilfried Martens like to see the world of the year 2000?

[Martens] As regards Europe, it is possible that it will enter the year 2000 as a confederation, to use President F. Mitterrand's words. But the terminology is not so important. If the reform movement continues, by then Europe will probably be able to have a common political institution. I believe that this will be an important piece on the world chess board. In Europe everything is possible—in the economy, in scientific research, in technology—if efforts are combined. Consequently, what is needed is political structures which will make it possible to unite everything that is still too disunited. I would like the nineties to bring the "third world" new hopes. True, I am more pessimistic here: It is too squeezed in the vise of economic backwardness, debts, and other adversities. It is the duty of the economically more developed countries to help it together, by means of joint efforts, and, moreover, to give it a new chance.

But all this will be impossible without lasting peace. I hope that we will enter the 21st century with a far better international security system than now. However, much still has to be done for this. So talks and agreements on disarmament, which would make it possible to ensure stability and peace, are the chief thing today.

Navy Staff Officer Hits Sub Intrusion Claims

PM0103170390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[Interview with Vice Admiral V.K. Zakharin, deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff, by PRAVDA correspondent P. Bogomolov: "Submarine 'Canards.' Myth About USSR Aggression in the Baltic: Vice Admiral V.K. Zakharin Comments"; date and place of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] "The number of Soviet submarine violations of Swedish territorial waters has increased since Mikhail Gorbachev took office," a report published recently in California by the Rand Corporation—one of the leading research organizations serving the U.S. military-industrial complex—claims. PRAVDA's correspondent asked Vice Admiral V.K. Zakharin, deputy chief of the Navy Main Staff, to comment on this report from the professional viewpoint and assess as a whole the attempts by certain Western circles to generate mistrust in USSR policy in the North of Europe among the Swedish and international public.

[Zakharin] It is hard to describe the Rand Corporation report as a document with any serious foundation in fact.

If we take into consideration the fact that the Western press has carried insinuations about Soviet submariners' intrigues around the shores of Sweden for many years, we could in principle confine ourselves this time to the usual rebuttal. All the same there are, in my view, several elements that put us on our guard and compel us to dwell in more detail on this latest form of "submarine" speculation.

The first thing you notice is how thoroughly Rand Corporation experts try to dazzle you with statistics and their claims to what I could describe as a chronological consistency in presenting their conjecture. Whereas prior to the 1980's, the report's authors claim, the number of Soviet submarine "incursions" did not top four a year, later, they assure us, there were allegedly an average of between 17 and 36 operations of this kind each year. You will agree that you involuntarily get an illusion of plausibility when faced with this kind of exposition.

In this connection we must state again most firmly that there were no USSR Navy submarines near the Swedish coast in general and in Swedish territorial waters in particular (apart from the unforeseen entry into territorial waters in October 1981, which received press coverage, owing to a malfunction in the navigational instruments which was not picked up by the crew in a timely fashion).

Having a good idea of the Baltic Fleet's combat strength, I can attest that submarines could not, even if they so desired, operate in the shallow waters which people in Sweden rank as "areas of heightened activity" on the part of our submariners owing to their technical characteristics.

However, I repeat, they had no such desire. On the contrary we were always guided and are still guided by very strict directives and instructions from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and the Navy Command, which prevent both submarines and surface vessels even coming close enough to foreign territorial waters to permit the possibility of any mistakes.

[Bogomolov] Along with the "historical retrospection" the Rand Corporation also singles out the alleged increase in USSR Navy activity near Swedish shores over the last five years...

[Zakharin] ...Precisely, and that cannot fail to provoke very serious objections on our part. Given its adopted defensive doctrine, the Soviet Union is in fact implementing the phased withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe. M.S. Gorbachev's Murmansk initiative and his speech in Helsinki opened the way to a sharp reduction in confrontation in the north of the continent.

Think about this: Not a year passes without us reducing the Soviet military presence in the seas and oceans and restricting the scale of fleet exercises in a spirit of goodwill. This fully applies to the Baltic Fleet and is confirmed in particular by the withdrawal of the submarines known in the West as "Golf" submarines from the fleet by the end of the year. There are a considerable number of such cases. But what do the Rand Corporation's experts care about these facts!

But, as is well known, lies generate bigger lies. The report we examined contains a clearly unscrupulous hint that the Soviet leadership allegedly still has to convince some people within the country of the undesirability of further "reconnaissance operations" off the shores of Sweden. But one wonders who has to be convinced—some political opposition or, perhaps, the top brass? After all our military men are taking a most active part in elaborating and concluding highly important agreements with the United States, Britain, the FRG, and other countries to prevent incidents at sea. Under these conditions casting a slur on our Armed Forces and depicting them as a kind of retarding factor impeding the establishment of the new thinking is at the least unscrupulous.

[Bogomolov] Leaving aside the fact that the Rand Corporation report is anti-Swedish in character, paradoxical as this sounds at first, it abounds in manifestations of dissatisfaction with official Stockholm's circumspect and well-considered actions.

[Zakharin] Quite right. I have met ordinary Swedes and I can say with utter certainty that, whether Mr. Makkormik [name as transliterated] likes it or not, they, like the country's government, are not afraid of the Soviet Union and do not mistrust our policy. Especially since the Agreement on the Principles of Demarcation of the Waters of the Baltic Sea was signed quite recently between our two countries in the spirit of strengthening friendly relations and cooperation. As for the periodical highly ill-intentioned campaigns mounted in the Western press, they seem to have failed to achieve the end result.

Is that not why the U.S. military-industrial complex in the form of the Rand Corporation has decided to give Sweden's right-wing political forces support, exert some pressure on it, poison the public atmosphere within the country, and as a result damage its relations with the Soviet Union?..

To sum up the conversation, I would like to suggest that the Rand Corporation report in question is not so much designed to provide analytical backup to serious research programs as to generate an upsurge of anti-Soviet sentiments. This is probably also the reason for the pathological fantasies that in the event of an armed conflict Soviet troops would attack Norway which shares a border with us via the territory of neutral Sweden (!) and stories that agents landed by our submarines would roam around Swedish Air Force bases disguised as antique dealers, along with a great deal of other rumors. In refuting all these conjectures from distant California, we are proceeding on the premise that the Soviet and Swedish sides are quite capable of discussing any questions of navigation in the Baltic themselves in a spirit of good mutual understanding, after creating as a preliminary a bilateral commission of experts to consider all reports of incidents in the vicinity of Swedish shores. I believe that this article in PRAVDA gives us a good opportunity to once again propose this to our Swedish colleagues.

Swedish Objections to Plan To Admit Balts Noted

PM0103164690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 90 First Edition p 6

[Own correspondent Yu. Kuznetsov report: "So, I. Carlsson..."]

[Text] Stockholm, 26 Feb—The Swedish press is continuing animatedly to comment on the decision adopted the other day on what kind of government will govern Sweden. The Social Democrats will remain in power, their leader, Ingvar Carlsson, having received official instructions from the Riksdag (parliament) speaker to form a new cabinet.

What are the Social Democratic leaders counting on in formulating economic recovery measures, how are they planning to finance them? It has already been announced that the government intends once again, for the umpteenth time, to increase prices for state monopoly goods such as tobacco products, wine, and stronger drinks.

Furthermore, and the major local liberal newspaper DAGENS NYHETER writes to this effect, the Social Democrats intend to implement a program under which Sweden will open up access for people from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to come and work. They will be admitted to work for a two-year period. The object, people here think, is, on the one hand, to alleviate the present manpower shortage in Sweden. And on the other—to help the Balts to master advanced machinery and technology so that on their return home "they can contribute to the acceleration of the economic development of their republics in connection with their efforts to secure greater freedom in relations with the Soviet Union."

Let us leave this meaningful judgment to the conscience of the Swedish commentator, and merely note that the Social Democratic cabinet's plans immediately came under criticism from all sides. Some people are worried that the new immigrants will create an atmosphere of unhealthy competition for jobs. Others state that newcomers from the Baltic region could "simply stay here" after the two-year term, thereby creating a considerable additional burden on Sweden's social security system.

For the time being, however, all these suggestions and proposals are only a part of what is being said in haste and in the atmosphere of a government crisis which is being overcome at considerable cost to the workers' movement and the ruling Social Democratic Party.

Supreme Soviet Session

Supreme Soviet Recesses; Schedule Outlined

LD0203093790 Moscow TASS in English 0922 GMT 2 Mar 90

["Soviet Parliament Recess for Local Elections"—TASS headline; by TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—After a busy week in the Soviet parliament in which deputies decided to inaugurate the post of Soviet president, to call an extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to elect him, and endeavoured to find a way out of the protracted Azerbaijanian-Armenian conflict, many of them are returning home today to take part in Sunday's republican and local elections.

Today parliament will continue its work in committees and commissions. Work is proceeding on the final version of the USSR Law on Ownership which is expected to be submitted for final approval next week.

Next week will be a short one for the deputies: March 8, 9 and 10 are days off in the USSR.

The extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR will open on March 12.

Transcaucasus Closed Session Ends 1 Mar

LD0103161890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Today's closed joint sitting of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet has ended. The question of the situation in the Azerbaijani and Armenian republics and of measures to stabilize the situation were discussed.

At the same time, in the committees and commissions preparatory work was under way for examining a number of questions introduced into the agenda of that session.

Gorbachev Comments on Debate

PM0203111190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 90 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by unnamed TASS correspondent: "With Hope of Change"; date, place of interview not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A TASS correspondent asked M.S. Gorbachev to comment on the 1 March USSR Supreme Soviet sitting.

[Gorbachev] This was the second sitting devoted to the situation in the Transcaucasus. In view of the fact that it was a closed sitting, I can only note that deputies examined with tremendous interest the complex problems arising there and spoke with pain of the tragic events which resulted in fatalities. Let me take this opportunity to once again express my sympathy for the relatives and friends of the dead and for everyone who suffered sorrow and misfortune during those January days.

Of course, we were unable to avoid various emotional speeches and outbursts during the discussion, but the prevailing sentiment among the deputies was the desire to look ahead and the wish for Azerbaijanis and Armenians to meet one another halfway. I believe that some of the first steps have already been outlined here. We agreed in this spirit to finalize and then adopt at a subsequent session a resolution on this question.

I sincerely hope that the efforts made by the Supreme Soviet and USSR people's deputies, who express the feelings of the Soviet people, will strike a chord in the minds and hearts of the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia. I would like to believe that changes for the better are imminent.

Armenian Deputy Views Meeting

AU0103194590 Paris AFP in English 1838 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, Mar 1 (AFP)—The Supreme Soviet failed to agree Thursday on a 12-point settlement plan for Azerbaijan under which power would be returned to the republic's government and emergency rule abrogated. The emergency measures were taken as a result of nationalist and inter-ethnic unrest in January.

The closed-door meeting ended with the postponement until Monday of a vote on a statement on the situation in the troubled region, the Radio Moscow bulletin Interfax reported. The draft statement "pleased neither of the parties involved nor several other deputies (and) it was decided to debate and vote on the text on Monday", INTERFAX said.

The session carried on for several hours past its scheduled close at mid-day. It was the second major debate on the Caucasus following a meeting of the Supreme Soviet on February 19.

Earlier an Azeri deputy, Altai Zaidov [spelling as received], said the Azeri delegation was "satisfied" with the text, elaborated by the Supreme Soviet presidium, the top Soviet state authority. The Armenians had been expected to reject the plan which endorses Azeri sovereignty over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave populated largely by Armenians.

Mr. Zaidov said the text also called for the creation of a committee of enquiry to investigate anti-Armenian attacks on January 13 and for the withdrawal of Red Army troops deployed on January 19 to stamp out nationalist violence perceived as a threat to Soviet power. Mr. Zaidov, a journalist for Azerbaijan radio, said the text called for a "political appreciation" of the events on January 13. He said the Azeris agreed with this provided a similar "appreciation" was issued on the army intervention six days later in which nearly 100 people died.

Mr. Zaidov said the text "calls for no change in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh which was settled on November 29, 1989 by a parliamentary decree reaffirming Azerbaijani sovereignty over the autonomous region." This was expected to anger the Armenians who have been campaigning for more than two years for Nagorno-Karabakh to be reincorporated into Armenia from which it was detached by Stalin.

Armenian deputy Liudmila Arutunian [spelling as received] said her delegation rejected the plan. She said persecution of Armenians was still going on in Baku, the Azerbaijan capital where she claimed Armenians were being made scape-goats for the Red Army intervention.

Parliament on 'Favorable' Transcaucasus Solution

LD0103174190 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] The Supreme Soviet, this country's parliament, discussed in closed session today measures to normalize the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although the Armenian delegation bitterly censured a document drafted in advance, a favorable way out of the protracted ethnic conflict has shaped out at the session. Members of parliament do not rule out the possibility of working out a treaty between the two republics. Some speakers suggested holding new elections to the parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the rest of the Soviet republics to supervise the voting. However, before an interval in the course of the session, emotions in speeches by representatives of the sides concerned reached their limit again. It is quite possible one of the delegations will decline to further debate the issue.

Deputy Reports on Internal Troops Draft Law

LD0103170990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2113 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report by Deputy Fedorov on the draft law on the rights and duties of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the Soviet of the Union session on 26 February in the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed chairman, esteemed people's deputies. The draft law of the USSR on the duties and rights of the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] in the maintenance of public order, prepared by the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, is being submitted for the examination of the Soviet of the Union. I should like to remind you that the currently operating USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree of 28 July 1988 was subjected at the First Congress of People's Deputies to very serious criticism overall, and in particular in connection with the events, the well-known events, in the city of Tbilisi on 9 April 1989. As a result, the First Congress of People's Deputies instructed the USSR Supreme Soviet to study the question of the constitutionality of that decree, and the USSR Supreme Soviet gave the instruction to the Committee for Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order to examine the decree from the point of view of, and with relevance to the Constitution, and report its considerations.

It should be noted that the decree of 28 July 1988 played, on the whole, a certain positive part. It was the necessary and first legal document legislatively regulating the activity of the Internal Troops, their duties and rights in the maintenance of public order. The necessity for such a legislative act is evident against the background of the acute interethnic and social conflicts which have been continuing for the past two years in various regions of the country, at times escalating into massive disorders which unfortunately led not infrequently to human casualties. In all these cases the Internal Troops, within the limits of the rights which they have been granted, have taken the most direct part in thwarting the acts of criminal elements, often being the sole guarantor of ensuring the constitutional rights and safety of Soviet people.

Noting this, the Committee for Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order draws the conclusion that such regulating should be done not at the level of decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium or even, as does happen, of departmental orders and instructions, but at the level of the law, by means of the supreme legislative body, for it is a question of a constitutional nature. At the same time it is necessary to say that the aforementioned decree contains norms partially not in keeping with the current provisions of the USSR Constitution. This applies to the right granted to the troops to enter citizen's homes essentially without sufficient grounds, which contravenes Article 55 of the USSR Constitution. Apart from that, the decree does not provide for the participation of the union republic in resolving the question of the use of Internal Troops as a measure for stopping mass disorders, and the grounds for the use of special means are not defined.

These questions have been thoroughly studied in our committee with the participation of scientists, jurists and experts from the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Procuracy, the Committee for State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the Internal Troops and other ministries and departments concerned. As a result, the present draft reflects the changes in the legal status of the Internal Troops of the USSR MVD in the form of their withdrawal from membership of the Soviet armed forces. A mechanism is proposed for using these troops for maintenance of law and order with the direct participation of the union republics. A new Article 6 has been introduced, which defines the conditions for the use of the special means which the Internal Troops have at their disposal. The procedure for the use of weapons as an extreme measure has been clarified. Apart from this, it is considered expedient to take into consideration a number of proposals from people's deputies and also from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs which have been received recently, and are, therefore, not reflected in the text of the draft law which has been distributed to you.

They are dictated by real and substantial difficulties which the Internal Troops have faced in the performance of their duties in eliminating the aftermath of the emergency declared by decrees of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 15 and 19 January of the current year. It is a matter of unprecedented unlawful acts by anti-constitutional groups armed not only with firearms, including automatic weapons, but also with armored equipment and artillery weapons seized without authority.

In this connection it is proposed to give the Internal Troops the possibility of using weapons without warning against offenders who use combat equipment, means of transportation, flying apparatuses, and marine vessels in attacking personnel or citizens, and equally to permit the use of weapons against an armed person who refuses to carry out a legitimate demand to surrender weaponry, and also in cases when it is impossible to detain these criminals or disarm them by any other means.

We consider that the provisions of the present draft law are in keeping with the norms of international law and treaties signed by the Soviet Union. In addition to this, it seems important to point out that during the time of the work on the draft law there was examination of the problem of transferring the Internal Troops to the voluntary principle of recruitment by contract, or on the so-called professional principle.

Similar wishes were expressed during the discussion of this document in the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. At our recommendation, this matter is with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, where it is at the stage of being closely studied and where proposals to implement it are undergoing practical finalization. According to preliminary caluclations, the introduction of this principle of recruitment will entail a minimum fivefold increase in the overall cost of maintaining them. Thus, it is proposed that the transfer of the internal troops to a voluntary principle of organization should be implemented on the basis of a comprehensive, long-term and step-by-step program envisioning mixed recruitment initially. I think we, people's deputies, should support the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, which, by way of practical steps, is proposing to the USSR Council of Ministers that an experiment be carried out in the internal troops in 1990-1 to recruit five military units using professionals, according to service, such as operational units, special motorized militia units, units guarding corrective labor institutions, units on escort duty for judicial and investigative bodies or on routine escort duty, and units of special troops. This will cost more than 31 million rubles extra annually just for pay and allowances. This spending seems justified in order that at long last young men of 18 or 19 called up for active military service are not in future allocated for functions that are not appropriate for those called up for active military service.

Taking into account of the above, the following proposal is being suggested even now for the second part of Article 1, and I quote: "'Personnel are called up for active military service in the internal troops.' should be reworded as follows: 'internal troops are recruited from personnel called up for active military service in accordance with existing legislation, and also on a voluntary basis on contract.'" Since our committee has recommended the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the government not to confine themselves to the draft law that is being discussed today and to commence work on a broader draft on internal troops, it would evidently be right for the issue of full transfer of troops to a new principle of recruitment, as well as other provisions concerning the problems of the organization of the internal troops and their service activity and the social, legal, material and technical back- up for personnel, to be reflected in the future in a broader and more fundamental draft law.

Thus, one must note that this draft law is of an interim nature. But it is essential at the present time and in its present form deal with at least two general constitutional problems. The first problem is that of annulling the elements in the decree of 28 july 1988, which give grounds for talking of the unconstitutionality of a number of provisions of the decree. The proposed draft law annuls these problems, it removes them. The second problem to solve which the proposed draft law needs to be adopted is the problem connected with the necessity of lifting the regulation of such important matters that concern the constitution from the level of departmental instructions and orders to the level of a law adopted by the supreme legislative body.

Esteemed deputies, on behalf of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Issues of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, I propose and urge you to support the USSR law on the obligations and rights of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the maintenance of public order, to call on the committee to take into account the proposals that are evidently still going to be made here today and to pass it on for consideration by the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Draft Governing MVD Use of Weapons Explained

PM0103111190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Interview under the "USSR Supreme Soviet Day By Day" rubric with N.V. Fedorov, member of the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, and Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry (MVD) internal troops, by Captain 3d Class V. Urban: "Professionals—The Backbone of the Internal Forces"]

[Text] The Supreme Soviet chambers had separate sittings on 26 February. The Soviet of the Union examined the draft law on the legal regulations governing a state of emergency. There was a heated discussion, with the rights of the Union and the republics in determining the mechanism whereby the law operates causing the main disagreements. It was also proposed that the discussion should be postponed until the question of the status of the presidency is resolved and that the powers of the Armed Forces and internal troops should be set out in detail. Obviously, these arguments will also crop up in the Soviet of Nationalities, because the relevant committees have been told to finalize the draft and then submit it to the Soviet of Nationalities for its first reading.

At the same time, it took the Soviet of the Union only an hour to approve by and large the draft law on the duties and rights of Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops. In particular, the intention is to effect a stage-by-stage transfer of part of the internal forces and militia, who carry out routine tasks maintaining public order, to the voluntary staffing principle. An experiment will be carried out in 1990-1991 to switch the personnel of five troop units to a professional footing.

Journalists naturally asked N.V. Fedorov, member of the Committee for Questions of Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order, who directed all the preparatory legislative work on the draft, and Colonel General Yu.V. Shatalin, chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry internal troops, to comment on the new law.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA inquired, among other things, about the rights and duties of the troops regarding the use of weapons and special facilities. Is there anything new in the law?

[Shatalin] The following fact is a guarantee that there will be no abuses here. In all cases where weapons have been used the prosecutor's office will institute criminal proceedings. Even if there are no fatalities we are obliged to inform the prosecutor's office so that it can check for what purpose the weapons were used.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] But when are weapons used?

[Shatalin] The law says that in the event of an attack on a serviceman or militia officer, or if citizens' lives are threatened....

[Fedorov] The serviceman makes all his own decisions....

[Shatalin] He is also legally liable for the incorrect use of weapons.

[Fedorov] Depending on the intensity of the attack and on the situation, the serviceman also decides for himself how to act. For the first time we are enacting in law the formula: The serviceman is given the right to act according to his discretion. But if there are any problems, both the commander and the serviceman will then have to demonstrate that the circumstances were such that a particular type of authorized weapon had to be used.

[Shatalin] Weapons cannot be used when masses of people are milling around. Troops have special means of defense.

As we can see, all this demands a high level of training and adequate legal education for soldiers and junior commanders. The Soviet Union accepted these arguments when it voted for the gradual professionalization of the internal troops. Now it is up to the Soviet of Nationalities.

Further Ryzhkov Remarks on Presidency Issue

LD0103145190 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] When members of parliament debated the presidentship issue in the Kremlin on Tuesday, some of them said presidency was indispensable to overcome disturbances in the country. There was also a proposal made to give emergency powers to the government. Our reporter Vyacheslav Terekhov has asked Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov to comment on these statements:

[Begin Ryzhkov recording in Russian with superimposed English translation] It's not only the current moment that matters; we should look ahead. In fact, there's power regrouping under way in the country. Although this is the most important thing, many fail to understand it, and the impression is that since it's bad today, give us presidential powers. Once a president comes in he will restore order and so forth. Why has such a situation emerged today? One power has grown weak; another one has not grown strongly yet. That's the essence of everything.

Who adopted decisions earlier? The party did. Today the party says power should be vested in local governing bodies—soviets—and it's this process that is under way, a process where a vacuum should be avoided. Good or bad, power existed. Since power regrouping is taking place, all institutions of power should be set up so that nothing would remain outside. [end recording]

Voicing agreement with the proposals to give emergency powers to the cabinet, Nikolay Ryzhkov urged the need for acting in keeping with the Constitution rather than resorting to special powers. Such powers should be given only as a way out of certain situations. Executive power today, Nikolay Ryzhkov added, is not what it used to be. When we are criticized for bullying someone it's forgotten that if we do, we've got to breach the law, Ryzhkov said. Although the union republics have received more leeway, they continue to keep the center under pressure as before. This has led to much inconsistency between reality, and calls for independence. Whenever there's trouble somewhere in the USSR it's the central authorities that are mainly blamed. Of course, the government works with shortcomings; it should work in a new way. But political changes must concern everybody rather than executive power alone. A new political power system is in the making, Nikolay Ryzhkov went on to say.

He concluded by voicing certainty that presidential structure will help to avoid executive power instability some members of parliament were afraid of. What's most important is that presidential power and the new political system will help to safeguard democracy. There's nothing more important than that.

Yakovlev Discusses State of Emergency Draft

LD0103141490 Moscow Television Servie in Russian 2025 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report by Justice Minister Veniamin Yakovlev on the draft law on the legal foundations for a state of emergency, at the Soviet of Nationalities session on 26 February in the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed chairman, esteemed comrade people's deputies. The draft law on the legal regime for a state of emergency has been compiled by the USSR Government, in accordance with the Supreme Soviet instructions. Allow me to share with you certain considerations which were taken into account in the process of compiling this draft, considerations that reflect its thrust and content. In the first place, I would like to note this aspect: That no matter how paradoxical it is, the state of emergency legislation is a normal element of any legislative and legal system. In essence, legislation of this kind exists if not in all countries of the world then in many countries. The necessity for this kind of legislation is explained, first and foremost, by the fact that in any society there may arise—and suddenly, at that—extreme situations posing danger for great numbers of people.

Unfortunately, our recent reality abounds in situations of this nature, tragic, large-scale situations assuming various forms. These include the tragedy in Armenia—a major earthquake—as well as the Tajik earthquake, the Chernobyl accident, the events in Fergana and Novyy Uzen, events around Nagorno-Karabakh, along the state border in Azerbaijan, in Baku, and Dushanbe.

The second noteworthy aspect is this: Article 119 of the USSR Constitution provides for the introduction of a state of emergency. However, we have no law which would stipulate the procedure, the grounds for, and the essence of measures entailed by a state of emergency. This state of affairs condemns the authorities and those in charge to indecisiveness and inaction precisely at a time when resolute action is needed to save people, to protect their safety and public order—or else the absence of the law can serve as a pretext for unjustified and excessive measures being applied, violating citizens' rights into the bargain.

It is precisely the purpose of the State of Emergency law to create the legal prerequisites urgently to apply effective measures to normalize public life, to ensure vital supplies for the people, to reestablish and maintain public order. Consequently, the essence of the law consists in defining the measures which the authorities and those in charge may apply in extraordinary circumstances. These measures must, moreover, be at the same time adequate and sufficient to fit the situation and to some extent they must inevitably entail a curtailment in citizens' rights—but, at the same time, they would not be unjustified and they would not be incommensurate with the situation.

In the first place, of course, there arises a question of the draft law that has been submitted being in keeping with the Soviet Union's international obligations and with the relevant international standards. I must say that Article Four of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows for a state of emergency to be introduced, under certain conditions which I will now name. First, it is a requirement that it must be officially announced.

Second, measures which represent a departure from one's obligations arising from the covenant are, naturally, allowed, including measures that affect citizens' rights—but their extent must be commensurate with the acuteness of the situation.

Third, it is required that measures that are taken are not incompatible with our other international obligations, obligations under international law and that they do not entail discrimination exclusively on the basis of race, sex, language, religion, or social origins.

Fourth, the measures that are introduced must not represent a departure from such inalienable citizens' rights as the right to life, nor should they entail inhuman treatment or treatment which humiliates one's dignity, slavery or coercion—here I am simply quoting the covenant—nor should they entail deprivation of freedom for nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, or making the criminal law that introduces new liability or more severe punishment retrospective. The measures should not entail a deprivation of one's rights in law [pravo subyektnosti] or of one's freedom of thought, conscience, or religion.

So these are actually the demands with which the submitted draft must be in keeping. The way we see it, this correspondence does exist.

The draft law envisions, in the first place, the grounds for the introduction of a state of emergency; in the second place, the procedure for its introduction, and in the third place and most importantly, the measures which may be applied by the relevant bodies of power and administrative bodies under extraordinary circumstances. It also provides for guarantees that these measures can be realistically applied.

The draft law submitted by the government has been examined by the Committee for Legislation, Legality, Law and Order and it has been, I mean, approved by it with relevant additions and amendments. All in all, as it seems to us, these additions and amendments improve the draft and I think one should agree to them, although some of them need to be elucidated and it even seems to me that some of them are not completely acceptable, something I shall briefly touch on here.

So, in the first place, we have the grounds for the introduction of a state of emergency. The draft that has been submitted by the government outlines the grounds as follows: A state of emergency represents a temporary measure, announced in accordance with the USSR Constitution in the interests of defending the USSR and protecting the safety of its citizens during natural disasters, major accidents or catastrophes, epidemics, mass public order disturbances, and other circumstances posing danger to life or health of citizens or which may entail serious punishment.

The draft that has been approved by the committee puts it somewhat differently. I would say that here the grounds have been narrowed down somewhat. Instead, I mean, disturbances of public order as being grounds for the introduction—it says mass disturbances. Of course, one might also agree with this way of putting it but it seems to me that this is, as it were, a justification that has been somewhat narrowed down and maybe it fails to encompass all the circumstances that may make a state of emergency necessary. The point is that mass disturbances is a provision that has been defined in law. By this one understands pogroms, destruction, arson, and armed resistance. But, after all, mass disturbances of public order can be expressed in some other actions, too, such as, for instance, let us say, illegal mass scale eviction of citizens from their housing, robbery with violence, plunder, killings, and so on. Strictly speaking these are not mass disturbances but they are mass violations of public order and they are violations of citizens' most inalienable, as it were, and most essential rights. That is why it is quite possible that we should nevertheless dwell on the phrase mass disturbances of public order which pose a threat to citizens' life or health or can entail serious consequences.

As for the procedure for introducing a state of emergency, it is defined in the USSR's Constitution: Article 119, point 14. In accordance with Article 119—and this has been enshrined in the draft law—a state of emergency is seen, in the first place, as a temporary measure and, in the second place, as a measure that is confined to a certain timeframe and, in the second [as heard] place as a measure that applies to a certain definite territory and confined to within a certain definite territorial frame. Article 119 of the Constitution says that it is the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium that introduces a state of emergency. It can declare a state of emergency throughout the whole of the country or in individual localities, with an obligatory examination of the issue with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union republic in question. Again, the draft's Article 2, which enshrines the grounds for the introduction or, to be more correct, for the procedure of introducing a state of emergency differs somewhat in the committee's version from the version that is contained in the draft that has been submitted by the government.

Here I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the version proposed by the committee is not, in our view, a completely suitable one. The point is, in the first place, that it is not fully in keeping with Article 119 of the Constitution and if it is to be accepted in the committee's version then it will also be necessary to alter the wording of the Constitution's Article 119. But, the main thing is this: That the formulation proposed by the committee is such that, in essence, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium is unable to introduce a state of emergency urgently, even when it is extremely essential.

Let us ponder the formulation proposed by the committee. It says: In the event of a real threat to the interests of the USSR and the safety of its citizens, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium declares a state of emergency throughout the whole country and also in individual localities with the issue being obligatorily examined with the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the union republic in question. So far, it is fully in keeping with the Constitution's Article 119. But, further on, it says: In the event of a union republic failing to give its consent to a declaration of a state of emergency on its territory to the USSR Supreme soviet Presidium, the issue is to be examined by a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. This formulation can be interpreted as meaning that it will not be possible to introduce a state of emergency without the consent of a Supreme Soviet session.

But, consequently, in order to have a state of emergency introduced, one will need to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet—you are aware that it is not done all that quickly—and, secondly, one will need to have had relevant discussions and debates here, at a Supreme Soviet session. But, in the meantime, during that time, circumstances which should have been averted as a matter of emergency may be taking place.

I must say that as far as foreign legislation is concerned, the introduction of a state of emergency is a prerogative of the executive power, one that is able to act very promptly indeed. For instance, in the United States it is the country's President who introduces a state of emergency. In France, it is the government. It is another matter that French legislation provides for a subsequent confirmation by the Parliament of the state of emergency—but it is another matter. However, the introduction itself of a state of emergency is done quickly and expeditiously by precisely the executive power. Well, in this case, our Constitution envisions the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium here. I think that, all the same, one should surely stick with the formulation enshrined in Article 119 of the Constitution—otherwise our state will be unable to ensure the safety of our citizens in extreme conditions, conditions where bloodshed may occur. This is why we ask you to take a very attentive look at the formulation of Article 2.

Further, the state of emergency law should define the measures which authorities and those in charge may apply in extreme conditions, when a state of emergency is declared. In this sense, Article 5 of the draft law, outlining the measures to be applied in state of emergency conditions, represents the key norm of the draft law.

All in all and despite everything, it seems to us that the draft law has, with account having been taken of the considerations I have spoken of here, been prepared in what is not a bad way and I think that it could be possible to approve it in the main and, following some little additional work, to also pass it.

Our main task consists in restoring moral health to our society and it is quite possible that precisely such work on our society's moral health will serve as one of the main means of averting the emergency of extreme situations. Thank you.

Vilkas Reports on Economic, Social Draft Law

LD0103134690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1904 GMT 26 Feb 90

[Report by Eduardos Vilkas, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Social and Economic Development of Constituent and Autonomous Regions and Territories, on the draft law on the general principles of management of the economy and social sphere in the union and autonomous republics at the Soviet of Nationalities session on 26 February in the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] The draft was examined at a conference of representatives of republics, autonomous oblasts, and okrugs. The exchange of opinions which took place made it possible significantly to enrich the draft and take fuller account of the specific nature of the economic autonomy of the various territorial-state formations. The draft law, in comparison with its preceding versions, has been radically reworked. The approach to the concept of the law has been fundamentally changed. Instead of the traditional ordering of the rights and powers of the union and autonomous republics, it is proposed to set up a system of legal measures determining the new economic relations of subjects of the Soviet Federation. The draft law which is being submitted determines the remit of the USSR and establishes the republics' right autonomously to decide all questions of their economic and social development apart from those which are transferred by the republics to the authority of the center. As I have said, it would be a good thing to say voluntarily transferred. It is proposed to include in their number only those spheres of activity which ensure the protection of the common interests of all the republics and create the legal prerequisites and economic conditions for their autonomous management and mutually favorable cooperation in the framework of the all-Union market.

A central place in the draft is occupied by provisions defining the economic autonomy of the republics. This concerns primarily their powers in the financial sphere, formation of the system of taxation, regulating the use of nature, planning, and other spheres of management on their own territories. Doubtless, in the course of debate, all questions will arise about the competences, in these spheres, between the USSR and the republics, being demarcated insufficiently clearly. But you can see for yourselves that this is very difficult to do, and I think that if the principle is adopted that the Union engages in the coordination of policy where such coordination is required, then after some time it will all work out and no such misunderstandings will arise.

The republics' right is envisaged, autonomously to compile their budget and determine the directions of its use, to regulate conditions of investment activity on their territories, voluntarily to take part in all-Union programs, to carry out autonomous foreign economic activity, and to decide all questions of social development. Fundamentally new is the attempt to replace command methods of the center's relations with the republics with economic ones. An important role is assigned to agreements and treaties between the government of the USSR and the governments of the Union republics, and also contractual forms of bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation of Union and autonomous republics.

The advantages of the economic autonomy of the republics, local soviets, and enterprises can be most fully implemented in conditions of an all-union market. The formation of such a market will promote the effective division of labor and the economically expedient integration of the republics and regions, thus ensuring the strengthening of the economic foundation of the Soviet Federation.

Formulated in the law are the basic principles of the economic relations in conditions of the all-union market. These are, above all, autonomy of the producers of goods and the equality of various forms of ownership, a single monetary system and absence of customs barriers, the existence of all-union social guarantees and other norms directed at protection of the working people's rights.

The law envisages an economic mechanism of regulation of regional markets by union and autonomous republics and also norms for the protection of the all-union market and prevention of discrimination against the various management subjects. The draft law substantially expands the competences of the autonomous republics which receive practically the same rights of self-government as the union republics. Much significance has been given to strengthening the economic autonomy of autonomous oblasts and okrugs.

The draft law proposes a legal mechanism ensuring guarantees of economic autonomy for union and autonomous republics, and also determining the mutual economic responsibility of the republics and USSR bodies of administration. The republics are granted the right to suspend decisions adopted by central bodies of administration, and which violate the rights of union and autonomous republics established by legislation of the USSR. A definite procedure is envisaged in the settlement of disagreements between the government of the

USSR and those of the union republics and also between the union and autonomous republics.

In view of the fact that the law fundamentally differs from the draft previously debated in the Supreme Soviet, the committees and commissions which took part in compiling the draft law have come to the conclusion that it is necessary to change its name, as has already been pointed out. It is proposed to give it the following name: Law of the USSR on the Foundations of the Economic Relations of the USSR, the Union, the Autonomous Republics. This variant is noted in the draft.

The draft law envisages the possibility of the creation of special conditions of economic autonoy for individual Union republics in view of the specific nature of their economic and social development. This opens up broad opportunities for the republics to display initiative in the selection of various models of management of the economy and perfection of the forms of mutual relations with the center and with the other republics.

The version being submitted basically takes into account the remarks and proposals of the committees and commissions which took part in the work on the law. The greatest discussion centered on problems of mutual relations of the union and autonomous republics. The Commission of Nationalities Policy and Relations between Nationalities posed the question of changing the existing system of subordination of autonomous formations. In the version of the law under debate, the autonomous republics are, as regards competence in the economic sphere, made equal to the union republics. They are also competent autonomously to decide questions of social development, use of nature, and ecology. As for the other aspects of this problem, they lie outside the framework of the present law and must be examined at a constitution level.

Account has been taken of the remarks of the Commission for Planning, Budget and Finance on questions of delineating the competences of the USSR and the union republics, and also of the proposals of the Committee for Issues of the Economic Reform regarding the ordering of the all-union market.

The present draft law is an organic part of the system of laws determing the restructuring of all economic relations in our society. It is directly connected, as already noted, with the laws of property, land, the enterprise, local self-government, and so on. Essentially it somehow amplifies the demarcation of the powers of the USSR and union republics in the economic sphere with more specific content.

We consider that the adoption of this law will be a real step on the road to forming a union of equal, autonomous republics on a qualitatively new economic basis. Since the law introduces a number of fundamentally new provisions, in the case of its being adopted it will be necessary to make amendments to the relevant articles of the USSR Constitution. This concerns primarily the articles devoted to the economic system of the USSR, the union, the autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, union and republican bodies of state power and administration.

Taking into account the fact that before the completion of the first stage of the program of measures for the imporovement of the economy, many provisions of the present law cannot be fully implemented. It is poroposed to adopt a resolution on the procedure for its coming into force. It is envisaged at this stage to preserve the procedure for citing initial data for planning with consistent reduction of the proportion of state order, while granting the republics the possibilities of introducing restrictions on deliveries outside the limits of the republic of output produced above state order.

The government will have to carry out a great deal of organizational work for the restructuring of the whole system of bodies of administration, make clarifications to the procedure for drafting the maintaining programs, plans and budget, on the basis of the present law. We will hope that it will operate better that the case of the Baltic Law.

Analogous work will have to be done also by the bodies of state power and administration of the union and autonomous republics.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Meets With Baltic Deputies 28 Feb

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[Text] Six USSR people's deputies from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia yesterday met with Mikhail Gorbachev. This is Roma Pakeniene reporting.

The initiative for the meeting came from Mikhail Gorbachev himself. Lithuania was represented by Kazimiera Prunskiene and Eduardas Vilkas, USSR Supreme Soviet deputies.

According to K. Prunskiene, Mikhail Gorbachev became rather worried about the position expressed by the Baltic deputies that they did not recognize the setting up of the institution of president and were prepared to abstain from voting in the presidential elections. The discussion took place during the lunch break at the Supreme Soviet session and lasted about half an hour.

The leader of the Soviet Union tried to convince the deputies that the institution of president was not detrimental to the Baltic republics. In their turn, the representatives of the three Baltic countries directed the discussion toward the topic of the restoration of independence.

In spite of what our point of view on the president as a possible partner in the negotiations might be, said K. Prunskiene, our position remains very firm: to reinstate the state of Lithuania.

Therefore, the representatives of the three Baltic countries stressed urgently that the negotiations between individual Baltic republics and the USSR should start without delay.

[Begin Prunskiene recording] It seemed that Gorbachev did not oppose the idea of discussing this issue at the Supreme Soviet at an earlier date, shifting the issue from item No. 20 on the agenda to a significantly earlier stage. However, it should be discussed together with the set of similar issues concerning relations between the republics and the center.

After all, it does not matter where on the agenda our issue will be discussed. The only important thing is that we want to have it discussed earlier so that the topics for negotiations are set up at the Supreme Soviet. That is, as far as we are concerned, it is entirely our business. We shall have it set up. But for the union it is a different matter: What is the subject of negotiations? Will there be a Supreme Soviet commission?

If these negotiations take place before the institution of president comes into power, or if the negotiations take place later, then clearly the situation will change. Of course, we would like to have it as soon as possible so that at least the start of negotiations is established when the institution of president becomes legally valid.

One of our main objectives at the moment is to have our position on the restoration of our statehood formulated and to ensure that these negotiations get under way. [end recording]

According to K. Prunskiene, M. Gorbachev himself seems unprepared to take responsibility in deciding who the opposite side in the negotiations should be—himself or a special commission set up by the Presidium. He clearly wants this issued to be raised at the Supreme Soviet and it seems he is inclined to speed up the discussion of the issue.

I asked K. Prunskiene if M. Gorbachev had expressed his position in any way concerning our aspirations for independence.

[Begin Prunskiene recording] This position could be guessed from somewhat (?unofficial) utterances. Let us take this point: He understands that no reverse process is possible. He even said let Lithuania be first to taste this, meaning you will see how bad it is, because the Latvians had said that both sides would be better off. He has serious doubts about this, that both sides would be better off, of course, giving no arguments to substantiate why it would be better to remain in the USSR.

We all left without having reached any concrete agreements. However, he said twice: Act as you think fit. In other words, he thinks that the initiative would come from us concerning the negotiations and the content of negotiations and that we will not stop at that and that we will be expecting from him some concrete statements after this, I would say, preliminary discussion. [end recording]

In general, K. Prunskiene said, Gorbachev was rather annoyed. However, this was probably because of the heated discussions at the Supreme Soviet concerning the institution of president. K. Prunskiene said that the thoughts expressed by the deputies could even have given him some consolation in that, in general, the institution of president is probably not a bad idea in stablizing the situation. Perhaps it would be more useful to us to have a stable neighbor. However, essentially, this does not concern us. In other words, you are going to have a dictator and we do not care at all. According to K. Prunskiene, this position adopted by the Estonians was selfish and we thought it was totally unacceptable.

Another meeting, also of great importance, took place on Monday in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. This was an unofficial consultative conference. Lithuania was represented at the conference by Romualdas Ozolas, one of the chairmen of the Independence Commission, and three other specialists in this field. From the Estonian side there was Arnold Ryuytel, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and members of government commissions which are working on the preparation of materials for the negotiations with Moscow.

According to Romualdas Ozolas, the aim of this meeting was to find out what the real situation is concerning actions for independence in Estonia, to define more precisely the Estonian principles known to us, and to find out what concrete actions have been planned on this issue by the current Estonian Government.

The meeting was rather rich in content. We clarified the Estonian position which is very determined concerning the issue of independence, R. Ozolas maintained.

[Begin Ozolas recording] One thing which caused me some concern is that they are prepared to ally the main stress on the people's will, that is, on the institution of self-determination, while at the same time we maintain that we do not have such a freedom. We cannot carry out self-determination one way or the other. We made our decision more than half a century ago and we have independence. Therefore, we can repeat the declaration of our independence once more. Attempts should be made to implement it at the newly elected Supreme Soviet. Here our points of view on the issue are somewhat different. However, I regard this as a matter peculiar to our countries. [end recording]

I asked R. Ozolas why Latvian representatives did not take part in this conference. Ozolas said that their situation is rather complicated, that they had not yet adopted the essential decisions concerning 1940, at least on the scope that we had.

[Begin Ozolas recording] The idea of setting up a provisional Baltic parliament, which would be similar to Sajudis, the People's Fronts, and the Baltic Council would probably be fruitful. This idea should be made more specific when the Presidium of our Supreme Soviet is convened. We are going to present an official proposal or at least an opinion on the issue. If everything takes a normal course and no unexpected events which would demand immediate response take place, we are going to leave for Latvia without delay to find out what the situation is like in real terms there and to hold discussions with them concerning the possibility of setting up such a council.

By the way, the problem of permanent communications between Sajudis and the People's Front will be solved at last. Our representatives will take up residence in Riga. Working permanently there, they will be able to supply us with all the information. [end recording]

Kazimiera Prunskiene and Romualdas Ozolas were talking about the just actions of the Baltic countries striving for negotiations with Moscow on the restoration of independence.

AFP Report

AU0103164090 Paris AFP in English 1620 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Moscow, March 1 (AFP)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has ruled out the creation of a special parliament commission to discuss moves for independence by the three Baltic republics of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, a Moscow Radio publication said here Thursday. Mr. Gorbachev told deputies from the Baltic republics and deputies of the pro-reform Inter-Regional movement Tuesday he would examine resolutions adopted by their three parliaments last year that said secret protocols to a 1939 pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were null and void.

Krima Prunskiene, Lithuania's deputy prime minister, told the press in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, the Soviet leader turned down their request that a parliamentary panel should be set up, the Moscow Radio INTERFAX news service said. The 1939 pact which was signed by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his Soviet counterpart Viacheslav Molotov carved up spheres of interest in Eastern Europe nine days before the start of World War II. Provisions in the secret protocols led to the 1940 annexation of the three Baltic nations that had been independent since the end of World War I.

Jusice Minister Yakovlev on Presidential Power

LD0103100590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1950 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Interview with USSR Justice Minister Venyamin Fedorovich Yakovlev by political observer Georgiy Ivanovich Zubkov; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Zubkov] The first question is an obvious one. What is presidential power, what is its essence?

[Yakovlev] In terms of a scientific definition, it is a form of government, in other words, it is a form of organization of authority under which there is a supreme state official who individually, rather than collectively, fulfills the duties of the head of state. Such a head of state is normally called the president of the country.

In terms of the president's position within the structure of the bodies of power, we should say that it is a very special position which coincides neither with the position of the legislative authorities nor the executive authorities nor the judicial authorities. In essence he personifies the unity of the nation and the state, represents society, the people as a whole, guarantees the sovereignty, independence, security, and territorial integrity of the given state, and the interaction of these same bodies of legislative authority, executive authority, and even the judicial authority.

[Zubkov] Why is this institution being introduced? What has brought it about?

[Yakovlev] That is indeed a totally justified question and I think an extremely interesting one because we have not had a president either before the October Revolution or after. That is, for over 70 years we have lived without a president.

I think that the reasons for this are very profound. The point is that now, within the process of perestroyka, the structures of our state are being formed anew. Frankly, our society has been governed, and I think this situation is well known, by party structures, party bodies. In particular, the highest political body of the country, in a sense, taking the most important political decisions, was the Politburo. And if we go further back, the functions of this kind of let us say center of political power were fulfilled simply by Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin who, as we all know, was not a president either. Nevertheless, as the leader of the party, as the leader, he to a significant extent fulfilled the functions of the head of state. But that was not constitutional power.

Now it is a question of forming state structures, so that power is transferred from party bodies and party structures to state bodies and state structures. We have formed a legislative authority, which is the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Peoples' Deputies at Union level. Now we presumably have to form the missing structure, which is the structure of the head of state, so that the function of the head of state is fulfilled not by collective bodies like until now, not by the Politburo and not by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, but by a person who in the appropriate instances can take important state decisions—taking upon himself the responsibility for such decisions—and take them sufficiently promptly and ensure their implementation.

[Zubkov] We are turning more and more often to the experience of Western democracy and on the occasion in hand, it would be possible to compare presidential power, the institution of this power, with other countries. Well, it would above all be interesting to find out about and compare the United States and France.

[Yakovlev] First of all it needs to be said that the presidential form of government is extremely widespread in the world, contrary, perhaps, to our widespread conception. After all, if we take Europe, presidential power and presidency are present in France, in Italy, in the FRG, Austria, Greece, and so on. Presidents have now appeared in the socialist countries. These are the president of Poland and, as is known, the president of Czechoslovakia, the president of Hungary. Presidency also exists in the countries of other continents. As is known, there is a president in the United States, in Mexico, in India. So this is an extremely widespread form of government. But it must be said that although there is such a unity, as it were, of form we nevertheless observe here a great diversity in the sphere of the specific functions performed by the president within the structure of the state bodies. After all, les us say, the President of the United States is one thing, the president of France is quite another. The President of the United State is not only the head of state with functions which do not belong to anyone else, but he is also the head of government, that is, in other words, he is the head of executive power. The president of France is the head of state with extremely extensive powers....

[Zubkov, interrupting] Very extensive....

[Yakovlev] With very extensive powers, with powers which recall the powers of other, as it were, figures, heads of state because there are after all also heads of state in the form of monarchs, kings, emperors, and so on. The president of France has extremely extensive powers, but nonetheless there is a government which also has a premier, as it were. That it is, there is here, although to an unequal degree, a leader with executive power, but nevertheless, in contrast to the President of the United States, one who does not directly head the government. Therefore, there are different structures, different sets of powers, and so on. Our approach, it seems to me, generally, is rather distinct. Our president, judging by the draft which was discussed yesterday at the USSR Supreme Soviet, is the head of state, of course, but he does not receive legislative functions together with this, whereas many presidents do possess significant legislative functions alongside, of course, functions belonging to the parliament. This is the first thing. Legislative power will remain with the Supreme Soviet.

Secondly, he does not head the government, either. The government, as an executive body, the supreme executive body, is maintained, as are the head of government, the premier, and all his functions. In essence, our president is, so to speak, filling a vacuum. In other words, we are introducing a new figure, which we have not had but for which we are now feeling an acute need, especially taking account of all manner of extraordinary situations and so on. So, there must indeed be a head of state who will not appropriate to himself or take the place of either legislative, or executive, or judicial bodies. His powers are very precisely and strictly limited. Let us say....

[Zubkov, interrupting] Go ahead.

[Yakovlev] Let us suppose the following: He ensures, in the case of necessity, interaction in the work of our representative legislative bodies and the executive branch. That interaction is now patently inadequate. He represents our state in external relations. Who, you ask, represents our state in external relations now? It used to be the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Now we do not have the old Presidium. In other words, practically nobody does, in reality. Of course, it must be the head of state, the president. He also has to represent our state, as the supreme official, in some kinds of domestic relations. He is the very person who should take charge of such matters as appointing our plenipotentiary representatives abroad, accepting those who seek citizenship of the Soviet Union, and awarding orders and medals to our citizens for some sort of achievements and special services to the state, and so on. In short, yes.

But, of course, I have perhaps not said the most important thing, forgive me: The organization of execution of the Constitution and laws of the USSR and the organization of due observance of the rights and liberties of Soviet citizens. The state must have a guarantor of the Constitution, a guarantor of observance of our laws, if we are now going over to a law-governed state, to the government of society through laws, and so on. So, as you see, in many countries of the world and here, the president is the supreme commander in chief. Who else can there be in the structure of our bodies of power? So, in essence, he has a completely independent and special sphere of activity and power, which interacts splendidly with the other bodies, legislative, governmental, judicial, and so on, without replacing or appropriating the prerogatives of those other bodies.

[Zubkov] A question arises not only about the combination of and interaction between presidential, executive, legislative, and judicial authority, but also about the presidency of our federation.

[Yakovlev] Yes, this question was raised yesterday during the debate at the Supreme Soviet session and it was discussed very vigorously. It was raised by deputies from the Baltic region and from Georgia, and I think that they put this question correctly. But it must be said that federation and presidency are certainly not mutually exclusive. It is a well-known fact that the United States, which has a presidential form of government, is a federation, and the same goes for the FRG. It is all a question of properly defining the relationship between the union bodies of power and the republican and local ones. Only that which is placed under all-union jurisdiction should, naturally, be within the jurisdiction of any given all-union body, including the president—of any body of power, including the president. The president cannot, after all, arrogate to himself more than appertains to the union within the framework of a federation. Consequently, I believe that the construction of a federation of new principles, which is in fact what is taking place and what we are doing at the present time, will also signify a sensible tackling of issues placed within the authority of the president, but the one does not rule out the other at all.

[Zubkov] There is also, of course, the question of electing the president.

[Yakovlev] Yes, that is also of course an extremely significant question. And it must be stated that the election of a president is organized differently in different countries. Many believe that a president necessarily has to be elected by the people, by the population directly. That is not at all the case. A variety of structures are employed. For instance, in Greece, Italy, the FRG, Poland, and Hungary the president is elected by parliament. In the United States and India, members of an electoral college are elected by the population, and they in turn elect the president. In France, Austria, and Mexico the president is elected directly by the people, by the population, on the basis of direct elections. So there is a variety of structures. It seems to me that our approach is based on what is perhaps the most democratic principle: election of the president by the population on the basis of a direct, universal, and equal secret ballot, and, I am sure, with alternative candidates. But insofar as the structures of our bodies of power on the union level have in fact only just been set up, it would no doubt be rather difficult to conduct popular elections now, particularly in a short space of time, and that is why it is being proposed that the first elections, the election of the first president, should be carried out at the Congress of People's Deputies, but also on the basis of a secret ballot and no doubt—and I am even convinced of it—with alternative candidates.

[Zubkov] One last but very relevant question. What about control of presidential power? How will it be expressed and how will it be implemented?

[Yakovlev] When the conception and the construction of presidential power were being discussed yesterday, people's deputies voiced several key features, so to speak, about which they wanted answers. In particular this also included the question of guarantees that presidential power would not transform into a mode of personal power, a mode of dictatorial power and so on, that is, those things which we are very much afraid of on the basis of our historical experience and our past. And indeed a reliable system of counterbalances in this respect obviously has to be created. I think that an entire system is needed here and it seems to me that this system is provided for in the bill.

First, there must be a clear definition of the president's powers, so that he cannot act in anybody else's place, so that there is an independently functioning legislative authority, executive authority—the government—and judicial authority. So we must have a clear assignment of functions. I think that is altogether the no. 1 guarantee. He should act within the limits of his powers, within the limits of the Constitution and not go beyond the limits of his powers or the Constitution. That is [point] one.

Second, of course, it is the election procedure, democratic election procedure, by the people, for a definite period; the proposed period is five years. Any one person, any one man cannot be elected to the office of president more than twice. All this establishes specific guarantees.

And of course there is control by other bodies of power, by the representative bodies, by the Supreme Soviet, of the legality of the president's activities, and the possibility of raising the question of his early removal from office if he violates the Constitution. Such a possibility is provided for in the bill. So I think that this time we have quite thoroughly thought out these guarantees and protected ourselves against those dangers which we, fully justifiably of course, would like to avoid.

[Zubkov] Thank you for the interview.

Need for Stronger Presidency Argued

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[Article by USSR State and Law Institute Director Boris Topornin: "Needed: A More Efficient Administration"]

[Text] **Events in Transcaucasia Demonstrate That Country Needs Strong Presidency**

Our state power is skidding again and again, trailing in the wake of events and occasionally losing control over the developments in some regions. The events in Transcaucasia where the conflict had been maturing for a long time, but extraordinary measures were taken only after an explosion, provide a concrete example. Undoubtedly, many [of] our woes are a legacy of the past years and grave illnesses are difficult to cure, but in my opinion one shouldn't ascribe all the errors to the difficulties of the "transition period" as some observers tend to do. The state power's duty is to see to it that all societal processes occur as calmly and painlessly as feasible.

What hampers the efficiency of the state power then?

One-level parliament

The first question to be asked is that of the correlation of the two bodies—the Congress of People's Deputies and the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. At the time when this two-level system was conceived and implemented political advantages offered by it were in the public eye. The Congress of People's Deputies became a forum at which the interests of various sections of society were expressed and vital problems of perestroika discussed. With time, however, the work of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet gained momentum and the system's inherent controversiality and lack of structural and functional coordination showed themselves. First, two bodies are now vested with legislative powers at once. Second, the Supreme Soviet doesn't pass decisions on a number of questions waiting for the congress to convene while the congress, in its turn, cannot make decisions owing to the specificity of its work. In the framework of this system the Supreme Soviet is often viewed not as an independent parliament responsible for all law-making activities but as a committee of the Congress set up to attend to some legislative affairs... Probably the new constitution should either convert the two-level system to a one-level one or to divide the powers of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet in such a way when the Congress could act as a supreme body appointing the top state structures, passing programmes, declarations and statements and hearing accounts of other state bodies from the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet all the way down.

Division of power

Persistent and consistent implementation of the policy aimed at delineating the powers of the party and the state and concentrating power in the Soviets of all levels is of great importance. The process is just off the ground and its pace differs from region to region. As a result the Soviets as representative bodies remain vastly isolated from power or, even worse, there appears a vacuum of power which anti-perestroika forces tend to fill more often than not.

Our faith in the democratic ideals must by no means be shaken by the state management crisis. Democratization is a major achievement of perestroika which we must specially cherish. But democratization does not at all imply weakening of the state power. Democratic government has to be strong and efficient. If democracy can't defend itself, perestroika may be aborted.

Let us agree what exactly we mean speaking of the idea of the sovereign power of the Soviets. Soviets of People's Deputies are the backbone of our state system. They are bodies of people's power. But we must realize that the Soviets can't do all the routine work of managing the state. The Supreme Soviet, for instance, is not in a position to manage the country directly, its mission is to adopt laws and tackle general problems. It is the administrative apparatus that must deal with the issues of executive or managerial character, in particular the questions of industry, transportation, supply, trade etc. The Soviets appoint and control executive bodies but nothing more.

The need for a clearer division of functions between different parts of the state machinery commands galvanization of the central and local executive bodies, all the way down from the centre. Today one may get an impression that our executive branch is sort of overshadowed by the Congress, the Supreme Soviet, parliamentary committees and committees and activities of people's deputies. Occasionally, issues are submitted before the parliament or its commissions for adoption or coordination which the executive bodies can perfectly decide themselves. Our government continues to be viewed as a purely economic body and Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov is often described as the country's top manager. But political functions too must be the responsibility of the government.

President, Parliament, Government

It would be useful to consider the expediency of the office of the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet in its present form. What role or roles does the Chairman perform? He is simultaneously a half-speaker and a half-president - an unnatural combination disproved by the world practice. Or rather 90 per cent speaker and 10 per cent president. Why should we need this? Gorbachev's chairing the Congress and Supreme Soviet session that is, performing speaker's functions, doesn't seem to be the happiest way of spending the time of the national leader. Presidency and Speakership are fundamentally different things.

Today as a rule the world practice suggests an autonomous office of the president. Concrete forms of this may vary, however. In the U.S.A., for instance, the president is simultaneoulsy head of state and premier; France combines the strong presidency with the government accountable to the parliament and the president chairs the government. West Germany has the presidential office too, but the country is often called the chancellor's republic.

Which way should we choose? While borrowing advanced state government techniques we must not ignore our own traditions. It seems useful to divide the functions of the Supreme Soviet presidium and the president (Chairman of the Soviet Union). The Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet should continue to supervise elaboration of questions to be considered by the Supreme Soviet, to organize the work of commissions and to manage other affairs directly connected to the function of the Supreme Soviet and its chambers. All organizational work must be supervised by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet which, in turn, must have its own chairman acting as the speaker at joint sessions of the chambers could be chaired by leaders of the chambers.

In this country the optimal way is to combine presidency with a strong parliament. In many Western countries the president's power is strengthened at the expense of the legislature. Undoubtedly, this tendency must be ruled out here. But at the same time we must have an efficient president, responsible for the appointment of top executives, citizenship affairs, pardoning, etc. The president should have the power to declare partial or total mobilization when parliament is on recess, the state of war in case of an aggression or when international obligations so command, and to introduce state of emergency or martial law all over the country or in some areas to protect the security of citizens. In all these cases the president will be subordinated to the Constitution. The President, of course, would chair the Defence Council and act as the Commander-in-Chief. It is imperative that we clearly define the relationships between the president and the Supreme Soviet. The president should be vested with the right to veto laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet, to appeal to the Constitutional Committee (or the Constitutional Tribunal if it is established). But the parliament should, of course, have the decisive say. After the presidential veto the Supreme Soviet would have the right to reconfirm and adopt the disputed act once again observing all the formalities.

In certain cases—should the two chambers fail to agree—the president would have the right to dissolve the parliament but this decision should be taken after the consultations with the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

If the constitutional reform produces the office of the president then it is necessary to define beforehand the criteria of the democratic essense of this office. The history of this country knows a number of instances when the unlimited power of one person led to tragic consequences. So in defining the constitutional status of the president it must be borne in mind not a concrete person but the optimal system of rational democratic stewardship. The president's responsibilities should be indicated, specified, the possibilities of his impeachment in case he should violate the constitution or misbehave.

Besides an energetic president, the country will need an active government. It is important to note that the government should be constantly controlled by the Supreme Soviet which shall enjoy the right to bring a vote of no confidence. The right to nominate the head of government and the new premier in case the government should resign would rest with the president. In his turn, the president must have the right to suggest cabinet resignation in case the government's line should differ wilth his own line and policy.

Another important aspect. We are speaking of a president of a federal state. The president will have to perform his duties in close cooperation with the republican bodies of power. A consultative body under the president could be set up composed of representatives or heads of the union republics. In principle, democratization and modernization of the state power in this country are inseparable from renewing the Soviet federation. Unitarist distortions in some areas generated the syndrome of ultracritical attitude to the Union which hampers a realistic assessment of the situation. How are we to solve the problem? First, we must stress and demonstrate that this country is really a Union of republics. We must clearly define the limits of the Union powers and provide for broad sovereign rights and weighty independence of the republics. At the same time it is important to firmly ensure respect for the interests and rights of all the people living in the USSR including those living in autonomies or without them.

Without Article 6

Changes in the political system are now considered in connection with Article 6 of the Constitution. Naturally, a political party becomes the leading force of society not because the Constitution says so but because it wins the leading role by its activities. That is why the new Constitution must not contain any clauses securing the role of the Communist Party.

The Constitution must not preserve the one-party system or introduce the multi-party one. This is the matter of political practice and social development. The Constitution must allow the formation of political parties and define the conditions of their activities.

No legal act should allow or prohibit combination of the offices of the General Secretary and the head of state. The practice shows that leaders of political parties as a rule occupy the top posts in the state hierarchy. However, there are no laws which stipulate this dependence. There is no doubt that CPSU standing in society will be determined by restructuring in the party, redrawing of the party programme documents and rules, revolutionizing the methods and style of its work.

Cadre Policy Body Views CPSU Draft Statutes

PM0602120190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Session of Commission"]

[Text] A routine session of the CPSU Central Commission on Questions of Party Building and Cadre Policy was held 3 February.

The commission examined basic conceptual provisions of the draft CPSU Statutes for the 28th Party Congress. It was stressed that the Statutes being drawn up must be an instrument for the CPSU's renewal, stimulating the kind of restructuring of intraparty relations which will combine the party's broad democratization with an increase in its degree of organization and capability. The Statutes are called on to reflect the current view of the Communist Party's role in socialist society which is being renewed.

It was deemed advisable that the Statutes be short and contain only the fundamental norms of party life. In these Statutes, it is essential to renounce overregimentation and create maximum opportunities and conditions for communists and party organizations—particularly the primary party organizations, as the foundation of the party—to be able to engage independently in creative work, and also for the new political thinking and bold, nonstandard practical actions.

The commission discussed proposals on the procedure for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. This question is being widely discussed in the party. Communists attach great significance to it, justifiably believing that the results of the congress will depend to a great extent on the composition of the delegates. The CPSU Central Committee is receiving many suggestion from local level on this subject. The commission's proposals will be submitted to the participants of the CPSU Central Committee February plenum.

The commission examined the question of restructuring the work of party organizations and and of communists at places of residence. This work is acquiring increasing significance in the current conditions. Work at places of residence is acquiring new aspects in the course of the extensive development of territorial self-management.

The party organizations and party committees have accumulated diverse experience of work in microrayons and housing districts. The commission deemed it expedient to familiarize party committees with this experience and inform them of recommendations regarding the basic avenues for the restructuring of work at places of residence.

The commission's session was chaired by G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

V.K. Pugo, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee and Yu.A. Manayenkov and G.I. Usmanov, secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, participated in the commission's work.

Shishlin Says Party Will Persue Reform

OW0502133990 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1204 GMT 5 Feb 90

[From "NHK News Today" program: Interview with CPSU Central Committee spokesman Nikolay Shishlin by NHK Moscow correspondent Tanaka—recorded, in Russian with Japanese translations in subtitles; date, place not given]

[Text] [Shishlin] The party must obtain status as a social leader through political activities, not through regulations of the Constitution. One-party rule will be abolished and the party will pursue the course of reform. The party lags behind most in carrying out perestroyka. Reform is making rapid progress in other areas. The Communist Party organs are the strongholds of conservative forces.

[Tanaka] What is the possibility of General Secretary Gorbachev resigning?

[Shishlin] I think there is no such a possibility at all. To be sure, there are moves within the party to denounce the radical faction. There are also people opposed to Gorbachev's way of thinking. The Central Committee and the party are supporting Chairman Gorbachev. Gorbachev's position will be further bolstered.

Academician Sees Need for CPSU Changes

LD0702162690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 7 Feb 90

["Excerpt" from interview with Academician Vladimir Yevseyevich Zuyev, chairman of Tomsk branch of Siberian Department of USSR Academy of Sciences, by special correspondent Lyudmila Semina; date, place not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Semina] There presently are very many varied opinions on what the party should be like. As an old communist, do you support the view that a great deal must be changed, and changed decisively, in the party?

[Zuyev] Yes, I support this position, resolutely and irreversibly. I am deeply convinced that the leadership of the party, the Politburo, and the party Central Committee are clearly not keeping up with events in the country. I personally consider, and I am deeply convinced of this, that one of the main obstacles in the situation of virtual crisis that both the country and, in particular, the party find themselves in is the fact that the party has been slow to restructure its own ranks. This must be done without delay and, I would say, in a revolutionary manner.

[Semina] What is the most important thing to do now, immediately?

[Zuyev] I think that as part of the preparations for the party congress decisive organizational measures should be adopted, i.e., I consider that we must have a thorough purge of the ranks of the apparatus in the party, at all levels, from top to bottom. [passage omitted]

I consider that there should not be half-hearted decisions. To be specific, they have again revived the CPSU Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR. This is an obviously half-hearted decision. Why doesn't Russia have the right, as the mightiest republic, the richest republic, why doesn't Russia have the right to its own party, its own academy, with all its own bodies, just as in all the other equal union republics? This question has come up repeatedly at the plenum, and I am sure that this half-heartedness concerning the future of the Russian party must be removed from the agenda.

CPSU Should Cede Power 'in Good Time'

PM1602143190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Letter from reader V. Tsukanikhin under "Editorial Mailbag" rubric: "I Support... Better To Share Power in Good Time"]

[Excerpt] Vyazma—[passage omitted] How is one to explain the fact that many people do not accept the idea of a multiparty system in the country? Solely on the grounds that a one-party system emerged historically? Yes, it did. Yes, the CPSU was the initiator of perestroyka. Yet history reminds us that the party's monopoly of power has led more than once to what are delicately described as negative phenomena. The causes of the Stalin's lawlessness, Khrushchev's excesses, and Brezhnev's stagnation were due not so much to the bad moral character of the leaders as to the absence of an opposition.

The goodwill of our leader, his humanity, and his concern for the country's future are the sole guarantee of our current freedoms. I wish Gorbachev a long life with all my heart. But, alas, no one lives forever. It may be that he will have a worthy successor. But is it conceivable that we should entrust the fate of our long-suffering homeland to the dictates of chance? How often we hear: Oh, if only Ilich had lived a little longer!... If he had only lived another 10 years. It is dreadful even to contemplate that such might be said after Gorbachev: Oh, if only Sergeich had lived a bit longer... His victory and, if you wish, his heroic achievement, will lie in the fact that even after him the life of the country will continue, albeit with difficulties, toward the development of democracy and dialogue among different social forces.

I am certain that no law on the press will provide a full guarantee of glasnost without an opposition. And only free parties enjoying equal rights and possessing independent news media will provide glasnost with backing. Public life will begin to flourish in such a way that, unlike today, we will not think in fear and confusion: "God, what now? Who will come to power if Gorbachev tenders his resignation? And suppose?..."

Perestroyka under the one-party system is already, it seems to me, petering out. No matter what we say about the grave legacy inherited by our present leaders, 5 years it is they, rather than their predecessors, who are now accountable. And here the monopoly of power is far from doing the CPSU the best of turns.

Does all this mean that the present government cabinet has demonstrated its bankruptcy? No. We simply have no idea of its real and full potential.

The threat of retirement and competition between political groupings will not only reveal the best people but will of itself help enhance their skills. And this is no trifling matter. Stalin's weak political skills allowed many mistakes to be made, in particular the Soviet-German pact, which contributed to the world war. And the war that Gorbachev had to clear up? Were 13,000 of our sons left there dead as a result of Brezhnev's great competence?

No doubt some people will object: Where is this second party to be found today? Right here, alongside us. The democratization of society has thrown up a host of energetic modern-minded figures. They know what life is about and enjoy great authority among the masses. If one regards such people and groups not as a threat to the CPSU's influence but as forces which can help the country get out of its impasse more quickly, dialogue with them and the involvement of members of today's informal groups in studying solutions and making decisions would, it seems to me, give an appreciable boost to our society.

The apparatus, reluctant to share power with anyone, will of course resist. But even today it is not as uniform as it once was. Quite a few new, more independently minded people have appeared in it. Sooner or later it will become clear to many, if not all, that it is better to share power at the right time than to discredit oneself through "highhanded methods" and then find oneself with no job at all, as has recently happened in many East European countries.

I consider the CPSU to be a strong and viable party. That is why it should not suppress its opponents. It is no longer possible to remove the opposition—one can only drive it into underground activity.

In short, I think that our society, weary of the cult of the personality and stagnation, is mature enough to transform itself into a genuinely democratic one. And the more forces are represented at the helm of state, the more substantial the gain will be. [letter ends]

From the editorial office: We received this letter shortly before the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum. It is not difficult to see that many of the questions worrying the letter writer were also discussed at the plenum and that ways of solving them have been designated in the draft platform. The harmony between public opinion and what was discussed by the Central Committee is a sign of our times.

Implications of Political Pluralism Viewed

PM0103161190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Professor A. Butenko under "Discussion Page" rubric: "Restructuring What Into What?"]

[Text] Moscow—In the discussion under way on CPSU perestroyka there are, in my opinion, a number of shortcomings—one of which is poor consideration for the new things being introduced into our party's life by the rejection of political monopolism enshrined in the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Congress and the assertion of a multiparty system in Soviet society.

Nobody nowadays is surprised by the admission that perestroyka in the party is proceeding more slowly than in society and that this is holding up the entire renewal process. There have been calls to accelerate party perestroyka and to level out the front of change. But things often go no further than calls. Why? Because, first, self-criticism by the party, as well as criticism of it by informals and journalists has to a considerable extent undermined communists' staunch positions and thereby substantially disrupted their ranks. Second, with every passing day the increasingly vocal official appeals about

CPSU perestroyka (without any clear explanation about what should be restructured into what) are also increasingly disorienting communists and resulting in their surrendering of their former positions.

In this situation one can hardly find a Soviet communist who would not be concerned about what is happening to his party, who would not admit that it is losing the gains it had won, and who would not wonder whether we are on the right track.

Just seven or 10 years ago our party was like a huge ant hill: outwardly full of active life and intelligent bustle. In its central upper echelons dozens, hundreds, and thousands of functionaries gathered for party congresses, Central Committee plenums, closed sessions, and conferences where resolutions and directives were worked out. These functionaries then went back to their local areas, where they convened similar but smaller-scale sessions and adopted similar decisions.

Few people wondered why ordinary communists should be unthinking cogs or walk-on extras who waited to hear the "capital-city wisdom" of their leaders visiting from Moscow. Even fewer people took account of noncommunists: While reshaping people's lives, nobody thought it necessary to even ask nonparty people just how deep the happiness selflessly donated to them by the party was.

Were these defects an accident—shortcomings of everyday work—or did they reflect the essence of the organization which was the guiding force of Soviet society? Not only all our actions in party perestroyka but the very possibility of its success depend on the answer to that question.

When we are all called upon today to restructure the party more actively and restore its democratic Leninist features, these calls have a quite unambiguous ulterior motive: The people making the calls themselves seemingly believe and propose that we believe that somewhere in the distant past—during V.I. Lenin's lifetime, say—a different Communist Party existed that was democratically based, sensible in its functioning, responsive to ordinary members' opinions, and subordinate to the will of the party masses. They claim that today our entire task is to cleanse and illuminate the genuinely Leninist features of the Bolshevik Party, breathe new life into them, and fill them with modern content by rejecting the party's Stalinist accretions.

But this is not the truth! In restructuring the party and striving to give it a modern, civilized face, we have nowhere and nothing to go back to. In our historical legacy, if we take the history of Bolshevism, the image of the party that we now need does not exist.

When we all state that we should reject the Stalinist party and return to the Leninist party, this by no means answers the question of what kind of party we need today—after all, a Leninist party, a party of a new type, has been and remains a tool of the struggle for political power. It coped with this task as well as it could, but it failed to resolve other tasks. We need to repeat over and over that the Bolshevik Party neither under V.I. Lenin nor after him was a party of a power-wielding people, since it wielded power itself. Usurping the working people's power functions under I. Stalin, it has still not returned them to the people.

That is why, when people call today for "all power to be returned to the soviets!" we should try to find out from whom that power should be taken so as to return it to the soviets. Let us not balk at repeating what was said at the 19th party conference: The party and state apparatus has long taken power away from the soviets, concentrating it in the hands of party and state functionaries.

But what about perestroyka? For the time being, party perestroyka has not been very successful, and the reason for this failure is extremely simple: Party organs should give up political power, return it to the people through the soviets, and deal with their own direct party affairs themselves. But many party organs simply do not want to do this, since they would like to continue ruling as before, without returning power to the soviets and the people and without returning to other functions. That, in my opinion, is the key to answering the question of why the party is lagging behind in perestroyka.

I cannot fail to mention one other idea. When you read closely the discussion articles on party perestroyka, you do not always notice whether the debaters are taking account of the new points introduced into the debate by the published draft CPSU platform. Sometimes you get the impression that certain writers continue to develop ideas dear to them without looking around and taking account of the new situation. What is the essence of this situation? Of course, it is the CPSU's rejection of its monopoly of power and the recognition of the multiparty system, and, consequently, of the need to implement perestroyka in the party itself in precisely this light. Some people might find this premature, if only because other parties are only just being set up. Thinking this would be a major delusion. And not only because there are already more than enough competing movements and organizations. The essence of affairs is more important. Recognition of the multiparty system is fundamentally changing the idea of party perestroyka.

Here is one example. How much ink has been spilled in trying to demonstrate the need for the party to be separated from power. But this question is only topical for a one-party system, when the party itself replaces people's power. Conversely, in a multiparty system each party **must struggle for political power** and by no means remain aloof from it. Here it is a question of which spheres of state rule could be the objects of an interparty struggle and which would not be, but this is an entirely different matter and a different issue.

Of course, life makes itself felt. Both communists and our party are today by no means what they were seven to 10 years ago. But the problem is not whether we have changed, but how we have changed—have we become better or worse? I think that there can be no unambiguous answer on this.

In fact, you need only look around to see for yourself that we have long been living in our party home differently from the way we were before perestroyka, although changes have not taken place everywhere and not in everything. Life, still organized as before but now comprehended in a new light, still throbs away in the upper stories, where numerous functionaries scurry around today just as they did before, convening plenums and narrow conferences. But there has already been something of a breakthrough and we need only descend a bit to suddenly discover mounting discord in a once well-oiled mechanism. Disruption emerges here and stoppages occur caused by the fact that people do not accept orders but demand practical action. Certain functionaries at oblast or city level, no longer experiencing their long-standing veneration for, fear of, or faith in instructions from the higher "leading stories," dig in their heels, fight their corner either through habit or conviction, do not want to do their jobs, do not relinquish power, act in defiance of new instructions, and arrange if not a sabotage, at least a "personal strike." And then, if the position adopted by functionaries is in conflict with citizens' activeness and their demands, both communists and nonparty people start pressuring them (the events in Chernigov, Tyumen, and Volgograd), which sooner or later forces them out of their hidey-holes into the light of glasnost, often making them do what is required or resign. In short, having lost its "blessing from on high" and its administrative-edict support, our party is gradually losing its former power functions and its air of a well-oiled mechanism as well.

Is that good or bad? It is good because that is how the existence and functioning of the party as a leviathan of power and the main commanding force of Soviet society which used to carry out the key functions of an administrative-edict system of rule is being ended. It is bad because the party's prestige is declining at the same time. While losing power functions, it is not acquiring new functions or reaffirming its necessity and usefulness to society. It turns out that the old is passing away and that the new has not yet arrived, the life of party organs is being weakened. To prevent this happening, we need to clearly and precisely answer the following question. By removing power functions from the party and transferring them to the people via the soviets, what are we reviving in the party itself, how will it make up its losses, and on what should its prestige be based? Or is the party not needed at all? Obviously it is. But in that case what kind of party do we need, what is its concept, and can we expect what we want from the CPSU?

If we are unable to answer these questions by turning to Bolshevik history—since the Leninist party was not an instrument of parliamentary struggle for political power—then what are we to do now that we need such an instrument? It is becoming obvious following the publication of the draft platform that we do not need a party that is a framework for an administrative-edict system, but a democratic party of humane and democratic socialism defending the positions of an open multiparty system and a struggle for power by parliamentary means within the framework of a rule-of-law state. In resolving precisely these tasks, the CPSU is acquiring a new face and a new place—a place in society which is in line with its past and present-day actions and its services to the people.

However, such a concept cannot be introduced simply and smoothly into the CPSU—after all, Soviet communists have never had any experience of either the democratic governance of the country or of the practice of a competitive struggle with other parties for influence among the masses, nor has there been any experience of real ideological-education work among the masses.

One can imagine the kind of individual psychological breakdown that thousands and thousands of party workers have had to experience. That is why the panicky fear which certain party figures are now experiencing from time to time when they have to prove that they are right in an open political struggle with the help of arguments and when perestroyka forces them to take part in rallies and discussions is entirely understandable. Nobody finds that sort of thing easy!

Something else is no less clear: We need only permit the creation of other parties in the country, which will require high standards and a political struggle, for it to become clear to us what we need to do and how we should restructure ourselves. But there is one "but": I think that Soviet communists and party workers—who are not only unprepared and unwilling to take part in open political debate and discussion but are downright scared of it—would participate in such a political struggle as losers rather than winners. Is this not the main reason behind the fear of the multiparty system and its advent?

However, life is implacable: Either our party makes a sharp break with its foundations and rejects its assumption of power functions and its customary stereotypes of behavior, preparing for a political struggle for its existence and for the right to represent and defend working people's interests, or life itself will end its history as a political party capable of struggling for working people's interests, for social justice, and for a society in which the free development of each is a condition of the free development of all.

Readers' Responses to Debate on Power

PM0402152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed roundup of readers' letters: "We Need Determination! First Reactions to Article 'Perestroyka and Power'"]

[Text] Summing up the results of the PRAVDA discussion (1 February) on the powers of the central authorities under the conditions of perestroyka, the editorial office invited readers to continue the discussion. Literally on the day that the newspaper appeared, people started phoning us, sending us telegrams, and then writing in. All this shows that the newspaper has touched on a topical subject of concern to many. Today we are publishing the first reactions to the discussion.

Who Benefits by Delay?

I attentively read the PRAVDA discussion on the nature of power. Very important questions were raised; it is good that PRAVDA voiced concerns which are disturbing people more and more as time goes on.

On the one hand, we should wait until the people's legal culture improves, until their awareness "matures," and until their representatives in the Supreme Soviet and at Congresses of People's Deputies recognize their responsibility, stop turning parliamentary sessions into rallies, learn not to resolve important issues in an offhand manner, and stop "pressuring" M.S. Gorbachev. And on the other hand? The very same people are dissatisfied, both directly and in the form of their parliamentary representatives: There is no time to waste, they say, why are they (and most often he, referring to M.S. Gorbachev) taking so much time? Moreover, not without the efforts of certain people's deputies, there have been rumors that, if the government does not impose order, it will have to be replaced at the next Congress.

How is this paradox to be resolved? In my opinion, during the transitional period the chairman of the Supreme Soviet should be given powers enabling him to apply the full weight of the authority he needs to implement the strategic tasks of perestroyka. What do I have in mind? The right to suspend laws or to send them back for further work and another vote, the right to replace ministers who cannot cope with their tasks, to reorganize ministries, and to impose a state of emergency. Other options which crop up in life should perhaps be envisaged as well. There is no need to complain or make the excuse that this is not covered by the Constitution.

What about the situation in which the country finds itself, the point we have reached in spreading perestroyka, and the forces stubbornly opposing it—is all that covered in the Constitution? So are we again starting to look for excuses instead of proceeding on the basis of the objective situation and acting resolutely?

If there were any suspicion that the emergency powers could become permanent, it could be proposed that M.S. Gorbachev state the period for which he would need those powers. But they need to be given to him, and his actions should not be bound up with petty tutelage and suspicion forcing him to look over his shoulder all the time at the Congress or the CPSU Central Committee Politburo.

A risk? But there is no other way for us if we want to rapidly rectify the situation in practice rather than in words.

[Signed] Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Sekretaryuk, director of the Consumer Electronics Scientific Research Institute, Lvov

Question Was Correctly Raised

I am personally convinced of the perniciousness of the former administrative-edict system, and I have no regrets about scrapping it. Yet at the same time virtually every day brings concern: Democracy is being choked by legal nihilism, interethnic hostility, and economic anarchy from one end of our great country to the other.

The other day I read the very timely reflections of a number of academics published in PRAVDA under the heading "Perestroyka and Power." At the time, there was a live broadcast on TV of a rally in Tallinn, at which one of the speakers called for the elections to the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet to be boycotted and for alternative organs to be set up to run an independent Estonia. The right to vote—in the view of the "democrat" who was speaking—should be held exclusively by the descendants of the "original" citizens of the Estonian Republic. I'm sorry, but what should we call all this? It's very easy. Any professional Western political scientist would dub this approach ethnic segregation or a call for the establishment of apartheid.

So it strikes me that the newspaper was right to raise the question of the role and importance of power at such a complex historical time as now. And I would like to add that today we do not just need strong power based on the personal qualities of the state leader. The force of power should be based on something else—on the people's trust in it and on strict fulfillment of the law. I personally advocate that the head of state be elected by all the country's citizens from among several candidates.

[Signed] V. Velgrube, CPSU member since 1982, Pyarnu, Estonian SSR.

For Full Power

On the eve of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, PRAVDA has begun a discussion devoted to the functions and role of the central authorities in the perestroyka era. The academics' discussion creates the impression that the lack of complete power on the part of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet is to blame for all our problems—strikes, conflicts between peoples, the economic crisis, and the decline in the party's prestige. The speakers cited arguments to back up this idea: The position and powers of the head of state are not clearly formulated in the Constitution, the institution of head of state is not developed, the president's power is not backed up by strong power locally, and so forth.

We often encounter the idea that the former leaders Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Shcherbitskiy, and others are to blame for our previous and current problems. Needless to say, there is a grain of truth in this, but it is not the whole truth. Above all, I want to ask: Why were deputies or members of higher party organs passive during those years? After all, the Constitution demands different approaches from them. At any rate, I have a question: Why did the 19th party conference, the First and Second Congresses of People's Deputies, and the Supreme Soviet not demand that the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers fulfill their constitutional duties in all circumstances and—by applying the relevant articles of the Constitution and Soviet laws—ensure the unconditional resolution of the issues raised in PRAVDA?

In no way can we excuse the irresponsibility of the two Congresses of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, which proved incapable either of giving the top leader [pervoye litso] powers—if he lacks any—or of ensuring that his powers are fully implemented. After all, our president should first and foremost ensure the implementation of the principle of the inevitability of punishment for violation of the Basic Law and all other laws. Clearly, the failure to implement this principle has led to the emergence and rapid development of a chain reaction of tragic and dangerous events in Stepanakert, Tbilisi, Baku, Lvov, and other cities. But it is as if the people's deputies are unable to see the lack of resolution on the part of the executive.

The forthcoming party Central Committee plenum will obviously discuss the question of why serious political blunders, economic and ecological shortcomings, dangerous lack of resolution, and inaction in places where immediate and sensible action is needed have become possible in the country.

Soviet people expect that M.S. Gorbachev will provide an objective and critical assessment at the plenum of the mistakes made by him and the party's entire leading nucleus during the perestroyka period and indicate a way out of the party's seriously critical position. He too is the only person able to say whether he needs additional powers as president of the country.

It may well be that some of our people hanker after a strong leader. However, I am convinced that dictatorship by an individual and a tough regime will not do us any good, it will drive society into a dead end. We need people's power, full democracy, and revolutionary perestroyka. To make truly responsible decisions we should, even in the direst emergencies, urgently convene the Congress or the Supreme Soviet and place this difficult burden on them. A strong leader should propose to parliament the ideal option from among the many submitted, justify and defend that decision, and then put it into practice.
[Signed] Academician K. Sytnik of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Kiev.

Democracy Means Order

I think that the newspaper was entirely correct to begin a discussion on the problem "Perestroyka and Power." After all, in the rule-of-law state which we intend to build the question of the relationship between democracy and power is one of the most important.

Recently I have been living and working in the capital of Soviet Moldavia, and I am now in Riga. In both these regions, as is well known, a tense situation has arisen against a backdrop of interethnic differences. People's fronts are active in both areas. I am not opposed to such public organizations if they help perestroyka, but can we calmly watch the actions of extremists—people who want to exploit the democracy struggle for their own selfish interests? In the Trancaucasus things have even gone as far as bloodshed.

I entirely agree that we often lack determination in implementing decisions. I think that in our transitional period the power of the country's top leader should be sufficiently full, but we also need a control mechanism.

The newspaper suggests that readers think about the possible introduction of a presidential system in our country. This is a very difficult question. The most eminent and prestigious academics and the broad people's masses must be involved in deciding the matter. However, in my view, during this complex period when it is necessary to urgently make important decisions I think that it would not be out of place to have a leader enjoying great powers and relying on the trust of the entire people.
[Signed] A. Arkhipov, department chief at the "Orgtekhstroy" Trust, Riga.

Dividing Up Functions

First and foremost, I want to sincerely thank PRAVDA for the article "Perestroyka and Power." The fact that this bold, intelligent, unpatronizing [doveritelnyy], thought-provoking, and controversial article was published in the organ of the CPSU Central Committee is further proof of the irreversibility of perestroyka processes in our society.

Now to get down to the discussion. In my view, the holdups in our country's development, both political and economic, have been caused by a lack of determination and excessive caution even in simple situations. For instance, we should strive more rapidly and consistently to divide up functions between, for instance, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Council of Ministers on the one hand, and party oblast committees and oblast soviet executive committees on the other. At the moment the latter are always delaying matters and waiting for the opinions of the former.

One other point. We should not complain about the imprecision and vagueness of formulations in the USSR Constitution relating to the powers and position of the head of state. Yes, our Basic Law is incomplete—we recognize that. In the event of the president deviating from the letter of various articles in the interests of the country and its citizens, people will not condemn such action but be grateful for it.

[Signed] A. Polyakov, pensioner, Sverdlovsk.

We Support the Proposal

I read with satisfaction the discussion "Perestroyka and Power" in the main party newspaper. I agree that the current situation in the country requires greater determination from the central authorities.

In this situation, it is quite right and justifiable to raise the question of expanding the powers of the main official in the state. I and my colleagues at work support this proposal.
[Signed] Militia Captain V. Bondarchuk, Dnepropetrovsk.

Intoxicated With Freedom

Perestroyka has laid bare not only negative phenomena but also the objective laws governing our condition. For instance, it has become obvious to me that a society living under established "socialism" is only capable of relative political and socioeconomic stability given rigid centralized rule based on the limitation of a whole number of human rights. Is that a bad thing? Of course it is!

But let us admit that social awareness, which was deformed for many years, too often sees the abrupt leaps toward democratization in a distorted light, translating a plurality of opinions into real actions. That is why our society is increasingly reminiscent of the swan, the crab, and the pike in Krylov's fable [in which the three animals are unable to coordinate their actions]. In my view, the success of perestroyka is only possible if priority is given to economic transformations. But these presuppose determination on the part of the authorities and a clear-cut, realistic course based on a firm legal foundation. That is the only way to overcome our "intoxication" with democracy and prevent the shoots of freethinking in people's hearts and minds from being destroyed. That is why I agree with Ye. Ambartsumov that currently we cannot do without elements of authoritarianism. That is, along with freedom for economic forces and the expansion of democracy, the power of the country's political and state leader should be strengthened.
[Signed] A. Karasev, railroad engineer, Chita.

Interior Minister Details Need for Law, Order

PM0103145690 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 28 Feb 90 p 12

[Interview with Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin by correspondent Ezio Mauro; date, place not given]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted] [Mauro] Minister Bakatin, before Sunday's demonstrations, there was talk of the danger of people seizing power. When did this fear arise, on what bases, and why?

[Bakatin] I personally started becoming alarmed Sunday 4 February, with the first wave of demonstrations. When millions of people go out into the streets and you hear certain slogans being chanted, you cannot pretend nothing is happening. I was, and remain, convinced of the huge antagonism that may be felt by some extremists, entailing a serious danger of mass disorders, hence the need to prepare to guarantee law and order and to defend the state and democracy.

[Mauro] What is the source of the threats to the state and to the constituted order of perestroyka ?

[Bakatin] It is difficult to say where they come from, but they certainly exist. We have noticed in recent weeks a sudden rise in tension, with a tide of alarming rumors. The result has been a climate of very great anxiety, which we were unable to control. We have seen some very dangerous signs: There was talk of pogroms, of some people's desire to exploit the crowds' impetus to seize power, and of the advent of armed fighters. I have always believed that they were lies. But this was the climate and it was necessary to remain alert, watchful, vigilant. I have received reports of bombings, attacks with explosives. The rumors were very insistent and we realized that when we acted to quash them we were ultimately achieving the opposite result: If the government is getting involved, people said, then this time there really is something to it.

[Mauro] You are painting a picture of complete destabilization. Do you believe that somebody organized a plan for these rumors and alarms?

[Bakatin] I cannot yet give you a precise answer. We have been subjected to the utmost pressure, but sometimes we have discovered nothing concrete behind the rumors, whereas on other occasions there was something. On Saturday 24 February, I was even telephoned to inform me that there was going to be a pogrom in Moscow against the Interior Ministry's kindergarten. Then, following another telephone call, we rushed to search for a bomb at Paveletskiy station. They were false alarms. People clearly wanted to increase the tension. This explains last week's hysteria, which led to the appeals from the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Central Committee, and the government, which persuaded many people to stay home Sunday but which also frightened the population even more: If the leadership is so alarmed, people wondered, what is about to happen in the USSR?

[Mauro] In any case, 170 demonstrations took place throughout the country. Isn't this a victorious show of strength against the government?

[Bakatin] Actually, I have some more complete figures. There were 340 demonstrations throughout the USSR Sunday, and they brought slightly over a million people into the streets. That is a lot, but less than we expected. We expected at least 2 and ½ million people. Everything took place in a perfectly orderly fashion. Of course, almost everywhere there were slogans against the party, the government, the authorities in general. But this is nothing new. We have no intention of silencing people now. We simply want to defend the authority of this state, which cannot continue to be challenge as it is now, and we want to possess the means to do so.

[Mauro] Is this why you requested the new state of emergency law?

[Bakatin] This law is indispensable in view of the country's situation. It is futile to deny that mass disorders have become a reality in the USSR and now recur frequently. Without a law to regulate emergency military intervention, two negative effects occur in such a situation. On the one hand, the law and order forces display indecision, because they do not know their rights and do not properly know what to do. On the other hand, the same law and order forces sometimes exceed the limits of their power by acting arbitrarily. Enough: All this must be regulated as soon as possible.

[Mauro] But many republics, starting with those of the Baltic, regard the state of emergency as a threat by Moscow, entailing the danger of tomorrow, finding Soviet tanks deployed against their autonomy. How do you answer that?

[Bakatin] I agree with the need to redefine relations between the center and the periphery of the country, defining and safeguarding the scope for autonomy. There must be a new federal agreement or any other mechanism that will redefine the state of the union—but as soon as possible. This, because this indecision has for months concealed a constant and most dangerous tension.

[Mauro] The radicals say that sooner or later perestroyka will be imprisoned by a state of emergency extended to the entire country. Does this danger exist?

[Bakatin] I do not know, but I do know that it depends on them, too. As interior minister, I would like to say a few words to the radicals: It seems to me that while the CPSU clung to its monopoly on power this democracy of demonstrations, which raises tensions and passions, could have made some sense. But now? Now the party recognizes the legitimacy of a political opposition, so it is necessary to convert to dialogue, to the quest for cooperation or at least a possible compromise, without cataclysms or disruptions. The radicals must make up their minds to move from the streets to parliament, to the institutions.

[Mauro] Why do you want to turn the Interior Ministry's riot troops into a special highly professional volunteer force?

[Bakatin] I could reply that I want this because it is inhuman and senseless to send in 18-year-old recruits with no experience or special training to quell the riots between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. And this is true, though the troops have not caused us problems, except in marginal instances. But the fact is that we need highly professional trained men for the most delicate operational tasks. I fully support this reform, even though volunteer troops—albeit smaller in number than now—will cost at least five times more.

[Mauro] So we come to the president. Can the USSR's transformation into a presidential republic really solve the problems of consensus, nationalism, and separatism?

[Bakatin] First, this transformation gives the country a precise message: No democracy can exist without a strong, legitimate, and respected government. I believe that this logic inevitably leads us to the presidential solution so as to strengthen the leadership institutions. But I want to say that it would be irresponsible to adopt such a decision solely on the basis of a few serious disorders, in the mistaken belief that the president can restore calm and consensus. However strong, no president can break the law. And the legislative foundation of his powers must be formulated very carefully so that in the future we do not find ourselves betraying the country by enabling the president himself to break the law by acting arbitrarily.

[Mauro] But is what you call Soviet democracy—that is, perestroyka—now in danger?

[Bakatin] Let's be clear. If you have in mind the danger of an authoritarian outcome, I would say not. I believe that the real threat to be averted now is, rather, that of anarchy and nihilism. We can succeed by trying to combine two things that are difficult to combine—a sure march to democracy and a strengthening of the state's power, without being afraid to hit those who abuse perestroyka by distorting it to the extent of breaking the law.

Shebarshin Outlines Main KGB Tasks

LD0103122790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1035 GMT 1 Mar 89

[Text] Moscow, 1 Mar (TASS)—The Soviet intelligence service is charged with the task of providing the country's leadership with authentic information on the designs of the leading Western countries with regard to the Soviet Union and on the most important international problems. Leonid Shebarshin, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB, head of the Soviet foreign intelligence service, stated this at a recent meeting with the labor collective of the Banner of Labour factory in Moscow.

Despite the radical change in the international situation, he noted, a number of figures in the West have not given up plans to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. In this respect, one of the main tasks of the intelligence service is "surveillance of armaments' developments" in order not to overlook a possible breakthrough by the West in the sphere of military technology, in creating new types of weapons.

The vital need to overcome crisis phenomena in the USSR's national economy sets as a priority task for the intelligence service the rendering of assistance to the country in the more effective utilization of foreign economic ties, information on the processes occurring in the world economy, and information on the plans and activities behind the scenes in this sphere.

The Soviet intelligence service, Leonid Shebarshin stressed, is striving to reveal all that is positive in world politics—all the reserves for improving international relations and for achieving mutually acceptable solutions. It should pay particular attention to those elements that create a threat to the Soviet Union's security, to its positions and interests. In a number of cases, the true picture cannot be elucidated by any other way except the intelligence service.

Speaking about the work of the USSR KGB in combatting the activity of Western special services, Leonid Shebarshin noted that the intelligence service is effecting penetration into the special services that are conducting work against the USSR. The fact that in 1988 the attempts made by them to incite Soviet citizens to collaborate secretly, or not to return to their homeland, tripled over those of 1985, is evidence of the energetic activity of the "Russian" departments of Western country's special services. Over the last few years some 30 agents of the Western special services have been exposed.

Replying to the question about whether the KGB has data on centers existing abroad which are inciting the events in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, Leonid Shebarshin said that according to his data there was no such center. However, facts are known about extremists being kept supplied with arms, money, propaganda literature, and copying machines by various foreign sources.

The head of the Soviet intelligence service noted that at the present time serious transformations, including cadre transformations, are occurring in the USSR KGB. In particular, the fifth directorate, which used to deal with dissidents, has been abolished. Work is being conducted on a draft law on state security. A draft law on the USSR State Security Committee is being formulated. "The removal of excessive veils of secrecy from the KGB will undoubtedly be perceived positively by society," Leonid Shebarshin noted in conclusion.

Biryukova Attends Health Ministry Collegium

PM1502170790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Health Service: Beginning of Revolution?"]

[Text] Day hospitals and neighborhood hospitals, the team form of organization of doctors' and nurses' work, collective contracts in hospitals and the birth of the institution of doctors working from home. These first brushstrokes on the new canvas of our health service are important not only in themselves. They are the natural consequence of the revolution that has been taking place in this important sphere of society's life in the two years since the adoption of the all-union program to improve the health service.

Some results of this work were presented 12 February at an enlarged session of the USSR Health Ministry collegium. Minister Ye.I. Chazov noted that during this period there has been a change in the attitude of the state and society to the protection of people's health. Despite the state budget deficit, a further 36 billion rubles has been allocated to the health service. Many obsolete directive detachments have been revoked or revised, a plan has been devised for transferring the sector to the new management conditions, and new forms of work have been approved and endorsed.

The fundamentally new approach to tackling questions of mother and child care has begun to bear fruit: Infant mortality has fallen by 10 percent in the country compared with 1988. This has been aided by the establishment of diagnostic centers in many cities and the intensification of state monitoring of the environment.

A.P. Biryukova, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, participated in the work of the enlarged collegium of the USSR Health Ministry.

Yazov, Abalkin Address Seminar on War Lessons

PM0502151990 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 3 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "All-Union Seminar"]

[Text] An all-union seminar entitled "45 Years Since Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 and Topical Problems Concerning the Patriotic and Internationalist Education of the Soviet People" was held in Moscow 31 January-2 February.

The seminar was organized by the All-Union "Znaniye" Society Board, the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Central Committee, the USSR Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] Central Committee, the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, and the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

Speeches by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and others stressed that the beneficial influence of the Great Victory is still being felt in the everyday achievements of the Soviet people today and in the revolutionary restructuring of society which is under way and which is perceived by all progressive mankind as a historical necessity. At the same time, the positive changes in the country's life are proceeding more slowly than we would wish. In these conditions, the propagation of the lessons and results of the Great Patriotic War and the heroic history of the

Soviet people and their valiant Armed Forces and the strengthening of the indissoluble unity and cohesion of our society assume special significance.

Committee Examines Game Reserve Scandal

PM0502145790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report under "After Criticism" rubric: "Something To Do With Hunting or Willingness"]

[Text] The USSR People's Control Committee recently examined a statement by N. Kovalev, a warden at the "Smolenskoye" game reserve, who reported that this facility was being used to entertain high-ranking leaders.

It transpired that when the USSR State Agro-Industrial Committee was being abolished it renamed those reserves as state game reserves without permission so as to keep them within the sector. By an order of the liquidation commission dated 19 September 1988 they were placed on the register of the "Soyuzptitseprom" all-union science-and-production association, which has nothing to do with hunting.

Particularly luxurious conditions were provided for huntsmen. For a number of years money was spent unjustifiably on capital construction, the maintenance, reproduction, and protection of game, and payment of service staff at the expense of the state budget. For example, almost three million rubles [R] were invested in the development of the "Smolenskoye" game reserve. A high-quality two-story "hunting lodge" was built costing R212,000 with three deluxe rooms, sauna, pool, billiard room, and dining room. The house is equipped with expensive furniture and decorated with pictures and various hunting trophies.

Last year a substantial administrative block was commissioned even though the managerial staff numbers just six people. At the same time the "service staff" lives in buildings which do not meet the most basic health requirements.

The USSR People's Control Committee has severely punished A. Kaydalu, chief of a department of the "Soyuzptitseprom" all-union science-and-production association, and Ya. Kolesnikov, director of the "Smolenskoye" reserve, for an irresponsible attitude to work and a lack of principle.

In an interview given to PRAVDA correspondents by G. Kolbin, chairman of the USSR People's Control Commission, even before the "huntsmen" question was examined, it was said that there is an "oblast huntsmen team which includes A. Orlov, chairman of the Smolensk Oblast Executive Committee [oblispokom], himself." But it seems that the relevant document required to institute proceedings against him has still not materialized at a committee session. An explanatory letter signed by A. Vlasenko, first secretary of the Smolensk CPSU Oblast Committee [obkom], has been received by the editorial office.

Vlasenko reported among other things: "An investigation has been conducted on the party obkom's instructions into the criticism leveled at A.I. Orlov and has established that no oblast huntsmen teams have been formed. Since becoming oblispolkom chairman in July 1987 he has hunted at the reserve only once (on 27 December 1987). That hunt was conducted according to the regulations and at current rates and the proper payment was made. During the disbandment of the USSR Gosagroprom, the Smolensk Oblispolkom raised the question of reorganizing the work of the game reserve to cater for foreign tourists paying hard currency. That would ensure profitable work. However, the oblast's proposal was rejected."

Lenin Defended Against Journalist's Attack

PM2802155390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 90 First Edition p 1

[Article by Professor, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Captain First Rank M. Tikhonov under the rubric "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform": "Shooting at the Past..."]

[Text] Leningrad—You did not need to be clairvoyant to foresee the fierce attacks which are being made against the first section of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform. The answer is simple—this section contains the bases of the CPSU's ideological-political positions.

Furthermore, such attacks are not rare. Attempts to discredit Marxism-Leninism as a science are surfacing increasingly frequently in the various mass media, which seriously worries me as a scientist and communist. You can understand it if it is emigre writers who are making those attacks.

But when social scientists begin defaming Lenin (there is no other word for it), that arouses a natural urge to protest. I shall dwell briefly on one publication which, in my view, is the most typical. Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A. Tsipko, writing in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 17 January last, claims among other things, that the Bolsheviks' strategic program was based on a "Marxian utopia."

There you have it. Plain and simple. Lenin sought a Marxian utopia. And we are following Lenin. And we have reached a crisis. Thus it isn't hard to draw a conclusion about who is to blame for all our problems.

Unconcerned about arguments, Tsipko endeavors to "debunk" Lenin. He claims that Lenin never gave serious thought to "the consequences of the civil war that he unleashed or the possibility of realizing the dream which he imposed on his people."

Hold your horses, Professor! Have you given serious thought to this? Why do you credit Lenin with the initiative of unleashing the civil war? That is to turn everything upside down. Has the dream of a society built on the ideals of freedom, social equality, and fraternity really been rejected by us or other peoples? It will only die when mankind dies. Because the sincere commitment to socialist values is deeply rooted in the people's experience, in common sense, and in man's age-old striving for a better life and social justice. The essence of the question lies in the ways of achieving democratic socialism. Lenin sought that path. He warned: "We do not and cannot know the stages and practical measures whereby mankind will move toward that supreme goal." The experience of millions of people and the practical activity of mankind were to show that path.

Unfortunately, we did not make use of the advice of the leader, a great dialectician who examined phenomena in a concrete historical way, in their development, and in their interrelationship with other phenomena. Comrade Tsipko blames him for that: It always strikes me how easily Lenin changes the initial paradigms of his thinking at various stages of his struggle.

And this is a philosopher speaking! Indeed, how can you investigate the most complex "nuances" of socialist teaching if, putting it mildly, you confuse a divine gift with a fried egg. Hence the unjustified accusations and bogus conclusions.

This case, unfortunately, is not an exception. It seems that not a single rally passes without some bumptious loudmouth taking the platform to revile our socialist ideals. Worse than that, sometimes these are communists holding high posts. Believe me, I am ashamed to watch them ingratiating themselves with the "agitated" crowd, to watch their cheap populist devices, and their readiness to flout their convictions merely to satisfy their own ambitions.

People today are trying to blame Marxist-Leninist teaching for all our ills. I see several reasons for that.

First, not everything in Marxist-Leninist teaching has been borne out, some things remained dreams. That is natural. There was no experience of building the new society, only a theoretical model existed. In the very first years of Soviet power, Lenin saw certain discrepancies between that model and the actual course of events. He immediately made adjustments. That is what happened with the NEP, for example. Within a few years the country not only surmounted the crisis but also became a food exporter. But by the late twenties a return to the old model began. The result is well known.

Second, some tenets, correct in their day, have become obsolete. That is characteristic of any science. Here, however, we have tried with might and main to canonize that teaching. For all times and all occasions in life. The authors of the teaching, of course, cannot be responsible for our dogmatism.

Third, for various reasons, after Lenin's death the practice of building socialism in many respects took a direction completely opposite to that of Marxist-Leninist teaching.

It is no coincidence that the Central Committee draft Platform stresses: "The CPSU considers it fundamentally important to clearly distinguish between that in our past which is the product of the Stalinist era and a consequence of the flouting of socialist principles and that which represents the real contribution of the party and the people to the progress of our own country and all mankind."

Economic

Economic Experts Discuss Foreign Trade Policy

LD2202120190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1645 GMT on 20 February carries the 75-minute "Repercussions" program hosted by Georgiy Zubkov, on which studio guests answer questions phoned in by viewers about the Soviet Union's foreign trade, and by video link by two groups of foreign representatives gathered in two other Moscow locations—a group of businessmen from Sweden, Austria, and Italy at the overseas exhibition center, and a group of students, mainly from Third World countries, at the Lumumba Friendship University.

Zubkov opens the program by introducing his panel which comprises: Vladimir Nikolayevich Burmistrov, deputy minister of foreign economic relations of the USSR; Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko, chairman of the Board of the USSR State Bank; Ivan Dmitriyevich Ivanov, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; Vyacheslav Vladimirovich Sychev, secretary of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; and Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeyev, chairman of the subcommittee for questions of foreign economic, scientific-technical and trade links of the USSR Supreme Soviet and first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers.

Zubkov introduces the first question from a viewer: "The first person to get through to us is Nikolay Nikolayevich Popov, an engineer from the town of Kaliningrad in the Moscow oblast. He has the following message for the participants in the program—for which our thanks, as for subsequent questions: In trading, economic, and financial cooperation with overseas countries one has to think not just about the immediate profits of our entrepreneurs, but to be guided by the careful and assiduous consumption of our country's natural resources, since they are being exhausted and cannot be replaced. Ivan Dmitriyevich: our foreign economic activity is understandably closely linked with the economic situation within the country, and is a mirror image of that. But in answering Comrade Popov, please explain the main aspects of our foreign economic activity, the main principles that we now profess."

Ivanov responds: "We live in an interdependent world in which the Soviet economy can develop normally only if it is interlinked with, and in competition with the world economy. In the long term, therefore, as a part of the economic reform, we expect that what the economists call an open economy will be created in the Soviet Union. This open economy means that our foreign economic links will develop more rapidly than the growth in our national income, that all interested enterprises will have access to the external market, that our prices will be comparable with world prices, and that the internal market of the Soviet Union will also become a field of international competition. Naturally, with this one has to run one's economy in a very capable way. The concern of those people who say that in the main we are sending our natural resources into the sphere of external links is understandable, and although the proportion of these resources is not that great, it can of course influence the situation within the country. In the long term we are planning to industrialize Soviet exports, but that task cannot be resolved within any fairly short timescale. Under the external economic links strategy, which we will adhere to, we will try to freeze exports of raw materials and fuel at the level they were at in the middle of the 1980's, and to develop our exports in the main through finished output. This is a matter for Soviet industry to attend to, and then it will depend upon how quickly and at what level it will renew the range of its products. For our own part, in our technical policy nowadays we naturally take world standards as our reference points as regards competitiveness, and industry will be given appropriate support and incentives by the state. Unfortunately, during these years we are now obliged to retain raw materials among our exports in so far as we do not have an adequate alternative to them."

Other questions follow. Zubkov then names viewers who have asked for an assessment of the activities of cooperatives and joint enterprises on the external market.

Burmistrov replies: "First I would like to say that of more than 13,000 officially registered participants in foreign economic links, approximately 1,400 are accounted for by joint enterprises, that is to say by enterprises in which there is participation by foreign capital investment. Of course, it has to be said that not all of these enterprises are operating in an equally active way on the external market. And also of course there are great difficulties in the work of these enterprises, and in general there are also shortcomings in their activity. I would like to note that despite the fact that the first decision on the possibility of joint enterprises' working on our market was issued approximately three years ago, up to the present time no more than about 200 of these 1,400 enterprises are working actively. And there are even fewer of those operating in the production sphere, those that are increasing our export potential in real terms. As far as the structure of the capital investments is concerned, altogether the share capital for these 1,400 enterprises is approximately 3.3 billion [no monetary unit as heard]; of this, foreign investments account for just 1 billion. As you see, despite the fact that we adopted a special decision that foreign investors can have any number of shares and any proportion of the share capital, nevertheless just 30 percent of foreign capital is accounted for by foreign investment. As we see, foreign capital is not yet rushing to invest in the Soviet market on a wide scale. In addition there is another trend which is not very positive: Foreign investors try to place a large share of the risk involved in the activity of these enterprises on the Soviet side, and to a large extent upon the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity through the relevant credits being taken from them.

"Well, what are the difficulties? No doubt the main difficulty is that there is a certain contradiction. Foreign investors hope to use our huge market to the maximum degree. We, on the other hand, are interested in expanding our export potential and our export deliveries. To different degrees, in different enterprises, this problem is being resolved. And there is another very great difficulty where in fact we are the ones to blame. We have not found the place that is essential for joint enterprises in our system of material and technical supplies. This is perhaps the chief difficulty today in the activity of the joint enterprises."

Ivanov then states: "Their chief difficulty at present is the fact that it is very difficult to supply them from the domestic market—a market which does not yet exist. Nevertheless, last year they produced output already worth 500 million rubles (R) including output worth R80 million for export, and here I am talking about the output of the 250 enterprises which were working. The fact that it is difficult for them to get supplies results from a certain distortion when a very large proportion of these enterprises went into the services sphere instead of the production sphere."

The director of the Italian "Interexpo" firm, which has just organized an Italian exhibition in Moscow, is invited to ask his question. He points out that the lack of convertibility of the ruble is to a considerable extent a restraining factor upon the development of international trade between the USSR and Western countries, and asks Gerashchenko to talk about the basic principles of the convertibility strategy of the USSR State Bank.

Gerashchenko replies: This question has indeed been under very active discussion of late, not only in the pages of our economic press, but in all economic and foreign trade organs. We understand that drawing the Soviet Union and its economy into the world economy would be more successful and more rapid if our currency, the Soviet ruble, were convertible. But, as you correctly pointed out, several components are needed for creating such conditions, and first and foremost it is necessary to work on developing the competitiveness of our export potential. In addition, as you no doubt know, one important component for the introduction of convertibility of currency is a rate of exchange that has been worked out in the appropriate way, an official rate of exchange between the ruble and other foreign currencies. And it is my deep opinion at the present time that working out such a rate of exchange will be made difficult until definite economic steps and measures are taken in our reform, especially a change in the present structure of prices."

Zubkov then reads the following question: "How likely is it that there will be a currency reform in our country?" Gerashchenko replies: "In my personal view and in the view, I would say, of the country's government, a currency reform is not necessary under present conditions, and would not solve the problems that are arising in our economy. Essentially what is arising in our economy is the following process in which a fairly rapid growth in the incomes of the population has been taking place over the past two and a half years, while at the same time production has risen insufficiently, particularly production of consumer goods, and trade turnover. This has been reflected in a certain lack of balance on the consumer market, while the monetary incomes of the population, both in the hands of the population and in their savings bank deposits, has grown. This, perhaps, provides the grounds for such light-weight arguments, as I would describe them, that if one were to conduct a regressive currency reform and remove, as it were, part of the pressure of the weight of money from the consumer market, that this would assist the economy. In my view that is a profound mistake, and if one looks at the whole of the postwar period of the development of the economies in Europe, then currency reforms of that kind have been carried out in the immediate aftermath of the World War II, and as part of a set of other measures. I would like to assure listeners and television viewers that this policy naturally contains no elements of desire to protect the money of the shadow economy, which is what some television viewers ask about."

Zubkov comments: "Furthermore, we also have questions here—and there are rumors in Moscow, I don't know how reliable they are, but the rumors raise the same kind of question—are we virtually going to have a situation in which imported goods will be sold for hard currency, while our own Soviet goods will be sold for rubles? Are rumors of this kind based upon any kind of reality?"

Ivanov responds: "No, they are not. A market that is not saturated always gives rise to rumors. But how does the provision of imported goods for our domestic market take place? The greater part of them come from centralized purchases from the foreign currency funds of the state. These goods enter the normal retail trade network and are sold for rubles. Another section of these goods—and this one currently is increasing—is purchased by enterprises out of their foreign currency earnings. These goods are marketed to the collectives of the enterprises, again for rubles. Sales of these goods for foreign currency do exist, but in the main these are intended for foreigners who live in Moscow or are visiting Moscow. At the present time we have an instruction to normalize and improve retail sales for foreign currency for Soviet citizens who have some in their accounts, because there are a lot of shortcomings in that trade. Those are the channels by which imported goods enter the Union and are sold in the Union."

Zubkov then puts the following question asked by several viewers to Gerashchenko: "How realistic is it for several units of currency to exist in one state? That is to say, in practical terms will there be different money in individual union republics?"

Gerashchenko answers: "One could answer this as follows: In some countries, for example, as a resut of traditions that have evolved, it is not just the basic national currency unit, like the British pound, for example, that circulates, but the Scottish pound, say, also circulates, issued by the Bank of Scotland, fulfilling the role of the issuing center for that part of the country. But in the present case, essentially, the Scottish pound is an inseparable part of Great Britain's single monetary system. It accounts for a fairly inconsiderable part, and exchange takes place at parity, so to speak. What has been appearing in our country in recent times in some regions and republics—the desire to have one's own currency—I would say, is connected with attempts to protect one's own consumer market with the aid of an instrument of that kind, and in my view if one considers the development of our national economy as a single national economic complex, then the creation of such currency units on the territory of whichever republic, will in my view not solve any of the problems but, I would say, will bring certain confusion in settlements and nothing but harm—if, naturally, there isn't behind this the desire to prepare one's own banking and monetary system for a subsequent secession from the Soviet Union."

Zubkov interjects: "You must excuse me, but this next question is put point-blank: How much does the USSR owe, to whom does it owe it, and why? The question is signed Kantemir, but evidently the problem of loans in general is a very interesting one. Our country still has a credit in the form of confidence—people give us loans—but on what conditions and what are the rates of interest?"

Gerashchenko responds: "I would say that our country still does have a credit in the form of confidence. In principle our external indebtedness has increased during the year 1989. Up to the present time the figure of our external indebtedness has only once been given in our country, by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, last year. Naturally it has grown a little during this time. At the same time, evidently, one ought not to forget that we are essentially trying to implement a fairly tough policy in restricting our imports so that our external indebtedness can be held within the limits in which we would be able to keep up, and pay without pain, the necessary interest sums and pay off the basic debt at the proper date."

An Austrian businessman, taking part in the program via video link from the exhibition center refers to a situation he currently sees in the Soviet Union where enterprises increasingly demand payment from each other in hard currency for supplies and services rendered. He continues: "I have a question for Mr. Gerashchenko: Is a situation being planned in which all juridical persons in the Soviet Union will be able to participate in regularly held auctions of currency?"

Gerashchenko responds: "I would say that the first two auctions, held in 1989 and 1990, have not yet provided a very great volume of organizations wanting to sell this currency. The Bank for Foreign Economic Activity was therefore obliged to restrict the circle of participants, of those able to participate in this auction, and purchase currency. I think that as foreign economic links develop, as Soviet organizations have a greater quantity of currency earnings or currency, and as larger sums are allocated for centralized sale, this type of currency trade or trade in currency will develop in our country."

Tabeyev then reads questions that have been handed to him. He says: "A listener form Penza asks: Are prices for goods going to rise? What compensation will there be in terms of wages and pensions? I have to say that the USSR Supreme Soviet has made a decision and has approved the government program for the 13th five-year plan period, which envisages raising both wholesale and procurement prices, and also raising retail prices. In this connection the Supreme Soviet has explained that both wages and pensions will be fully compensated, and no Soviet individual will suffer from the fact that such an important economic action has been adopted—raising wholesale and retail prices."

The program concludes with Burmistrov answering questions submitted to him. He says: "Vasiliy Nikitovich Meshkov, from Moscow asks the following question: Industry has been given the right of access to the foreign market. Have exports of machinery and equipment risen in 1989 as a result of this? Unfortunately no. For a number of years machinery and equipment has accounted for approximately 15-16 percent of our exports structure at current prices, and if one takes comparable prices, the percentage will be even less. The reason? Well, of course, it is not that often declared reason that our machinery and equipment producers have allegedly been isolated from the requirements of the world market. No! The main reason here, of course, is the low level of development of the forces of production in a whole range of machine-building industries, and also the fact that production relations have not been perfected. The process of correcting these shortcomings is of course a fairly lengthy one, but we are hoping for a postive outcome."

Burmistrov continues: "Why does the USSR buy sugar from Cuba when we have a surplus of our own sugar? This question is asked by Comrade Ivanov from Kharkov. We do not have a surplus of sugar, Comrade Ivanov. Last year we bought 4.4 million tonnes of sugar from Cuba, and that is approximtely 30 percent of the sugar we consume every year. So we could scarcely get by without Cuban sugar. We would have to buy it somewhere else."

Agroindustrial Foreign Trade Activity Discussed

90UI0379A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 p 2

[V. Mamontov article: "Fleeced Business—Joint Meeting of the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Committees of People's Control Discusses Foreign Economic Operations"]

[Text] The issue put on the agenda of the meeting this time was so pressing and so complex that it required that efforts be pooled: The union and republic committees studied in depth the foreign economic operations of the enterprises and organizations of the agroindustrial complex using Voronezh, Ivanovo, and Moscow Oblasts as a sample. Perestroyka has given the foreign-trade sphere the unprecedented independence of enterprises and territories, has made it possible to study and use foreign experience, and to adopt advanced technologies and methods. We, the rank-and-file consumers, expected the new trade policy to benefit us.

Have our hopes been justified? Perhaps, all of us can now answer unambiguously: No, not yet.

Why? An analysis done at the Committee of People's Control [KNK] meeting said: Because this is the kind of resourcefulness and interest of our "breadwinners" as of now. Indeed, they have stepped up foreign trade operations sharply. However, they are first of all after their own gain whereas the interests of the consumer are still on the back burner.

For example, the "Moscow" Agroindustrial Combine [APK] signed a contract with the Bulgarian economic combine "Oranzherii" for the delivery of almost 20,000 ton of greenhouse vegetables. It signed an unconsidered, poorly written contract. As a result, the Muscovites received about 5,000 tons less vegetables than the amount promised. Besides, according to an evaluation by specialists, the payment for tomatoes was more than 11 million rubles [R] too high which can be classified as a net loss to the state. Meanwhile, Ye. Rychin, general director of the "Moscow" APK, not only believed that such a transaction was not a loss, but he also named a weighty total of profits! The answer was simple: The combine sold us less imported tomatoes than promised but at higher prices.

I would be interested to know what the housewives forming a line for German vegetable oil would say if they learned that the "Anninskiy" APK which has concentrated the foreign economic operations of the Voronezh gosagroprom [agroindustrial committee] has been selling vegetable oil abroad? The same incomprehensible logic puts up powdered milk for sale abroad while our country is not too well-fed. It has become difficult to purchase a pair of decent, sturdy shoes. Meanwhile, the "Anninskiy" APK is exporting 335,000 animal hides received from the meat-packing combines of the oblast. Could it be that these are above-the-plan raw materials, and we should welcome the initiative of Chairman of the Voronezh Agroprom I. Vinogradov who authorized the transaction? No, the citizens of Voronezh have failed to fill the state order for deliveries. The same is the case in Ivanovo Oblast: The tanning plants have failed to receive 26,600 hides while almost the same amount of them has been received by foreign companies which in the process had a good laugh at the shortchanged Soviet merchants who, as the proverb goes, set out to do shearing but came home fleeced.

In the course of the discussion, many reasons for such inept, not to use a stronger word, trade were given. Perhaps the chairman of the meeting, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR KNK Ye. Varnachev, came closer to the truth than anyone else:

"The money you are spending is not your own. This is the root cause of the problem."

This is true. Had the numerous miscalculations mentioned in a voluminous report ruined the traders themselves they would have, perhaps, treated the contracts more rigorously and would have calculated the benefits. Alas, foreign trade transactions are already in full swing whereas the reform of our economy which would ensure genuine self-captalization and would make the ruble the best controller is being delayed. Whichever way you look at it, the APK "Moscow" acted in the tomato transaction merely as a broker, a seller...of natural gas which it, naturally, does not produce but receives from the state. When the "gas" currency ran out they gave the combine more of it. It is easy to take "commercial risks" with this kind of financial backing in the rear.

Currently, many people do not find convincing the argument that we ruin the people, the state as a whole, by conducting business in this manner. The conversation held at the meeting also showed this graphically. A. Syanov, first deputy chairman of the Agroindustrial Committee of Voronezh Oblast, appeared to be greatly offended. He would not agree by any means that the R13 million which a sugar plant is going to cost have been actually stolen from the people. How else can you put it given the fact that the oblast executive committee has been planning to assemble it for 10 years now? In every one of these 10 years, the oblast has failed to process in a timely manner up to 1.5 million tons of raw sugar beets; this is approximately 60,000 tons of sugar. The outlay for storing this complete set of plant equipment alone (it was originally purchased in Poland) has exceeded R1 million. A million rubles-worth of equipment has already been lost irretrievably. Meanwhile, the executive committee and the agroprom engage in endless repeat coordination and ensure the KNK that they are on top of this issue at any given hour on any given day...

In all three inspected oblasts even the useful things which they have succeeded in procuring through foreign-trade operations are not used and bring losses. This includes sausage plants, factories producing crackers, dry savory biscuits, and processing poultry, equipment lines for producing ice cream, spaghetti, and margarine... All of this wealth in the form of equipment which has not been installed rots away in the rain and wind at worst, and at best it just sits in warehouses while warranty terms set by foreign companies expire. After all, they had frequently tried to get this equipment in every way possible and promised to install it immediately in the course of submitting justification on paper.

Given such conditions and this standard of responsibility of leaders, we cannot afford to wait complacently until the reform "itself" puts everything in its place and hits in the pocketbook or, better yet, punishes by bankruptcy an inept master or the one crafty after his own fashion. The well-known economist O. Latsis, member of the Union Committee of People's Control, who spoke at the meeting was right to raise the following issue: Now is the time to create a flexible system for regulating the new forms of foreign economic contacts. One "violation" should be a lesson, the second should draw a warning, and the third time around state foreign-trade departments may "revoke the license" of the violator, as State Motor Vehicle Inspection [GAI] inspectors do. It looks like such an inspection does not exist currently.

Our readers know from a series of our publications on the activities of the "ANT" concern how far some foreign-trade ships can sail. The APK "Kashirskiy" from Moscow Oblast can hardly compete with the "octopus," but one can discern a similar style: Instead of expanding the production of their own competitive goods, they got carried away procuring and reselling abroad the scrap ferrous and nonferrous metals and other goods which we could use here. The down and feathers produced by the combine itself yield a puny 0.5 percent of its hard-currency proceeds. However, aluminum, copper, titanium, and stainless steel bring in the remaining 99.5 percent. The scrap metal was purchased from the Moscow "Hammer and Sickle" Plant and the "Turbine" Cooperative in Kaluga. Only the intercession of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers brought the export and import operations of "Kashirskiy" to a halt. However, the APK soon again secured a permit to engage in them.

The Committees of People's Control noted that economic managers, executive committees, or the superior agroproms of Moscow Oblast, the Non-Chernozem Zone, and Russia do not have a concept of foreign economic activities which is clear-cut to any degree; they do not take into account and analyze the results of operations in foreign markets. At times, one gets the impression that some of the "merchants" need this international market strictly for their own purposes. As was established in the course of the review, in a number of cases the equipment which they seek from foreign company men traveling on many occasions to the Netherlands, the FRG, and Italy is produced in our country...

The managers mentioned in the article, as well as many other managers who have allowed the lack of organization, neglect for business, and irresponsibility to occur, were severely disciplined and penalized financially.

Currency Auction Delivers 'Another Blow' at Ruble

LD2802125290 Moscow World Service in Russian 1030 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] The third hard currency auction held in Moscow has dealt yet another blow to the ruble, according to the view of KOMMERSANT on the situation that arose at the auction. Those who wanted to change Soviet money for hard foreign currency outnumbered by four times those who were selling, that is, state establishments and enterprises. Relative to the previous auction, the ruble's exchange rate declined by 20 percent. Experts are of the view that the tendency towards the ruble becoming devalued is being fuelled, in particular, by inflation and by lack of balance in the domestic market.

Ryzhkov Meets Fish Industry Union Representatives

904F0078A Moscow TRUD in Russian 4 Feb 90 p 1

[TASS report: "A Meeting at the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] On 3 February, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.I. Ryzhkov met with a group of delegates to an extraordinary congress of the trade union of employees of the fish industry which is to open next Tuesday.

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers congratulated the delegates on this important event in the life of fishermen and noted that the government is aware of many issues which they are raising; a respective document on them is being prepared. Nonetheless, direct communication with the delegates of the congress makes it possible to learn better what the needs of the employees in the fishing sector are.

Views on the state of affairs in the industry, complicated conditions for the work of fishermen, particularly during long cruises, and the most acute problems of their daily life were exchanged in a businesslike atmosphere.

In his report, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Fish Industry Workers V.V. Kuzmenok described the situation in the sector, including difficulties which have developed in renewing the fleet and the limited economic opportunity of enterprises and associations to solve this problem. The lack of a transportation fleet and disruptions in the supply of fuel to the vessels make it impossible to fully utilize the potential of production facilities. The shortcomings of some elements of the economic mechanism are also an impediment.

Senior electrician mechanic of the trawler Povolzhye of the Murmansk Trawler Fleet Yu.T. Lebedev, senior trawler foreman of the Kamchatka Inter-Kolkhoz Production Association V.F. Kudin, vessel hull technician of the Diomidovskiy Repair Shipyard in Maritime Kray A.I. Perepelitsa, senior mechanic of the Litrybprom (Lithuanian Association of the Fish Industry) V.I. Plotkin, chairmen of oblast committees of the trade union of fish industry workers A.P. Fateyev, N.I. Uskov, and V.M. Melikhov stated a number of considerations for improving the living conditions of the employees, particularly of those who are registered as living on the vessels because they do not have a dwelling. Constructive proposals for solving this most complex social problem were made.

The issues of ecology and preservation of the fish resources in the lower reaches of the Volga, the Caspian Sea, and the shelf of Kamchatka were also discussed at the meeting. It was noted that the foreign trade operations of the sector do not sufficiently facilitate solving the problems of the fishing industry.

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers appreciated the proposals and critical remarks by the delegates of the congress.

It was recommended that First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.V. Nikitin and USSR Minister of Fishing N.I. Kotlyar, who took part in the meeting, summarize the proposals of fishermen in order to act on some of them in the immediate future and to consider the ones requiring detailed work together with the draft 13th five-year plan.

Landslide Buries Unattended Service Station

90US0492A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 6

[B. Urigashvili article: "Landslide in the Center of Tbilisi"]

[Text] It happened on Thursday at 1230. From the mountain slope hanging over service station No. 4 on the right bank of the Kura, a huge layer of earth tore itself away and virtually buried the service station [AZS]. Certain difficulties concerning gasoline, which the republic has experienced in recent months, turned out to be a blessing in this instance: The station had run out of fuel two hours before the landslide. In addition, no one was at the station.

The damage, according to preliminary information, runs to several tens of thousands of rubles. In the first place, Japanese equipment, paid for with foreign currency, had been installed at one time at the AZS. In the second place, the daily receipts from the disabled station reached 20,000 rubles on some days. And this, it would seem, is the end of the story. But a number of questions arise. What, for instance, is the condition of the layers of earth upon which the city stands? How are they influenced by underground water lines, and how does the construction of new subway lines affect them? These questions are not idle ones. Many residential buildings in the city are situated on the slopes of similar hills.

Agricultural

Details on Weather, Crop Conditions Reported

Mid-January Period

904B0143A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 25 Jan 90 p 1

[Report by A. Grishina, agrometeorologist: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] In the Baltic area, Belorussia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, and a large part of the Northern Caucasus, throughout almost all of the second 10 days of January the weather was warmer than usual. The maximum air temperature rose to 6-12 degrees above zero. There was almost no snow on the fields with winter crops or else it was no more than five cm deep. There were no severe freezes. The minimum temperature of the soil at the depth of the tillering node of winter grain crops was for the most part minus one to minus three degrees. In Moldavia, the south of Odessa Oblast, Krasnodar Kray, and the Crimea, winter grain crops resumed growing. Their winter hardiness decreased in this zone.

In the south of the Central, the Volgo-Vyatka, the north of Povolzhye, the northeast of the Central Chernozem regions and the north of Rostov Oblast, during the first half of the 10-day period, the depth of the snow cover on fields with winter grain crops was not great (mainly two to five cm) and in places there was none at all. The temperature dropped to minus 25 to minus 32 degrees, and in Rostov Oblast to minus 22 degrees. The conditions for the winter crops deteriorated here. At the end of the 10-day period, the depth of the snow cover in a number of regions increased somewhat and amounted to eight to 10 cm.

In the regions in the northwest and north; a large part of the Volgo-Vyatka and the northeastern part of the Central regions; the north of the Povolzhye, and the south of the Ural regions, during the period from 12-17 January, the weather was unusually cold. The low air temperature dropped to from minus 35 to minus 46 degrees. On the fields with winter grain crops, there was a deep snow cover (35-45 cm and more).

An unfavorable factor for the further wintering of winter crops is the formation of a crust of ice on the ground in places in the Central Chernozem region and the northeastern part of the Ukraine. The retention of a crust of ice on the ground have hindered the winter crops in individual regions of Estonia, Latvia, the Northwestern, Central, Povolzhye, and the south of the Volgo-Vyatka region.

In the Transcaucasian republics the air temperature was close to the many-year average.

In the farming regions of Siberia during the first half of the 10-day period it was warmer than usual. Then the temperature dropped sharply. On certain nights the low temperature was from minus 30 to minus 45 degrees. The winter grain crops were under a good snow cover and wintering normally.

But in the southwest of Novosibirsk and in certain regions of Kemerovo Oblast and in places in Altay Kray, because of the irregularity of the snow cover and the severe freezes at the end of the 10-day period, the low temperature of the soil at the depth of the tillering node of winter grain crops was from minus 23 to minus 26 degrees, which was dangerous for wintering plants. In certain regions of Tyumen and Novosibirsk Oblasts and Altay Kray there is still a crust of ice on the soil and it is under a deep snow cover. Under these conditions the ice crust is less dangerous.

In Kazakhstan the coldest period was the middle 10-day period when the minimum air temperature in the northern half of the republic was from minus 28 to minus 36 degrees and in the southern half—minus 15 to minus 30. In a number of regions the cooling was accompanied by snow storms. As of 20 January there was a snow cover everywhere. In most places it was 10-25 cm deep.

In the republics of Central Asia in the first half of the 10-day period the weather was mainly colder than usual. The low air temperature in the northern half of the region was from minus 11 to minus 20 degrees and in the southern half—from minus three to minus 10 (in the mountainous regions of Kirghizia its was minus 20). Then it became warmer. In the southern part of the territory during the day the air temperature warmed up to two to nine degrees above zero. For most of the 10-day period the winter grain crops were in a state of winter dormancy.

Early February Period

904B0143B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by agrometeorologist Ye. Solovyeva: "How the Crops Are Withstanding the Winter"]

[Text] On the European territory of the USSR the weather stayed unusually warm during the first 10 days of February. Then it became colder and snow storms began to occur in a number of places. In Latvia, Lithuania, the western oblasts of Belorussia, the western and southern oblasts of the Ukraine, and also in Moldavia the swelling of the buds of fruit trees was observed 1.5-2 months earlier than usual. There was no snow cover on the fields in these regions and the soil had thawed out.

In Estonia, in the western part of the Northwestern region, in the east of Belorussia and the Ukraine and also in the west and south of the Central region, on a large part of the territory of the Central Chernozem oblasts, and also Rostov and Astrakhan oblasts and the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] there was almost no snow cover on the fields planted in winter crops or else its depth did not exceed five centimeters. The soil was frozen (to a depth of 10-40 cm) and the low temperature of the soil at the depth of the tillering node of winter grain crops was in the range of from zero to minus three degrees.

The results of the growing of plant specimens taken from the fields by the weather stations at the end of January showed that the wintering had been favorable for the areas planted in winter grain crops in the main regions where they are cultivated. But because of the freezing weather in January, in places in the north of Povolzhye and the south of the Volgo-Vyatka region the winter rye was thinner than usual. In Estonia, Latvia, the Northwestern, and the south of the Central region the thinning of the plants on individual fields in the specimens of winter rye (15-30 percent and more) was caused by the crust of ice on the soil in December and January and the overmoistening of the soil in the autumn. In the Northern region, in the northeast of the Central region, in the north of the Volgo-Vyatka, and the west of the Ural region there was also a little thinning of the winter rye in certain specimens (from 15 to 25 percent) as a result of self-warming.

In winter wheat the greatest number of specimens with increased thinning (from 15 to 30 percent) was observed on individual fields of the western and southern oblasts of the Central region and in places in Kursk, Voronezh, Kuybyshev, Saratov, and Sumy oblasts.

In Azerbaijan, where the daily air temperature was six to 11 degrees, the winter grain crops and perennial grasses grew poorly and in the rest of the regions of Transcaucasia they are in a state of winter dormancy under a snow cover.

In the majority of agricultural regions of Western Siberia the weather was warmer than usual. The depth of the snow cover in most places here was 30-50 cm.

In Kazakhstan the beginning of February was cold. The winter grain crops and grasses were under a snow cover in a state of winter dormancy.

The weather was warmer than usual in the republics of Central Asia.

Mid-February Period

904B0152A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by agrometeorologist Ye. Solovyeva: "Weather and Crops"]

[Text] In the second 10-day period of February, the average air temperature in the European territory of the USSR exceeded the long-range average by five to eight degrees. However, in the middle of the 10-day period, a short cold snap was noted in a majority of regions which was accompanied by stronger winds, snowstorms, and abundant snowfall. There was no snow cover throughout the period on the fields with winter grains in the western part of Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, as well as Moldavia, the western and southwestern oblasts of the Ukraine and Krasnodar Kray. In these locations, the soil thawed through. The swelling of the buds on apple, cherry, pear, sweet cherry, and apricot trees, as well as on other bush and tree plants, was registered, which is approximately one to 1.5 months sooner than the long-range averages. The vegetation of winter grain crops resumed in Moldavia, in the southwest of the Ukraine, and in Krasnodar Kray.

In the rest of the territory of the European part of the USSR, winter grains were in the condition of winter dormancy under the cover of snow. Minimum temperatures of the soil at the depth of the position of the tillering node were within the range of zero to minus two degrees, and in the Middle Volga area—that of minus five to minus seven degrees. Conditions for the wintering-over of sown winter crops were satisfactory. In the Northern Region, the southeast of the Central Region, the north of the Volga-Vyatka Region, and the west of the Urals Region, the snow cover remained high (40 to 60 cm and more) with little freezing in the soil (less than 30 centimeters). Snow-smothering continued in these regions. In the Northwestern, Central, Central Chernozem, and Volga Regions and in the south of the Volga-Vyatka Region, a crust of ice clinging to the soil remained in some places in the fields with winter crops.

Warm weather dominated in the republics of Transcaucasia. For most of the period, winter grain crops were growing. By the end of the period, the weather got colder, and the vegetation of winter grain crops came to a halt. A snow cover formed in the fields; its height ranged between 4 and 20 or more cm.

The weather which was warmer than usual dominated in most of the agricultural areas of Siberia. Maximum air temperatures ranged between minus four and plus four degrees. By the end of the 10-day period, an abrupt cold snap occurred. In West Siberia, winter grains were under a snow cover the height of which ranged between 20 and 55 cm. The wintering of crops proceeded favorably.

The weather was warmer than usual for most of the 10-day period in the southeast of Kazakhstan; by the end of the period, there was a cold snap. Winter grain crops were under a snow cover in a state of winter dormancy.

Warm weather also persisted in the republics of Central Asia which facilitated a vigorous revegetation of fruit crops. The swelling of the leaf buds and blossoms on apricot, plum, cherry, almond, and mulberry trees, as well as on other fruit crops was registered here. In the vineyards, the sap began to flow. For most of the period, winter grain crops were growing (except in Kirghizia). In Kirghizia, their condition was for the most part that of winter dormancy.

Scientific

Journalists for Space Flight Aboard Mir Named

LD0103195290 Moscow TASS in English 2000 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—The first Soviet journalists—candidates for a mission aboard the Mir orbital complex—were named here today. A panel of medical experts at the USSR Health Ministry's Institute of Medical and Biological Problems found Svetlana Omelchenko of Moscow's VOZDUSHNY TRANSPORT (Air Transport) newspaper and Pavel Mukhortov of Riga's SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH (Soviet Youth) newspaper the fittest. They have been admitted to a special training course in the cosmonaut training center outside Moscow.

"As regards our institute", Soviet physician-cosmonaut Valeriy Polyakov, who is now deputy director of the Institute of Medical and Biological Problems, told TASS, "we approached the issue of preparing a press representative for a space mission in full seriousness and with a sense of utmost responsibility. We did all in our power to select those from the great number of applicants who can actually withstand the extreme space conditions—naturally, after an appropriate preparation in the cosmonaut training center. Personally I wish with all my heart to see a representative of the journalist legion effectively and highly-professionally reporting from the orbit".

Soon, an institute spokesman told TASS, some more journalists will complete a comprehensive set of medical examination. Then a complete list of candidates for pre-flight training will be published. The final selection is expected to be made by the Chief Medical Commission and the Space Commission of the USSR Journalists; Union". [quotation mark as received]

Barnaul Reassured After Radiation Scare Rumors

LD0103212890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0430 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] In Barnaul people have become convinced the rumors about heightened background radiation connected with nuclear tests near Semipalatinsk are baseless. The people of Barnaul now know precisely that the level of the background radiation is normal, amounting to 12-17 microroentgens per hour. Such are the readings of a dosimeter set up in the town center, which analyzes the situation around the clock.

Doctor Calls for Nationwide AIDS Campaign

LD0103233590 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Kiev March 1 TASS—"In order to curb the spread of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome [AIDS] in the Soviet Union, it is necessary to organize a nationwide campaign against the AIDS epidemic. This can be done only through a qualitatively new level of understanding our behaviour, as well as through advanced science and equipment," deputy head of the Ukrainian Chief Sanitary Doctor Vladimir Shestakov said. [sentence as received]

The Soviet Union has more than 500 AIDS carriers. Their number will increase to 500,000, with about 4,000 people ill with the disease, by the year 2000, if effective measures to combat AIDS are not found. Three people have already died of AIDS in the Ukraine.

The money earmarked by the state is not enough to curb the epidemic. A national anti-AIDS program can be introduced only if everyone supports the program and realizes the seriousness of the situation.

A special public fund has been established and a special bank account has been opened to finance the program, Shestakov said.

"We are legally careless in our stand on AIDS," Shestakov went on to say. "Neither the Soviet Union nor the Ukraine have clear-cut legislation against AIDS carriers. A decree by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, providing for protective measures, does not give such guarantees.

"The question of the forthcoming AIDS epidemic should be in the focus of the new Ukrainian Parliament that will be elected on March 4. Otherwise, we will face an 'AIDS Chernobyl'," Shestakov said.

Military

Structure, Flow Chart of Armed Forces Detailed

90UM0322A

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian in the 22 February Morning Edition on page 6 publishes the chart below. It was accompanied by an article by IZVESTIYA military correspondent V. Litovkin, entitled: "Secrets Without Secrets".

Litovkin notes that a schematic of the Soviet Armed Forces has not previously been published due to military opposition. He also points out:

—though they do exist, the Moscow anti-missile defense(s) are not depicted due to their relative insignificance;

—that the name of the Commander of the Civil Defense Troops is not named, since the Civil Defense Troops are subordinate not only to the Armed Forces, but are also a part of the structure of the "Civil Defense of the Country, which is commanded by General of the Army V.L. Govorov. It is significantly larger than the framework of the Army and Navy and within the competence of the USSR Council of Ministers";

—"though it does exist, the sole District of the Air Defense Forces, Moscow, is not drawn in due to the space available. Its Commander is Colonel General of Aviation V.A. Prudnikov;"

—the diagram does not show the Border, Internal and Railroad troops, since they have been removed from the Armed Forces;

—"... Now the question of the removal of Civil Defense forces, military construction detachments in more than 20 civilian ministries and agencies, and also road-building units working on the construction of roads in the non-black earth zone of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR], is being reviewed;"

—the chart "reflects a defined stage in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Indeed tomorrow and the day after tomorrow they will appear in large part different."

Structure of the USSR Armed Forces


USSR Minister of Defense
General of the Army D.T. Yazov
Deputies of the Minister of Defense
General Staff
Gen Army M.A. Moiseyev
Glav PUR of SA & N
Gen Army A.D. Lizichev
Branches of the Armed Forces
Strategic Missile Forces General of the Army Yu.P. Maksimov
Ground Forces General of the Army V.I. Varennikov
Air Def Troops General of the Army I.M. Tret'yak
Air Forces Marshal of Avn A.N. Yefimov
Navy Admiral of the V.N. Chernavin.
RearServices Gen Army V.N. Arkhipov
Civil Defense Troops
Main and Central Directorates
Main Commands of Troop Sectors
Commander-in-Chief General of the Army S.I. Postnikov
Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General V.V. Osipov
Commander-in-Chief General of the Army N.I. Popov
Commander-in-Chief Colonel-General A.V. Kovtunov
Combat Arms (Troops, Aviation and Naval Forces)
Stationary Basing
Mobile Basing
Motorized Rifle Troops
Tank Troops
Airborne Troops
Missile and Artillery Troops
Air Defense TRoops
Air Defense Aviation
Surface-to-Air Missile Troops
Radio-Technical Troops
Bomber (Aviation)
Fighter-Bomber (Aviation)
Fighter (Aviation)
Ground Attack
Reconn-aissance
Military Transport
Submarine Forces
Surface Forces
Naval Aviation
Naval Infantry
Coastal Missile & Artillery Troops
Special Troops
-Engineering
-Chemical
-Signals
- Motor Vehicle
-Road
-Pipe-laying
Operational - Strategic and Operational Formations
Military Districts
Missile Army
Baltic Col-Gen F.M. Kuz'min
Belorussian Col-Gen A.I. Kostenko
Carpathian Col-Gen V.V. Skokov
Odessa Col-Gen I.S. Morozov
Leningrad Col-Gen V.F. Yermakov
Moscow Col-Gen N.V. Kalinin
Kiev Col-Gen B.V. Gromov
North Caucasus Col-Gen L.S. Shustko
Transcaucasus Col-Gen V.A. Patrikeyev
Volga-Ural Col-Gen AM Makashov
Turkestan Col-Gen I.V. Fuzhenko
Siberian Col-Gen B.Ye. P'yankov
Transbaykal Col-Gen V.M. Semenov
Far Eastern Col-Gen VI Novozhilov
Groups of Forces
Western Gen Army B.V. Snetkov
Central Gen Army Ye A Vorob'yev
Southern Col-Gen M.P. Burlakov
Northern Col-Gen V.P. Dubynin
Air def Army
Air Army
Fleets
Northern Admiral F.N. Gromov
Pacific Admiral G.A. Khvatov
Black Sea Admiral M..N. Khronopulo
Baltic Admiral B.T. Ivanov
Flotilla
Caspian Rear Adm V.B. Leshchenko
Naval Base
Leningrad V Adm V..G. Selivanov
Note
administrative subordination
operational subordination

Baltic Republics

Moscow Control Over Baltic Transactions Ordered

LD0203110990 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1530 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Report by Moscow correspondent Hannu Vilpponnen]

[Text] The Soviet Central Bank has ordered that the payment transactions of the Baltic banks be under Moscow's control with effect from today. According to Rein Otsason, director general of the Estonian Central Bank, this means the end of the idea of the economic independence of the republics.

[Begin Otsason recording in Russian, fading into Finnish] Of course, this cancels out the entire [word indistinct] program. According to the program on economic independence, the republic should naturally direct its banking activities itself, says the director general of the Estonian Central Bank, Rein Otsason. A decision on the matter was already made a month ago, but it came into effect today. And the effects of the decision are already beginning to show.

A metal factory in Azov announced that under these conditions it has stopped the delivery of a consignment of 800,000 tonnes of metal to the Estonian national economy. Otsason considers it obvious that similar announcements will start coming from elsewhere, too. The suppliers of goods fear that in the end they will be left without payment. From today the Central Bank has declared all checks signed in the Baltlic countries invalid.

All these decision have been made without listening to the views of the Baltic republics. The Estonian Government, at least, has sent a strong protest both to the Soviet Government and to the Central Bank, but has not yet received any replies. According to Director General Otsason, the Soviet Central Bank, by its actions, has declared itself an antidemocratic organization of the period of stagnation.

Otsason does not believe, however, that the decision on centralization could remain in force. I do not believe that things can continue in such a way; it is either an example of economic stupidity or a deadly love of centralization, says Otsason.

The economic independence of the Baltic republics was due to begin at the start of this year. Formally, a law on this is in effect. The USSR Supreme Soviet has not, however, managed to achieve any other laws centrally affecting economic life, so that economic independence has existed only on paper so far. The central planning body, Gosplan, in particular has issued warnings against too rapid a transition to independence of the republics. This is, of course, understandable from its point of view, for it would lose its present stranglehold on the republics.

The independent development of the Baltic republics seems to be at the crossroads in other ways, too. The day before yesterday they refused to take part in the debate on extending the powers of the Soviet president. According to the plans, the president, equipped with the new powers, could, if he so desired, cancel the decisions taken by the republic's democratic power bodies. On Tuesday the representatives of the Baltic republics had talks with Mikhail Gorbachev on the independence of their republics. Today, according to an interview with Deputy Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene, published in a Lithuanian newspaper, Mikhail Gorbachev refused to participate in official negotiations on the question of independence.

However, the Baltic republics are paying back in the same measure. People's Deputy Marju Lauristin has announced that the people's deputies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania demand the discussion of the question of independence at the Congress of People's Deputies which will meet in just under two weeks' time. Unless this takes place, they will refuse to discuss other matters.

'Estonian Congress' Elections Under Way

PM2702090790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Feb 90 p 1

[Own correspondent G. Sapozhnikova report: "Tallinn"]

[Text] The city is changing like pictures in a coloring book. Just a day ago red flags were fluttering in honor of Soviet Army Day (many people here, admittedly, call it occupying forces' day—but those are details), and on 24 February, National Independence Day, all of Tallinn was full of striped flags.

It was on that day that elections to the Estonian Congress, which will be held in Tallinn 11-12 March and is assembling to discuss for the umpteenth time the question of Estonia's state independence, began. Everything is being done properly—electoral precincts, ballot boxes, and ballot papers.

Is the Estonian Congress planning to compete with the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, elections to which are being held in three weeks' time?.... Tiyt Rummo, chairman of the electoral commission at a Tallinn electoral okrug, believes that these two parallel structures should work hand in hand.

Despite the fact that the attitude of the non-Estonian population to National Independence Day and the congressional elections is approximately the same as the Estonian population's attitude to Soviet Army Day and Shrove Tuesday, mutual congratulations are very correct. A holiday is a holiday.

Latvia Adopts Law on Alternative Military Service

LD0103204490 Moscow TASS in English 2018 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Riga March 1 TASS—The spring draft into the Army will be the first test of the law on alternative service, which was adopted by the Latvian parliament. It had been thrashed out for a long time, including during the two-week break between the meetings of the current session of this Soviet Baltic republic's legislature.

The session that resumed today finally approved of the document.

The law commits citizens, who by their pacifist or religious convictions cannot be in active service, to undergo an alternative (labour) service within 36 months and 18 months—for citizens with higher education.

The session introduced changes to the republican housing code, which, legislators believe, will create guarantees for the protection of the interests of the indigenous population, will give them priority in receiving housing. The discussion of these amendments was closely linked with other issues and drew wide response in the republic, especially in Army units.

Talk about priveleges in providing housing to retired and demobilised officers, and the free choice by them of the city of residence was begun at the opening of the session. For the first time Riga saw people in military uniform standing on picket lines.

It was noted that the documents were prepared without the participation of Army representatives. This is why they were drawn in the further work on the bills during the break between sessions.

The resolution adopted today says that to maintain social justice and limit the mechanical population growth, which is burdensome for the republic, those reserve and retired servicemen will enjoy housing privileges who permanently resided in Latvia prior to the call-up. Those who were registered before March 15, 1990, will be provided with housing under the former regulations.

Although the session enforced several union laws and resolutions in the territory of the republic, its participants did not recognise the right of the bodies of the USSR state authority to check compliance with the constitution and laws of sovereign Latvia and called on the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to make amendments in the USSR law on constitutional compliance in the USSR.

Newly Introduced Latvian State Symbols Described

PM0103114390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report from Riga by Irina Litvinova under the general heading "Direct Line. Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter"]

[Text] **Latvia's New Coat of Arms, Anthem, and Flag**

The law on the establishment of Latvia's new symbols of statehood came into force 27 February. It had been adopted 10 days earlier at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet.

At 1000 hours a festive ceremony opened at the Supreme Soviet Presidium building. It was followed particularly closely by the indigenous population of the republic. After all, to them the new flag, anthem, and coat of arms mean the rebirth of the symbols of the Latvian republic which existed in the twenties and thirties and was the first embodiment of the Latvian people's statehood. A. Gorbunov, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, delivered a speech at the ceremony. Academician L. Stradin, a well-known republic scientist, was entrusted with hoisting the new state flag—crimson with a white stripe down the middle. A band and choir performed the new anthem: "God Bless Latvia!"

Now a few words about the coat of arms, or rather the two coats of arms. Amendments have been made to the republic Constitution in accordance with which a large coat of arms has been approved (to be used by the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet, its Presidium and standing commissions, the Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and civic document registration authorities on their seals) and a small coat of arms, with rules for its use to be elaborated by the Council of Ministers. The large coat of arms is in the shape of a shield which is divided into several sections depicting a rising sun on a pale blue background, a red lion rampant on a silver background, and a silver griffin with a sword in its right hand on a red background. Above the shield are three five-pointed gold stars arranged in a semi-circle and symbolizing "Vidzeme," "Kurzeme," and "Latgale"—the three regions which historically made up Latvia. The restored coat of arms has been designed by the well-known Latvian graphic artist Rikhard Zarinsh, who is known in our country as the creator of the first Russian postage stamps.

The session adopted a special provision on the use of the new symbols. There is, for instance, a precise division between the functions of the USSR state flag and the state flag of the Latvian SSR. On state holidays of the USSR only the USSR state flag is to be hoisted. On state holidays and commemorative days of the republic only the red-white-red flag will be used. It is permitted to use the state flag of the republic during people's labor and family holidays.

...After the ceremony at the Supreme Soviet Presidium building, the former red flag with pale blue waves was handed over for storage in an archive. According to a statement of the chairman of the Interfront of the working people of the Latvian Republic, the former anthem, coat of arms, and flag will be declared official symbols of this organization.

Sajudis Urges Speedup of Second Round of Elections

LD0103205190 Moscow TASS in English 2028 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius March 1 TASS—By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila:

Deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet representing the Sajudis Movement, who became members of the republican parliament after the first round of parliamentary elections in this Baltic republic, have urged to speed up the elections. Sajudis has won 72 out of 90 seats in the Lithuanian parliament after the first round of elections on February 24.

Speaking on their behalf, Kazimeras Moteka, one of Sajudis leaders and USSR people's deputy, spoke on republican television on Wednesday, urging residents of the republic to hold the second round of elections not on March 10, as planned before, but on March 4 or at least March 8.

By speeding up the elections, Sajudis leaders hope to hold the first session of the new republican parliament on March 10-11, i.e. before the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies, which is expected to institute executive presidency in the USSR.

Academician Juozas Bulavas, head of the republican electoral commission, told TASS that in 45 constituencies, where two candidates who won the majority of votes in the first round would stand for election, the date of the second round will be fixed by district electoral commissions. At present 22 constituencies are ready to hold elections on March 4. In the remaining constituencies the elections will be held before March 10.

Lithuanian Run-Off Elections To Begin 4 Mar

LD0103055890 Vilnius in English to North America 2300 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] A run-off in the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, at least in 20 electoral districts, will be held on Sunday, 4 March. The second round of the elections in other 25 electoral districts is due the next weekend. According to the current election regulations, a run-off must be organized not later than in 2 weeks' time.

Commissions of electoral districts were urged to arrange this procedure as early as possible after the failure to elect two-thirds of deputies on 24 February.

In the forthcoming run-off this Sunday, the Lithuanian reform movement Sajudis has good chances to increase its dominance in the parliament. In 16 out of 20 electoral districts there are Sajudis-supported candidates. In each electoral district, only two candidates remain on the ballot this time, and in the greater part of these 20 districts Sajudis-supported candidates were at the top during the first round.

The results of the run-off will be officially announced next Tuedsay and we hope that then the newly elected parliament will be legitimate.

Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Session Resumes

LD0103140190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] After a two-day break the session of the Lithuanian parliament has resumed work. A draft law on alternative labor service and other matters is to be examined.

Lithuanian Press Law Takes Effect 1 Mar

LD0103200890 Moscow TASS in English 1655 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Vilnius March 1 TASS—A law on the press and other mass media means went in force in Soviet Lithuania today. It was adopted by the session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet (parliament) two weeks ago.

The law says that all information in the republic should appear in the Lithuanian language and, when necessary, in other languages. The national minorities are guaranteed the right to receive, prepare and disseminate information in their native language.

The Russians, Poles, Jews, Belorussians and Germans living in Lithuania have their own newspapers, radio and television programmes. Local Ukrainians and Karaims will also have them soon.

"In working out this new law, we used the experience of Soviet and world press," USSR People's Deputy Domijonas Sniukas, chairman of the Union of Lithuanian Journalists, said. "No one has the right to deny a journalist access to information. If such a refusal is given, it should be done in a written form and can be apealed in court. A journalist can also refuse to prepare a material if it contradicts his political convictions."

The press control directorate under the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior has been instructed to register the mass media and issue registration certificates to their founders. The directorate will monitor the observation of information laws by the mass media, which can be closed if these rules are violated.

Lithuanian Ruling on Army Service Criticized

PM0103124790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Feb 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 3

[Dispatch by IZVESTIYA correspondent L. Kapelyushnyy: "Alien Soldiers and the Republic's Own Children"]

[Text] Vilnius—The Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Status of USSR Armed Forces in the Republic and Military Service by Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Citizens" has been published.

It is well known that the republic Supreme Soviet's recent session deemed Lithuania's entry into the Soviet Union illegal. Consequently, the presence of USSR Armed Forces on Lithuania's territory is "juridically inconsistent." Henceforth, "any actions by the USSR

Armed Forces which could obstruct the organs of state power and management in the Lithuanian SSR in the performance of their constitutional functions would be evaluated as interference in the Lithuanian SSR's internal affairs."

Had the resolution stopped there, this document could have been considered Lithuania's internal affair. But there are two subsequent mandatory points. The first makes it mandatory for the republic's military commissar to submit proposals for the recall of Lithuanian SSR citizens serving in the Transcaucasus republics. The second makes it mandatory for the republic's prosecutor not to remit to the country's Military Prosecutor's Office without the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's consent any criminal cases concerning Lithuanian SSR citizens serving in the USSR Armed Forces who have abandoned their military units as a result of violence committed against them.

I must admit that hitherto I had assumed that a military commissar was guided by Armed Forces regulations in his work, and that the fact that a prosecutor is not subject to any authority higher than the law is a truism.

The anti-Army hysteria which has been whipped up in Lithuania over the last few months contains an excessive measure of national egoism: Lithuanian children should serve in the republic or, in any case, in the European part of the country. All the rest has nothing to do with us.

The inability of the USSR Ministry of Defense to maintain order and discipline in military units so as to rule out any violence and tragic results in the course of service offered a basis for compromise: Following talks between the republic's leadership and the ministry, Lithuanian SSR citizens were granted certain advantages as regards the geographical location of their service. In my view, however, there must be no privileges along nationality lines in military service.

The Lithuanian parliamentarians have gone further still in their demand to recall their republic's children from the Transcaucasus: Never mind what is happening there, what functions are performed by the troops, or what mission has been assigned to soldiers there—the important point is that our own children should not be there.

An announcement by the Lithuanian SSR KGB on criminal actions against soldiers serving in Lithuania was published at the same time as the republic Supreme Soviet resolution. They are getting to be targets for potshots.

Is this right—feeling sorry for the republic's own children if they freeze or are exhausted by the heat, and yet shooting at other people's children?

It is not hard to imagine the possible consequences of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet resolution, the floodgates it might open. A series of legislative acts recently adopted in Lithuania are at odds with Union laws. Every so often the Supreme Soviet Presidium deems them contradictory and advises their repeal. But this advice is not heeded at local level. And the republic's citizens find themselves caught "between two laws"—one permits, the other prohibits. This situation is absurd, given the proclaimed course toward a law-governed state. The Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet's latest resolution directly concerns obedience or disobedience of the law. It is incumbent on the country's government either to recognize this presentation of the question as lawful or to find a common language with the republic's government. Citizens should not have to bear the cost of governments' inability to find a common language.

Lithuania's mutual relations with the USSR Armed Forces—just one aspect of the pretty complex Lithuanian situation—demands immediate discussion and solution. Otherwise, Transcaucasian mothers could demand the recall of their own children serving in Lithuania...

Lithuanian Christian Democrats Group Re-Formed

90UN0918B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 30 Jan 90 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Party of Christian Democrats Re-Formed"]

[Text] After a half-century interruption, the Party of Christian Democrats has been re-formed. This was reported in the program declaration adopted at the 27-28 January conference which convened in Kaunas. A 52-person council of the Party of Christian Democrats was elected at the conference. USSR People's Deputy Egidiyus Klumbis, a Kaunas physician, was elected chairman of the board of the council.

Taking part in the re-formation conference and addressing it were the deputy general secretary of the Worldwide Christian Democratic Union, Bryan Palmer, and the chairman of the coordinating and political council of the Russian Christian Democratic Union, Aleksandr Ogorodnikov. Representatives of other parties and movements welcomed conference participants.

The Party of Christian Democrats of Lithuania began its activity in the troubled year 1905. At its origins were progressive people of that time, professors at the Petersburg Theological Seminary Yu. Machyulis-Mayronis, A. Dambrauskas-Yakshtas, and P. Buchis. Christian Democrats played an active role in the creation of an independent Lithuanian republic. The party formed the first governments of Lithuania, actively participated in the establishment of structures to administer the republic and its army, and was involved in the accomplishment of land reform. After the revolution in 1926, Christian Democrats found themselves in opposition to the Smetona authorities. Party activity was terminated in 1940.

Party leader Egidiyus Klumbis stated to Lithuanian Telegraph Agency correspondent Genrikas Labanauskas: "One of the main points of the Christian Democrats' program, just as it was at the beginning of the 20th century, is the aspiration to Lithuanian independence. On the path toward spiritual renewal of the individual and consolidation of the family, the party will always be guided by the ideals of Christianity and will strive to achieve democracy in social and political life. We will work to strengthen cooperation between our schools and the Catholic Church in bringing up the young generation and in reconstituting the Department of Philosophy and Theology at Kaunas University imeni Vitautas the Great."

Klumbis stated that more than 30 branches of the Party of Christian Democrats have already been established in the republic on the territoriality principle, uniting over 1,500 members within its ranks. The largest branches have been established in Kelme, Utene, Kaunas, Telshyay, Mariyampol, and other cities of the republic.

Democratic Forces Hold Forum in Vilnius

LD0402231190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From the "Seven Days" program, presented by Eduard Sagalayev]

[Text] [Sagalayev] Now one of today's events. Our correspondent has called it a forum of the democratic forces of the USSR and East Europe. A report from Vilnius.

[A. Paulyus] Here is a curious detail: The forum took place in the Palace of Culture of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Sellers of countless newspapers, journals, and brochures which are, perhaps, not yet very widely known, took up positions at the entrance to the hall. These are the publications of those new movements which are representated at the forum. Participants came from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Volgograd, Arkhangelsk, Alma-Ata, and from many of the country's republics, krays, and oblasts. Many participants are also here from abroad: representatives of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Poland's Solidarity, the Czech Civic Forum—the list is endless. As the visitors from Czechoslovakia noted, there are approximately 50 new parties and movements in their country alone, and in our country there are hundreds of them.

There were formally three matters on the agenda: On the working class movement in the USSR and East Europe, on an independent working class press, and on young people serving in the armed forces—but the forum also touched on many other topics. Perhaps most attention was paid to the exchange of experience in strengthenig ties. Incidentally, this was also discussed during a 3-day All-Union Conference of the InterRegional Association of Democratic Organizations, which completed its work this evening here in the Lithuanian capital, and at a conference of Sajudis which took place in Vilnius yesterday under the title: The Road of Lithuania. In a word, it is evident that the leadership of new movements are striving for coordination, joining forces, and joint actions. [video shows publications on sale, including DEMOCRATICHESKOYE RABOCHEYE DVIZHENIYE, ISKRA, YEDINENIYE, GOLOS IZBIRATELYA, and TIMISOARA; general shots of conference showing speakers, including Sergey Grigoryants, editor of the journal GLASNOST and leading dissident]

RSFSR

Ligachev Interviewed in Belgorod Oblast

LD0103195190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Interview with Yegor Ligachev, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, by unidentified correspondent in Belgorod Oblast; from the "Vremya" newscast; date not given; recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] On a visit to Belgorod Oblast Comrade Ligachev had meetings over several days with workers and rural workers. The meetings focused on: The proceedings of the party Central Committee February plenum; the provision of food products for town dwellers; and the mutually advantageous cooperation between agricultural and industrial enterprises.

[Ligachev] I would like to say to you that in these past few days I have been to many meetings. In essence, all of these days have been crammed with meetings—in workshops, at work places, in meeting halls, and in clubs. I am justified in saying the following: It seems to me that this important political document—the party Central Committee's platform for the congress—is in the minds and hearts of our people.

Naturally, this delights us. I think this has happened because many of the proposals and wishes that had already been expressed beforehand in the pre-congress discussion were taken into account in this document. Now that the discussion of this document has begun, it will be given greater attention; it will be supplemented and undoubtedly enriched. That is the first thing I wanted to say.

The second thing is that I was very alarmed about all the topical, political, economic, and social problems. First, whereever I went and no matter who I spoke with—the conversations were mostly open and truthful and at times not very comfortable—people demanded that along with the further unfolding of the democratic process, there must be a strengthening of law, order, discipline, and organization. Second, very many people—not only the older generation, but also quite a lot of young people—were saying that this must not be done. They were saying that we must not allow our socialist ideal to erode and we must not deprive our generation and our people of belief in socialism, as certain publications and certain organs of television and radio are doing. Our history is indeed complicated but at the same time it is a glorious history. If one is to speak the truth, it is necessary for history to be presented in that way and for the other side to be given both the positive and the negative aspects. In brief, everyone is asking for people to treat historical memory with care.

Third, there were a few remarks saying that it is time to seriously get down to the ideological and organizational strengthening of our party and its party ranks. It is time to get down to broadening its links with the people and with public movements and organizations. It was also said that it is necessary to strengthen our Soviet federation in every way. Here many people said straight out: How is it that there are a few communists who, unfortunately, possess party tickets but engage in completely different, let us say straight out, anti-party deeds. They not only participate in, but even head anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, anti-party forces, nationalist and separatist organizations. Particular stress is laid on this.

[Unidentified interviewer] Yegor Kuzmich, what impression are you taking away with you of Belgorod Oblast, itself?

[Ligachev] I am very glad that in our stormy times, when certain rayons and whole regions of the country are engulfed in mass rallies, I have met with....

[Interviewer, interrupting] People here are working.

[Ligachev] ...first and foremost with real, businesslike work, with a very good mood, as they say, from worker to top leader of this oblast. This pleased me very much indeed.

By the way, the question, which is now very acute in our society, the question of foodstuffs is being resolved very intelligently and, I would say, wisely and efficiently here.

[Interviewer] We have only to rely on our own efforts and possibilities.

[Ligachev] Quite right—all enterprises, all collectives. People here have, I believe, mastered the wonderful words of our eminent Soviet poet Yegor Isayev who once said the the collective farm without the town is the same as the cart without the horse. The towns have been very strongly brought in to resolving the agro-industrial problems here. The agricultural workers, themselves, are very actively engaged in this. This is what I wished to note.

Local Involvement in Platform Debate Urged

PM2202113190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by A. Ilin, first secretary of Pskov CPSU Oblast Committee, under the rubric "On the 28th Party Congress: We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform": "For the Right To Be the Vanguard"]

[Text] I admit that I waited impatiently for the publication of the document in the compilation of which I also participated—namely, the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th party congress. As I compare it now with the other version I saw, the one offered to us at the February plenum, I am sure that our meeting in Moscow was not for nothing. The draft was very sensitive to the opinion of the hall—that is good. But its audience is the whole country. It is the people, tired of the squabbling, who now need more than ever before not only clear guidelines for the immediate future but also a pilot to direct them toward that future without running aground on the reefs. Those reefs, alas, are very real, and there are plenty of would-be pilots right now. Whom does one believe? As I reflect over and over on the enormous discussion at the Central Committee plenum and its product—the draft platform—and as I check my own impressions and thoughts in conversation with other communists on returning from Moscow, my conviction grows stronger: You must believe in the party.

No, I do not mean that belief which even many party members lost long ago—a distinctive form of party idolatry. I am talking about the trust which the CPSU deserves for finding within itself the strength and courage to announce its own radical restructuring. Nor is the platform an object of veneration while it is in draft form—it is a basis for displaying the will and creativity of party members and nonparty people alike. So let us reconstruct the vanguard of society together by abandoning the claims to infallibility and monopoly. There is still a short time left before the congress for each of us to contribute a little to the party's new foundations. Every idea is valuable, every minute counts. That is what each chapter of the platform calls for persistently. May everyone to whom the fate of the fatherland is dear heed that call.

I must say that in recent months our society has surely become somewhat accustomed to the nontraditional decisions of the party and state administration and the unexpected evaluation of things whose worth seemed eternal. We are ceasing to be amazed at the changes—they are so dynamic. The West seems to be more shaken than we ourselves are at the new opportunities appearing before the country in the light of the party's ideas. The CPSU has opened itself up for discussion, unafraid of competition with the new sociopolitical forces which have come into being, for the simple reason that it is aware of its responsibility both for the fate of each individual who has linked his own destiny with it and for the entire people, elevated and aroused by perestroyka.

The predominant temperature now is critical; rallies are heating the atmosphere near to boiling point. But if you discard the veneer of leftist phrases and moods the essence of the rallies is hardly more revolutionary than the plenum's ideas. Which of them particularly appeals to me personally and prompts me to reflect? First, undoubtedly, we must leave no doubts about the possibility of the existence of other sociopolitical organizations in the country alongside the CPSU. The congress platform must clarify the idea contained in the draft and formulate it unambiguously. It isn't right to have diametrically opposed ideological aspirations sheltering under the one name of the CPSU. In order to unite it is necessary to begin by demarcating positions clearly. That point was made by many people both from the platform and among those with whom I exchanged opinions during plenum recesses and back home in Pskov.

It is now necessary to boldly generalize all the work we have done during the years of perestroyka. Generalize the positive and analyze the mistakes. It seems to me that at this point note should be made of one important idea both in the report and in the speeches. It is that people should not be carried away by purely external, cosmetic changes. The document's main idea is how to organize a direct link from the Central Committee to the primary party organization and back. Today it isn't a link but a heavy, clanking chain. If we reforge it the party will surely be really strengthened.

On my arrival many people asked me: Is the party ready for work in the new conditions with the possibility of political competition? I believe that these are questions not just of a purely psychological perestroyka. Such a readiness requires a base supported by a political, economic, and legal reform. I know that some people are rubbing their hands in triumph, saying that the communists are in confusion. Well, if we are honest there is an element of confusion here. No, not because there are going to be other parties and that we won't have things quite as easy any more. That is superficial and it is not what worries me. Communist leaders today feel vulnerable because we seem to be on one side of scales which are counterbalanced by shortages and empty shelves on the other. Because the economic reform is not working. The situation is deteriorating engendering and reinforcing doubts among ordinary people here in the reliability of the power and political strength of the party. That is the most complex problem. At the Central Committee plenum—it seemed to me—we analyzed questions of the political reform more broadly without delving deeply into the sum total of priority reforms. But the now visible gap between the political reform and the economic reform is the main thing imputed to us as the weakness of the ruling party. Our worst mistake sometimes (which we then regret afterward) is haste. My view is that it is necessary to hold the congress and elaborate our party's strategy and tactics. Then, in light of the new demands, hold party reports and elections in the fall. In the present situation I would suggest the following sequence: A congress of Russian communists, a congress of the CPSU, and then reports and elections.

We need to restructure ourselves seriously. Democratize the elections of delegates and the activity of elective organs and primary party organizations. This is life bursting into our party offices—you know how when you fling the windows and doors of a room wide open, the draught blows everything away. That is how it is in the party now with its doors and windows opening. There is a draft, it makes some people uncomfortable, and causes conflicting feelings. I felt that "draft" when it was proposed to substantially reduce the number of Central Committee members. You ask yourself—What has this to do with the process of democratization if a number of oblasts and a large detachment of communists are not going to be represented at all in the CPSU's central organ? How will ordinary communists influence the elaboration of decisions then?

I also began thinking about the proposal to make these Central Committee members full-time officials. But won't this mean that we are producing a new and inflated apparatus again? The elected member loses touch with his roots and becomes a common or garden apparatus functionary. I consider that wrong. Nor do I agree with the proposal to introduce the posts of party chairman and two deputy chairmen. What kind of building will that be for us, what kind of model? If it is Leninist, well in Lenin's day there was neither a general secretary—in its present sense—nor a chairman. The Politburo members then had essentially equal democratic rights. There was a really collective leadership, which we would do well to strive for now rather than just dream about. Mistakenly, we are again overlooking what was said at the 19th party conference. I mean the maximum term of office for top leaders. The process of renewal must take place and two terms must be the maximum period.

At the local level now, more and more people are saying that what is needed is not a Russian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee but a Russian Communist Party with its own Central Committee. That was said at the plenum, too. At the local level there has been very much criticism of the creation of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau—both the organ itself and its election procedure. It was done in haste and not in the best manner. But given that the bureau exists it should lead the preparation for a conference or congress of Russian communists. The envoys of the autonomous territories and oblast and kray organizations should decide what kind of organ that should be. I personally favor a full-fledged Russian Communist Party Central Committee and an elective system for all leading links of the republics. The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic is a vast republic and must have its own institutions of power.

I believe that the plenum only opened the decisive stage of preparation for the congress. It is necessary to ensure—and I personally will do everything possible here—that the creation of the partywide congress platform is the impetus to the inclusion of every link and every minute party cell in this work.

Moscow Obkom Members Criticize Leadership

PM2802144390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Yu. Kazmin report under the general headline: "Obkom Plenums"]

[Text] Moscow—A plenum of Moscow CPSU Oblast Committee [obkom] was held yesterday. It discussed the results of the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum and the draft platform for the 28th party congress. A report was delivered by V.K. Mesyats, first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee [gorkom].

Analyzing the situation in the oblast and the country, the plenum participants noted with alarm the growth of tension in the economy and the social sphere, and the attempts to use rallies and demonstrations to pressure party and soviet organs. Most working people in Moscow Oblast have not been supporting the destructive political forces, have showed a sense of responsibility, and have advocated resolute support for the course of democratization and perestroyka. The concern shown by a number of speakers at the plenum was caused by the fact that in this extreme, rally-style situation certain communists and party activists have been displaying inertia. This was stated by V.I. Chulkov from Elektrostal City and other speakers. The irresoluteness or unprincipledness tolerated and the minor concessions made today may tomorrow entail more difficult consequences for the party, the state, and the people. That is why the party needs cohesion, organization, and clear-cut positions now more than ever.

The plenum participants advocated virtually unanimously the creation of a Russian Communist Party. Major criticism was made of the Central Committee leadership. In particular, Yu.N. Shogin (Zhukovskiy City) and P.I. Chelpan (Stupino City) believe that CPSU Central Committee secretaries are not paying due attention to the life of one of the country's largest party organizations.

The conviction was stated that every party raykom [rayon party committee] and gorkom should be entitled to make decisions on carrying out a report-and-election campaign—while taking account of the opinions of lower-level party components, of course. The Moscow Oblast party organization should hold its report-and-election conference in the last 10 days of May, sum up the results of the discussion on the draft CPSU platform and statutes, and elaborate a package of proposals on them for the 28th CPSU Congress. The delegates to the party congress should be elected on the basis of direct, multicandidate, secret ballots.

The Moscow CPSU Obkom Plenum supported the Lithuanian Communist Party which is running on the CPSU platform.

RSFSR Deputy Premier Appointed

PM2802113390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "At RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has appointed Comrade Valeriy Petrovich Chichkanov deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

Fire on Nuclear-Powered Ship in Murmansk

LD1902183690 Moscow TASS in English 1818 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] Murmansk February 19 TASS—A fire broke out on the nuclear-powered ship Rossiya, anchored at a wharf of the Atomflot repair yards here, in the afternoon today, but fast help from local fire-fighters prevented it from causing any damage to the reactor plant.

The fire, a TASS correspondent was told at the Murmansk region militia department, was due to a violation of repair work regulations in a stern compartment where synthetic ropes, cleaning waste and other materials used by the boatswain were stored.

The firemen were able to localise and put out the fire quickly.

Radiation in the yards and in the city does not exceed background levels. The local population were promptly notified of the accident. The situation in the city is calm.

Uncontested Elections in Kaluga 'Orchestrated'

PM1602122790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 10 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by TASS correspondent Yu. Solyanikov under the "Situation" rubric: "Privileged Candidates"]

[Text] Kaluga—A rare—maybe unique—event: A candidate deputy has voiced dissatisfaction at the absence of a rival.

V. Palchenko, chief of the "Kaluzhskiy Turbinnyy Zavod" Production Association test complex, was to have run as a candidate for the oblast soviet in No. 24 Moskovskiy Electoral Okrug along with V. Oleynikov, second secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee]. However, Oleynikov preferred to register for another okrug. Palchenko remains the sole candidate for the seat. Such uncontested elections have brought an appropriate negative reaction from him.

The lack of opposition in electoral okrugs is, alas, a far-from-rare phenomenon. It is only the indignation of candidates on this score that is infrequently heard. Moreover, it seems that this situation entirely suits some contenders for deputies' seats. The fact that a large percentage of party and soviet leaders figure among these "solitary" candidates is particularly alarming.

There is no one running against G. Ulanov, first secretary of the obkom; V. Oleynikov, Yu. Blinov, and G. Neretin, obkom secretaries; N. Saprykin, obkom department head; A. Strelikov, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]; A. Ivashurov, chairman of the oblast Trade Union Council; chairmen of the agro-industrial committee, the oblast Union of Consumer Cooperatives, the oblast People's Control Committee, the oblast court, and others. There is no one running against 19 rayon party committee first secretaries and rayon soviet executive committee chairmen. Leaders at various levels are in contention in 30 out of 49 oblast okrugs where only one candidate is registered. Almost all the okrugs where they are running are situated in out-of-the-way rural locales. When this occurs on such a scale one cannot speak of chance coincidence. In the examples there is no lack of orchestration of such "chances."

At the plenum of the local organization of the Union of Journalists I. Fomin, editor of the oblast newspaper ZNAMYA, was nominated as candidate deputy for the oblast soviet. He publicly thanked everyone for their show of confidence in him—and then immediately stood down. All we do know is that it was V. Oleynikov who was registerd as the second candidate in his okrug.

Relieving high-ranking candidates from election campaigning in this way and guaranteeing them an almost 100-percent chance of entering the oblast organs of power, has made voters—urban voters especially—indignant. At a plenum of Kaluga City party committee held the other day Yu. Sokolov, a machine-setter at the turbine plant, said that he was ashamed to read the list of oblast soviet candidate deputies. He demanded the recall of those oblast leaders who are running unopposed in their okrugs. V. Palchenko urged all communist candidates who are sole contenders for an okrug seat to repudiate such a "dubious" honor and carry out a new nomination procedure to ensure that the okrug has at least two candidates.

We have a paradoxical situation: Voters are giving a vote of no confidence to a body that has not yet been elected. The Law on Elections could not have envisaged anything like this, so it is virtually impossible to implement the proposal of Palchenko and Sokolov. There is, true, a theoretical option—if all the "singletons" were indeed to stand down. For this a new law is not needed. What is needed is courage and a conscience. But do all the candidates possess these qualities? That is the question.

Kaluga Obkom Chief Elected in Secret Ballot

PM2802143190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the general headline: "Obkom Plenums"]

[Text] Kaluga, 27 Feb—A plenum of Kaluga CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] was held here today to examine an organizational question. G.I. Ulanov has been relieved of his duties as first secretary of the party obkom in connection with his retirement.

The plenum expressed gratitude to him for his many years of work in the oblast party organization and his great personal contribution to the oblast's socioeconomic development.

The plenum was preceded by an extensive exchange of opinions on candidates for the post of first secretary of the CPSU obkom. More than 60 candidates were put forward at party gorkom [city party committee] and raykom [rayon party committee] plenums, city and rayon party organization aktiv meetings, and primary party organization meetings.

After a comprehensive discussion the plenum participants decided to include three candidates on the secret ballot: V.M. Gorchakov, first secretary of Kaluga CPSU Gorkom; A.P. Demichev, first deputy chairman of the local oblast soviet executive committee; and V.V. Sudarenkov, deputy chairman of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, who had formerly been first secretary of Kaluga CPSU Gorkom.

V.V. Sudarenkov was elected first secretary of the CPSU obkom by a majority vote.

V.S. Bondarchuk, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Building and Cadre Work Department, took part in the plenum's work.

Karelian Officials Disciplined for Abuse

LD0203114990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 2 Mar 90

[Excerpt] We have already reported in our information bulletins that in Karelia instances of officials using their position to acquire motor vehicles have occurred. Well, after a thorough investigation of all the circumstances of the matter, there was a sitting of the republican Council of Ministers. Immediately after the end of the sitting, our correspondent, Boris Ternoushko, met with (Sergey Petrovich Glinnik), who recently has headed the government of Karelia. Listen to what he said:

[Begin (Glinnik) recording] The Council of Ministers Presidium has decided and admitted that the system that has evolved of individual decision-making on the personal allocation of motor vehicles for private use to leaders of the republic's Council of Ministers does not meet the public requirements of social justice.

At today's Presidium, we considered the punishment of Comrade (Viktor Timofeyevich Istepanov), minister of public education, to whom a strict reprimand was given and entered on his registration card according to party policy. Also today we received a statement from Comrade (Stepanov) on his resignation from the post of minister of public education. Tomorrow we will make the relevant proposal to the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] on his removal.

The question of the advisability of the continuance of Comrade (Promoskov) in the post of Karelian ASSR minister of trade and of Comrade (Epshtein) as chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, is to be decided after they have returned to health. The presidium of the council of ministers has decided to consider impossible the continuance of Comrade (Demyanchuk) in the post of chairman of (Kooptorgpotrebsoyuz) trade and consumer union for the most crude violations of commercial service; which were brought to light by the procuracy and the republic's People's Control Committee.

It is not the first sitting of the Presidium at which we are trying precisely to examine the question of social justice in the republic. The decision has already been made on handing over a hospital as a military hospital, and on handing over the Shuyskaya Chupa, a dacha settlement of the Ministry of Social Provision for the billeting of invalids and war participants.

I think that the new composition of the government also is continuing that practice. That is, social justice should triumph, and in this respect, there is need for constant work. A serious and attentive approach must be taken to all those remarks and proposals being expressed by the population of the republic. I think that for all that to be accomplished, the voters going to their polling stations on the day of the elections should think hard about whom they are going to vote for. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Karelian Nuclear Power Project Suspended

LD1902115390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 19 Feb 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Karelian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has adopted a decision on suspending research and projects for the construction of the Muyerzeka atomic power station until a law is adopted on the use of nuclear energy and on nuclear safety. This was preceded by rallies and meetings and press articles by candidate people's deputies of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and of local soviets.

The Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic has been instructed to speed up an alternative energy supply program.

Comment on Election Meeting in Saratov

90UN1000A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 1

[Correspondent Yu. Kazakov report: "And All Was Calm"]

[Text] Saratov—"Let us imagine a different situation: The meeting in the square is taking place, order is being preserved by volunteers from the enterprises, on the platform are also city and oblast leader-deputy candidates, who are candidly answering the townspeople's most urgent questions...." This was how in the 13 February issue we portrayed a meeting of candidates with the electorate which the Saratov authorities did not permit.

In literally one week the realities of political life in the city have changed to such an extent that the "dream has come true," as they say. It was in accordance with precisely such a scenario that an oblast and city soviet executive committee mass meeting, which took place in Saratov's main square on 18 February, was organized, for all that.

N.P. Grishin, chairman of the oblast soviet executive committee, gave all who so desired leave to speak. Both those urging iron discipline and order, that is, a return to the "strong hand" policy, and those who said that what was important for the people now was not only a piece of bread and butter (this is natural), but also the utmost democratization of our life and complete glasnost on all matters, without which further progress is impossible, spoke. Very many questions were addressed directly also to the first secretary of the oblast party committee, who was present, on the improvised platform. There were mass meeting "excesses" also expressed in the none-too-proper statements and also catcalling at certain speakers, at which point the chairman was perfectly right to call on people for calm and for them to restrain their emotions.

But such costs were inevitable: After all, such a mass meeting was the first in the city, and both its organizers and the people themselves had to learn how to hold it. Passions had been inflamed also by the stubborn silence of the oblast leaders apropos specific demands made earlier. The question of the lack of choice of candidates, to whom it had been suggested that they stand down, was an acute issue. The latter step, incidentally, had already been taken by two candidates for deputy: N.F. Zorin, editor of the oblast paper KOMMUNIST, and V.Yu. Chernov, a worker at a Saratov enterprise.

Alas, K.P. Murenin, first secretary of the oblast party committee, who spoke in conclusion of the meeting, did not respond to the pointed questions put to him by people on the spot, at the meeting. A pity because Konstantin Platonovich had a unique opportunity to deflect many accusations leveled at the oblast's party and soviet apparatus.

Saratov Officials Urged To Pull Out of Elections

PM1502150990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Vera Nikolayeva report under the "Hot Line" rubric: "Dialogue With Working People Unavoidable"]

[Text] Saratov—The events which occurred in Saratov last Sunday are now being discussed by executive committees, bureau sittings, aktiv meetings, conferences, and meetings at different levels.... This is what happened. Residents of Saratov were perturbed by a gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] ban on a planned meeting between candidate deputies and voters in the central square. The fact that the square was cordoned off by rows of militiamen and the pretense that urgent repair work was being carried out there only aggravated the situation. There were spontaneous rallies attended by thousands, resolutions were adopted.

The rally participants were not demanding improved social benefits. The main cause of dissatisfaction, as already reported by IZVESTIYA (issue No. 42), is that candidate deputies for the city and oblast soviets will stand for election without any rivals half the okrugs. They are mainly party, soviet, and leadership officials. The rallies adopted an address to the deputies standing without rivals to refuse to participate in such elections. Demonstrators who assembled outside the party obkom [oblast committee] building demanded that someone from among the leaders came out to them. Unfortunately, not a single party or soviet leader responded.

Now, under pressure from the people's masses, the party and soviet organs are drawing the conclusion: Dialogue with the working people is unavoidable. Proposals are being made to support and, if possible, to actually head a new rally scheduled by the demonstrators for 25 February.

Following Sunday's events, N. Zorin, editor of the oblast party newspaper KOMMUNIST and one of the candidate deputies standing without a rival, told a sitting of the party gorkom [city committee] bureau that, prompted by civic conscience, he refuses to stand for election to the oblast soviet and withdraws his candidacy. So far, this is the only such precedent in the oblast that I know of.

Uncontested Elections in Saratov Oblast Deplored

PM0502145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Correspondent A. Vorotnikov dispatch under the rubric "Preparing for Elections": "On His Own—Without Any Worries"]

[Text] Saratov—Every so often, the correspondent's office receives telephone calls. They all make the same point—why is it that many Saratov Oblast leaders have been nominated as sole candidate people's deputies for the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and local soviets?

I spoke to people on electoral commissions about this—they shrugged their shoulders, saying that this is how things worked out. This is how things have worked out. A single candidate has been registered for election as oblast soviet deputy in, for example, the following electoral okrugs: No. 103 (Yu. Koshelev, first secretary of Atkarsk City Party committee [gorkom]); No. 148 (N. Tsyganyuk, chairman of Marks City Soviet Executive Committee [gorispolkom]); No. 161 (V. Chesakov, first secretary of Rtishchevo gorkom); No. 174 (L. Vashchenkov, general director of Engels' "Khimvolokno" Production Association); No. 211 (A. Sharyy, first secretary of Volskiy Rayon party committee [raykom]); and in several dozen other places. Look at some of the neighboring okrugs, on the other hand: No. 102 already has two candidates, the chairman of the agro-industrial complex trade union raykom and the maternity home chief physician; No. 149 also has two candidates, a shop foreman and a teacher; and so has No. 162, a plant toubleshooter and a sewing factory controller.

Unfortunately, Saratov Oblast party committee leaders failed to set an example by withdrawing from the electoral contest. All of its five secretaries are registered as sole candidates for election as oblast soviet deputies. Does this mean that ordinary people should fight for the voters' choice while bosses are guaranteed a quiet life?

The oblast newspaper KOMMUNIST recently published a sharp letter by voters from Marks City. They reported that a study of the ballot papers of candidates nominated for their city and rayon soviets prompts sad reflections. It appears that single candidates will run in the majority of okrugs. The letter writers cite some interesting facts:

"So, it appears that 51 of the 75 okrugs—68 percent in other words—have no alternative candidates for election as city soviet people's deputies, with 56 of the 98 candidates being leaders of various ranks. There are nine party gorkom and gorispolkom officials, seven of whom are sole candidates.

"Out of the 68 okrugs for election of rayon soviet people's deputies, 57 have no alternative candidates. Once again, 57 of the 95 registered candidates are leaders and chief specialists from enterprises or party and soviet organ officials. Specifically, the candidates include 11 party and soviet apparatus officials, nine of whom are sole candidates.

"It is noteworthy that 13 CPSU gorkom officials have been nominated as candidate people's deputies for the city and rayon soviets, and 11 of them are sole candidates."

Where is the competition, where is the choice?—the letter writers ask. Indeed, where are they...?

Leningrad Komsomol Forum Reported

PM0702162590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 2

[Report by "our correspondent" I. Potekhina: "They Decided Not To Take Decision; Notes from Leningrad Oblast Komsomol Conference"]

[Text] "I very much want to split but I don't know who to join." When the conference presenter read out this note the auditorium burst out laughing in unison. The tension, which had already reached near-brawl level, subsided. But not only because the ironic author of the note had allowed the excited delegates to take a sideways look at themselves. Wittingly or not he had suddenly explained to everyone why, with its shouting and waving of arms, the conference of the Leningrad Komsomol

[All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organization is quite incapable of reaching agreement on anything.

The battered drafting commission (the "intellectual flower of the conference," as the presenter called it) looked with depression at the green cloth of the table which was gradually being covered with a pile of papers. The proposals, additions, and comments on the draft platform of the Leningrad Komsomol organization at the 21st Komsomol Congress and the congress of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Komsomol organizations descended in an avalanche. As though this draft had not been published in the oblast youth newspaper. As though it had not been discussed in the primary organizations and repeatedly reworked by a special commission created in advance from conference delegates.

Over 60 people put their names down for the debates. Considering, still less bringing together, all this material in two days was not possible even with the most heroic efforts. There were 12 alternative draft platforms alone in the drafting commission. There were also thoughts and desultory thoughts. And ideas too: Mature ideas and ideas which had barely hatched, "apropos something or by themselves...." The situation became hopeless. Then a life-saving "call" was heard: Let's delimit our spheres of action! Right now! Leaving no way back.

"We are different," one speaker argued. "We will be unable to adopt a single platform—we must urgently create factions within the Komsomol. Or in general divide into several independent political organizations: Communist, social-democrat, anarcho-syndicalist...."

It had already been decided to put the question of factions to the vote because, as one delegate said, making a slip of the tongue because of his emotion, "We have reached differences." It was then that the joking note on a split appeared.

I hasten to disillusion the radicals: The split of the Leningrad Komsomol organization did not actually occur. Moreover, the conference voted... to adopt no platform at all for the congress. To publish it in the newspaper again and discuss it in the primary organizations....

Is the result that the conference has acknowledged its own complete impotence? And has essentially failed to fulfill its functions? And the R50,000 spent on holding it have been thrown to the wind? And that we should not actually reckon a substantial achievement the direct election of the first secretary of the Komsomol obkom [oblast committe]—even if it took place democratically, emotionally, and with a virtually unpredictable result? (We congratulate Yuriy Burchakov). After all, whatever importance attaches to who becomes leader of the organization, the road along which the organization is to advance in the future in order to survive is far more important.

It would seem that the Leningrad Komsomol has already resolved this question for itself. Less than a year ago it was stated at a joint plenum of the Komsomol obkom and gorkom [city committee] that the salvation of the youth league lies in its drastic politicization. Since then not a single event of any note has managed without the Komsomol's participation. Its independent opinion of all urgent questions is known to Leningrad. You only have to recall the party meeting of the Komsomol gorkom apparatus which was held literally a week before the conference. It decreed that an appeal be made to the party obkom demanding the urgent convening of an extraordinary conference and that a new CPSU obkom be elected at it.

You may agree or argue with the Komsomol in Leningrad today—you can no longer ignore it. That is why everyone expected such a lot from the present oblast conference.

No, it was not held in vain. It defined the basic task of the oblast organization for the period through April 1990—"participation in the campaign to elect people's deputies of the RSFSR and local soviets and subsequent work to defend young people's interests within the organs of state power." This in addition to preparation for the Komsomol congresses. The new Komsomol Obkom has been instructed at the very next plenum to approve the position of the Leningrad Oblast Komsomol organization at the elections while the deputies who are Komsomol members have been instructed to base themselves on the provisions of this position in forming their election programs.

The youth newspaper SMENA has been transformed into the organ of the oblast Komsomol organization. It has been deemed expedient to highlight the Leningrad city organization within the Leningrad Oblast organization....

A lot, you will agree. But the main thing remained unexplained: On what ideological basis will the renewed youth league be built? The conference had enough powder to put question marks after the words "all-union," "Leninist," and "communist." But it did not have enough strength to defend them or to reject them anyway.

"I do not believe the conference failed," said Yuriy Marinichev, secretary of the Sosnovyy Bor City Komsomol Committee. "But you cannot call it successful either. The normal objective process of development is under way. If this comparison is permitted, I would say that the birth pains have already begun—our league is on the point of giving birth. To twins at least. But the 'birth' should not be accelerated artificially."

In some respect Yuriy is probably right. If the factions in the Komsomol, for division into which some delegates were calling so passionately, already existed in fact, the conference would have had no difficulty in recognizing and recording them. But in reality there are no factions.

In the meantime we have to come to terms with the fact that, as one delegate said: "We have no Komsomol organization with many millions of members—we have a small number of functionaries working not only for money." They have varying views of the Komsomol's future. These people still have either to find a common language or divide into factions.

Ecological Association Formed in Leningrad

LD0702113990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0200 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] The main goal of an ecological association that has been formed in Leningrad is to consolidate efforts for environmental protection. Major industrial concerns and associations, scientific research institutes, higher educational establishments, and Lenkompriroda [Leningrad Committee for Nature] subdivisions joined it. First orders for manufacturing instruments to carry out a specific analysis of the state of water, soil, and atmosphere have already been passed to the city enterprises. The work is done based on financial autonomy, which would allow them to be proposed for use in other areas of the country.

Biryukova Visits Kostroma, Meets Workers

LD1602143390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2330 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Text] The problems and concerns of the people of Kostroma were at the focus of attention during meetings between inhabitants of that ancient town on the Volga and Aleksandra Pavlovna Biryukova, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who has arrived there.

She visited the Orbita garment-making association, where there was a discussion on how to satisfy market demand for consumer goods and on working under new management conditions. The workers at the enterprise voiced quite a number of bitter reproaches concerning poor provision of housing, food, and medical services.

In the course of several days, Biryukova also will visit health establishments and shops, and have meetings with the oblast party aktiv and representatives of the public.

More on Secretary Stroyev's Novosibirsk Visit

PM2702112590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "To Act, Rather Than To Wait and See"]

[Text] Novosibirsk, 23 Feb—How to utilize more quickly the opportunities provided by the economic and political reforms for solving the food question? The package of problems associated with boosting production, the situation in the countryside, and the needs of the peasantry provided the topic of detailed discussion at meetings held between Ye.S. Stroyev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Siberians during his tour of Novosibirsk Oblast 21-23 February.

There are no ready-made prescriptions for getting the country out of the situation in which it finds itself. So it is that much more important, it was noted during the conversations, for party organizations' activity to rely on the life-giving flow of ideas, initiatives, and creative quest spawned by the process of perestroyka. An example of the new approach to our work is offered by a joint enterprise near Berdsk City. The "Vega" Association built a pig farm to supply its workers and invited the "Zarechnyy" State Farm [sovkhoz] to run it on a partnership basis; the sovkhoz quickly started up the capacities. Are there any obstacles to prevent this experience in integration between city and countryside being adopted by enterprises whose subsidiary farm output costs them the earth! Party committees must show daily concern for the fresh shoots sprouting in the economic field, based on incentives for personal and collective interest, the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized.

He visited the retail outlets which the agrocombine and poultry factory have opened in the city of Iskitim and toured food and processing industry enterprises. The condition of this industry demands more active assistance from urban labor collectives. On Ordynskiy Rayon's "Bolshevik" Collective Farm [kolkhoz] he talked with lessees. They are prepared for lease contracts: The farm has opted for peasants' stage-by-stage transition to autonomy—through economically accountable links and intensive labor collectives. Much of the kolkhoz' practical work can be usefully adopted, primarily in the social reorganization of the countryside and the enhancement of field and stock unit productivity, which is still low in the oblast. The discussion at the agricultural institute's teaching farm focused on practical aspects of the idea of setting up an educational establishment for rural children along the lines of Akademgorodok's famous physics and mathematics school. While at "Sibselmash," Ye.S. Stroyev saw for himself the shops where the manufacture of new machines for the countryside is being started up. Problems of enhancing the efficiency of scientific questing, which is far below current requirements, and of strengthening collaboration with agricultural production were examined at the scientific center of the V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences' Siberian Department. Scientists must take a vanguard position in elaborating and implementing the "Grain" and "Meat" programs.

The secretary of the CPSU Central Committee met the oblast party and economic aktiv.

Ryazan Leaders To Lose Special Facilities, Cars

PM0902110190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Arnold Pushkar report: "Solotcha Houses for Invalids"]

[Text] Ryazan—The Ryazan Oblast Soviet Executive Committee [oblispolkom] together with the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] bureau has decided to hand over the dacha facilities in Solotcha and Laskovo, where party and soviet workers used to stay, to the consumer services administration. The houses in Solotcha, with its wild Meshcherskiy [geographical area] landscape, will be rented to war and labor veterans for their summer vacations. It is planned to convert Laskovo into a children's sanatorium. It has also been decided to hand over the hospital and clinic, which used to serve a narrow range of people, for the general use of Ryazan's citizens. Privileged service is being maintained only for war veterans and internationalist soldiers. The provision of personal cars for leading CPSU obkom and oblispolkom personnel has been abolished.

A new party obkom building is being constructed in Ryazan, even though the old building is in good condition. By public demand it is planned to poll the population to determine the use of this better building in the oblast center. These decisions have been accelerated by voters' instructions at meetings with Russian and local soviet candidate people's deputies.

Resignation of Gorkiy Secretary Demanded

90UN0995B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by V. Noskov under the rubric "We Demand Justice....": "Gorkiy"]

[Text] **A meeting attended by many thousands of Gorkiy residents took place last Sunday. Representatives of the so-called "Candidates for Democracy" association sponsored the meeting and proposed that the course of the election campaign for the local soviets be discussed and that the voters get acquainted with their programs.**

However, a constructive dialog never took place. In their speeches the orators generally reduced everything to criticism of the CPSU and the local soviet and party leaders.

Incidentally, the accusation that was made specifically against G. Kodyrev, first secretary of the CPSU obkom [oblast party committee], and A. Sokolov, chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee], that they used their official position for personal gain, was never substantiated.

In addition the meeting participants also discussed how poorly the city's inhabitants are supplied with food goods and how quickly the prices of those goods are increasing at the markets. The problem of housing is no less critical.

In their resolution the participants in the meeting demanded the resignations of G. Kodyrev, first secretary of the CPSU obkom, A. Sokolov, chairman of the oblispolkom, and Yu. Marchenkov, first secretary of the city party committee.

The document will be circulated around all the labor collectives of the city to acquaint people with it and to collect signatures. Representatives of the democratic forces reported that the next meeting in Gorkiy will be conducted on the following Sunday.

Tyumen Viewed in Wake of Obkom Resignations

90UN0886A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 7 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by A. Mikhaylov: "Let Us Make It Till April"]

[Text] **The situation in Tyumen Oblast is unprecedented for the CPSU: Until April there will be neither a first nor second secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee].**

As you know, the plenum of the Tyumen Oblast party committee [obkom] retired First Secretary G. Bogomyakov and accepted the collective resignation of the obkom Bureau. However, many people were dissatisfied with yet another example of the old way of letting go of the administrative failures with respect and in peace.

Former Second Secretary G. Goloshchapov, for instance, is happily leaving for a job abroad without having to report first to the oblast party organization. Here is a happy ending for you! Of the 13 bureau members who had applied for resignation, six were included in the new temporary bureau. Its 10 members were selected by its new leader, Obkom Secretary V. Kitaev. As Victor Vasilyevich told me, leaders transplanted from one organ to another used to set the tone of the perestroyka processes in the bureau. Why then did the resignation become inevitable if they already had such a magnificent group of six?

They say there was no room for intrigue in all that happened; but we know for sure that there was no room for democracy either. It was another classic example of the situation: The leader goes out of town; his critics unite and prepare a "surprise" for him; then they come up with a closet-made list of the new leaders; and the plenum has nothing to do then but vote for the list as a whole. Will it ever change?

"I do not know the mechanism for the selection of the first secretary," admits V. Kitaev. "But if the former leader was retired, should we apply all the brakes by creating some transitional structures?" Even if it is done with good intentions (like allowing the communists the time until the April conference to discuss the nominations for the position of the first secretary)?

As I remember, there was more than one call in the oblast to conduct a party conference and reelect the leadership as soon as possible. Time should not be wasted even though April, of course, is a remarkable month. But pleasing parallels will be the least of our worries if the tension rises even more by that time in the region which provides the country with so much hard currency and remains one of the most undeveloped socially.

Tomsk Party Obkom Rejects Calls To Resign

PM0502170090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Aleksandr Solovyev report: "Refusal To Resign..."]

[Text] Tomsk—Outside the party obkom [oblast committee] building, the plenum participants were greeted by pickets with posters saying "Let the obkom resign," "Tyumen—Volgograd—Tomsk"...

This reception did not come as a surprise for any of those arriving for the plenum: The day before, the city party club held a rally at which the participants (of whom there were more than 300), after many hours of debate, expressed a lack of confidence in the present composition of the obkom and its bureau.

Obkom First Secretary V. Zorkaltsev, in his report, admitted self-critically that uncertainty and pessimism prevail in the oblast party organization. Hitches in the economy—one in four enterprises failed to meet the plan; stoppages in housing construction; ration coupons and waiting lines—all these things evoke in the people of Tomsk a sense of dissatisfaction with perestroyka.

Failures are usually blamed on the obkom: It is too slow in restructuring itself, it has lost the political initiative, its prestige, and its links with primary organizations. Its decisions, made in offices and not backed up by the thinking and experience of ordinary people, are unviable. The hopes of the bureau and secretariat that everything would sort itself have not proved justified.

A split has occurred in the party organizations. Pluralism of opinion has turned into pluralism of action. The Tomsk City Party Club (to which raykom [rayon committee] secretaries also belong) has in effect become an opposition to both the gorkom [city committee] and the obkom. Communists are leaving to join the informal organizations. In only a year 815 of them have handed in their party cards. The party organizations of a number of enterprises and institutes, without waiting for the new CPSU Statutes, have frozen up to 70 percent of party subscriptions for their own needs.

However, both the hosts at the plenum and the guests said that it would be wrong to accuse only the first secretary, or the entire obkom arbitrarily, for all the troubles and difficulties. The resignation of the bureau, in their opinion, is not a solution either, but an evasion of responsibility, a sign of weakness and cowardice. Therefore, the question of resignation was rejected by the majority.

The plenum (which was relayed on television in its entirety) decided: All obkom members, beginning with the bureau and secretaries, should personally give an account of their activity to the collectives of communists and working people; let the question of confidence be resolved on a personal basis.

The main outcome of the plenum debate was that the oblast report and election party conference is to be convened early, in April, after the local soviet elections. Delegates to the conference are to be elected in primary organizations by direct and secret ballot, on a contested basis. The conference itself will determine what obkom and what secretariat can be entrusted with the leadership of perestroyka in the oblast.

Since a CPSU Central Committee plenum is to open soon and the obkom first secretary is a Central Committee member, the participants in the Tomsk plenum gave him a number of instructions for his proposed speech.

Call for Tatar, Kazan Party Resignations

90UN0995C Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 20 Feb 90 p 4

[Article by U. Bogdalov under the rubric "We Demand Justice....": "Kazan"]

[Text] **A meeting attended by many thousands took place on Sunday in front of the building of the gorkom [city party committee] and obkom [oblast party committee]. It was sponsored by representatives of three electoral districts of Kazan and a number of independent social organizations.**

Participants in the stormy three-hour discussion included the first secretaries of the Tatar Oblast and Kazan city party committees and candidates for people's deputy from industrial and agricultural enterprises. But in the overheated atmosphere of the meeting, "informals" seized the initiative. Citing one or another violation or abuse tolerated, in their opinion, by the representatives of the party and state organizations, they obtained the adoption of a resolution on the resignation of the party obkom and gorkom.

On Monday I learned in the Tatar Obkom about its reaction to that resolution. The results of the meeting had been discussed there immediately after it ended. The demand of the "informals" will be brought to the republic's local party organizations, which will decide the issue of confidence in the oblast and city party committees.

All the instances of abuses and violations of housing legislation which were discussed at the meeting will be, as they told me at the obkom, carefully examined and public action will be taken on them.

Indigenous Northern, Amur Peoples Begin Association

PM2002161390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Boris Reznik report under the rubric "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Association of Indigenous Peoples Set Up. Conference of Northern and Amur Peoples Has Completed Its Work in Khabarovsk""]

[Text] Khabarovsk—"We discussed highly urgent problems in the lives of the indigenous peoples of the North and the Amur region," V. Beldy, deputy chairman of the organizational committee and chairman of Nanayskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Soviet Executive Committee], said.

Concrete proposals emerged out of the heated disputes at the conference, such as the proposal to revive the indigenous peoples' traditional occupations—hunting, fishing, reindeer breeding, and sea hunting.... Original national culture must be revived on a new level along with the economy.

The ideas of the equal and in-depth development of the economy and social and cultural life of the small peoples were enshrined in the Statute of the Association of Peoples of the North and the Amur Region, whose main aim is to strengthen friendship among the peoples of the USSR on the basis of the safeguarding of their social and spiritual equality.

Western Republics

Belorussian Communist Party Finances Made Public

LD0203095390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1127 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Correspondent Vladimir Bogdanov report]

[Text] Minsk, 1 Mar (TASS)—For the first time, the budget of the Belorussian Communist Party has been published in the local newspapers. The party has 678,000 members and candidate members. Their subscriptions form the main source of the party's income, accounting for 55.7 million rubles last year. This sum financed more than 99 percent of all expenditure; the remainder—R300,000—was obtained through the sale of buildings, vehicles, and property being transferred to the national economy; lease payments for the use of premises; and other revenue.

Most of the expenditure—R31.2 of the R56 million spent in all areas of organizational and political work in the party—went toward the upkeep of party committees and of staff members released from primary organizations. The Central Committee apparatus of the republic's Communist Party cost R1.3 million last year.

For the first time, the primary party organizations were left three percent of their monthly subscriptions. However, some party organizations believe that this is not enough to conduct effective propaganda and hold free events.

The ecological situation in Belorussia is now extremely bleak; the accident at the Chernobyl atomic power station is taking its toll. The government is doing everything it can to help the victims, and the Communist Party has made a contribution of its own: Facilities intended for party needs have been dropped from the construction plan to speed up the building of houses for people resettled from the contaminated areas.

Belorussian Electoral Commission Defended

LD2702235590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Interview with Valeriy Burevich Tikhiney, Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic minister of justice, by Petr Makritskiy; place, date not given—recorded]

[Text] Demands for the resignation of the Central Electoral Commission for the election of peoples deputies in Belorussia were expressed at the initiative of the Belorussian Popular Revival Front [Belorusskiy Narodnyy Front Vazrozhdeniya] by participants in a many-thousand strong rally in Minsk.

At the request of the editorial office, our correspondent Petr Makritskiy had a meeting with Valeriy Burevich Tikhiney, justice minister for the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and member of the republic's Central Electoral Commission. Here is a recording of the interview:

[Begin Tikhiney recording] Unfounded accusations have been made against the Central Electoral Commission of violating the law on elections. As a member of the Central Electoral Commission, I took part in all sittings of the commission and I can say that in its activity the commission was guided by the law and only by the law. All the sittings of the commission took place in conditions of broad glasnost with the participation of representatives of the public. The decisions were taken openly by means of voting.

Some of the organizers of the rally which took place in Minsk on 25 February tried to find a black cat in a dark room where none such exists. I regard the rally which took place in Minsk as a means of putting strong-arm pressure on the Central Electoral Commission. In all, the Central Electoral Commission received over 70 complaints about the refusal to register candidates for people's deputy. All complaints were carefully checked and I must say that all the decisions of the commission were adopted in strict accord with the law.

At the rally, by the way, a decision was made on dissolving the Central Electoral Commission. This is a clearly illegal act. The Central Electoral Commission, as is known, is formed by the republican Supreme Soviet and it alone has the right to express a vote of no confidence in the commission.

My participation in the rally brought me to the very sad reflection that a certain section of the population of the republic has assessed the slogan of perestroyka, "more democracy," as an appeal to total licence. This is a dangerous delusion. Our democracy has nothing in common with lack of discipline, self-will, irresponsibility. Democracy outside the law is anarchy. We should remember that and not permit such a phenomenon.

Our electoral laws are not perfect. I expect that after the elections at a meeting of the Central Commission we will discuss these aspects and put forward proposals to the Supreme Soviet to make more precise, to introduce the corresponding changes and additions to the electoral laws. [end recording]

Belorussia Election Campaign in 'Final Stage'

LD2802224290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] The election campaign in Belorussia has entered its final stage. The current preelection contest is in many ways similar to the election of people's deputies of the USSR, although there are certainly some differences. Primarily, the range of people for whom the electorate is to vote has expanded considerably. These are 360 people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and 48,493 people's deputies of local soviets. The electorate has also gained greater political experience, and the selection of contenders for deputies' mandates is being conducted with greater exactitude. As in previous elecitons, communists enjoy great trust among the electorate; there are 87.5 percent of them among the contenders. But, there are few women, young people, and workers.

Moldavian Party Supports 'Open Dialogue'

LD0103185190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1729 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Kishinev, 1 Mar (TASS)—The Moldavian Communist Party [CP] leadership intends to begin a "democratic and open dialogue with rank and file communists and with the republic's general public." This was stated today by Petr Luchinskiy, the leader of Moldavia's communists, at a plenum of the republic's CP Central Committee.

Turning to the root cause of the tension in the republic, the head of the Moldavian CP's Central Committee sharply criticized the leadership style and mistakes of Ivan Bodyul, who headed the republic's party organization during the sixties and seventies and was afforded special protection by Leonid Brezhnev.

Among the mistakes Luchinskiy listed were distortions in the development of production forces, destruction of the ecological balance, irregularities in cadre policy, neglect of culture, education, and health care, and also artificial restraint on contacts with neighboring Romania.

Concerning this latter point, the first secretary of the Moldavian CP Central Committee stressed that the Moldavian leadership "is making full use of the new situation in Romania to establish good-neighbor relations and close contacts with it in various spheres, acting by developing its own sovereignty and independence within the framework of a renewed Soviet federation."

Since 1985, Petr Luchinskiy noted, "the stagnation has in effect remained intact" in the republic. Instead of holding a constructive dialogue with the public, the republic's leaders have rained criticism upon them. Last year the exacerbation of the situation and the confrontation led to political strikes and mass unrest on interethnic grounds.

Among the steps aimed at democratizing political life, the Moldavian communist leader named the "roundtable" meeting now under preparation, a kind of public parliament involving the leaders of the republic and of the most widely supported public movements.

The plenum participants decided to submit a proposal to the Moldavian Supreme Soviet on reviewing Article 6 of the republic's Constitution, which stipulates a single party system and the leading role of the Communist Party.

The plenum decided to convene the next, 17th, congress of the Moldavian CP on 17 May of this year.

Ukrainian Candidates for People's Deputies Named

90UN1001A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Tsikora, Kiev: "Candidates Have Been Named"]

[Text] It might be symbolic that the processing of data on contenders for the seats in the next term of parliament ended exactly by the time of the last session of the UkSSR [Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in its present composition.

The chairman of the republic Central Electoral Commission, V. Boyko, said: "As of now there are 3,091 people on the list of registered candidate UkSSR people's deputies. This means that seven people on the average are vying for each of the 450 seats in the Supreme Soviet of the republic."

The record of "competitive" struggle has been set by Kiev, where 33 candidates are competing for one parliamentary seat in one of the electoral districts.

The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission went on to say that according to their calculations, runoffs are possible in approximately one-half of the districts. This will cost the republic budget at least R4 to 5 million in additional expenses.

The working class has fielded the greatest number of candidates, 313. It is followed by the party apparatus with 298 candidates, more than 220 of whom are secretaries of large industrial associations, rayon, city, and oblast committees. However, it is important to note the following fact in this matter: The number of nonparty member candidates considerably exceeds the number of party apparatus functionaries; the ratio is 394 to 298.

V. Boyko continued: "Public organizations feel more confident in the course of the election campaign than ever before. They have nominated and ensured the registration of more than 600 candidates representing all strata of the population of our republic and its ethnic composition. There are close to 100 writers alone in the running. Of course, this credit of confidence is due to great changes in the public life of the Ukraine and the rejection of everything that is associated with the command-administrative system."

Writers Nominated

90UN0884A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 7 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by K. Grigoryev, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's correspondent in the Ukraine: "Unprecedented Demand for Writers"]

[Text] According to our incomplete data, over a hundred writers were nominated as candidates for deputies in the Ukraine. There were 25 such in Kiev alone.

As they say in the Ukraine "there has not been anything like that yet." As usual, of course, there are names of poets and writers among the candidates whose works are well-known not just within the republic: USSR people's deputies B. Oleinik, D. Pavlychko, Yu. Shcherbak, V. Yavorivskiy. Last year, by the way, they spoke more than they wrote, but nothing can be done about this: For the first time in our country, perhaps, the expression "a writer and a public figure" sounds reasonable. Among the nominees there are people who have had the right to claim representation in the parliament of the republic for a long time, but they did not seem appropriate for it by the previous administrative standards. I mean, for instance, I. Drach or M. Vingranovskiy. There are also some people among the candidates who used to feel the pressure of the commanding system in literature and who were constantly persecuted. Uzhgorod writer I. Chandey is one example to that, whose truthful novels did not fit the smooth flow of stagnation literature.

Not all the candidates will be elected deputies, of course, but you have to agree that the very fact of the interest the voters take in the representatives of the writing profession is very significant. Our artistic union has every right to consider its writers' organization very popular in the republic. Best of luck to our colleagues in their election campaign!

Donetsk Roundtable Dissatisfied With Obkom Plenum

Bureau Resignations Considered

LD1602153190 Moscow World Service in Russian 1040 GMT 16 Feb 90

[From the "INTERFAX" feature of the "Soviet Day by Day" program]

[Text] A roundtable meeting took place in Donetsk on 15 February. Representatives of various public organizations in the city, the strike committee, the city party committee, and the law enforcement bodies took part in it. An address to the citizens of the city and oblast which was adopted expresses dissatisfaction with the results of the plenum of the oblast party committee, at which the resignation of the oblast's party leadership did not take place, as had been demanded by the population of Donetsk. It is proposed that the plenum should be reconvened before 23 February, and that the issue of the resignation of the oblast committee bureau be reconsidered.

Miners Plan To Strike 2 March

LD0103171990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Text] Today again in Donetsk, an alarming word—strike—could be heard. Our correspondent, Gennadiy Kondaurov, reports by telephone:

[Kondaurov] Indeed, the Donetsk strike committee is calling for a political strike to support demands for the resignation of the bureau and of the apparatus of the oblast party committee, which were enunciated at the February plenums in Donetsk and in other cities of the oblast. Just now a meeting was held between the oblast party committee bureau members and the strike committee with the aim of seeking a compromise decision, but alas there was no consensus. After two hours of talking, the strike committee ended the meeting by repeating its ultimatum about the resignation. That time, too, the bureau refused to accept it, having referred to the decision by the obkom plenum and the 5,000-strong meeting of party committee secretaries of oblast enterprises, where it was agreed to hold an oblast party conference 6-7 April and to decide there all questions concerning the renewal of the oblast party organization.

The next day, the members of the strike committee who took part in that meeting went on hunger strike. It is taking place today, too. The 14 people on hunger strike are based near the building of the oblast party committee.

The miners are holding meetings, discussing the question of calling a strike.

While supporting the resignation demand, a number of enterprises are still against suspending production, for the situation at the mines is severe and the losses could be great. The critical situation is continuing.

The strike committee has just held a session at which it was decided to call a strike for tomorrow. What form it will take is to be decided by the actual miners' collectives, as envisaged in the law.

However, it seems to me that there is no consensus regarding the question of the immediate resignation of the oblast party committee bureau. Therefore, secretaries in a number of the Donetsk party organizations propose holding either a referendum, or meetings in all labor collectives so as to ascertain the majority opinion. They believe that a democratic way out of this acute situation is needed here.

1-Day Warning Strike Urged

LD0103221190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2052 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Television News Service" newscast]

[Text] A report from Donetsk: The local workers' strike committee has called for the holding of a one-day warning strike today. The miners are demanding the resignation of the party oblast committee and town committee. Now the miners are deciding by secret ballot whether there will be a strike or not. It has become known that at several collieries the miners' meetings have nevertheless decided to hold a strike tomorrow.

Donetsk Law Violations Mar Democracy Quest

PM2702165790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Special correspondent Pavel Gutiontov article: "Minute's Silence. On the Difficult Science of Listening To and Hearing One Another"]

[Excerpts] Donetsk—I was leaving after my assignment on a difficult day—gray, cold, dank.

The Donbass was in mourning—on 16 February Makeyevka was burying those who had died in a mine explosion, 13 coffins were being borne through its streets, and torrential rain was lashing the faces of people in the endless procession behind these coffins, not discriminating between the leader of the informals and the oblast party committee [obkom] secretary.

All the events that had just shaken the entire oblast had receded in the face of tragedy. Right after the report of the explosion the Donetsk City Strike Committee decided to refrain from holding the continuous rally announced the previous day in protest at the decision of the obkom plenum, which had passed a vote of confidence in its bureau. Even those who still came to the obkom building confined themselves to a minute's silence.

We too will observe silence and doff our hats.

But let us not forget that only a dreadful, irremediable grief has given us this **minute of respite** in a situation of barely controlled public passions, this **minute** [passage omitted]

It seems to me that the biggest danger to the processes of renewal (and not only in Donetsk) today consists in the fact that honest, intelligent people who are sincerely devoted to perestroyka both in the hall at the obkom plenum and in the square (and such people are still in the majority in both cases) hear one another poorly. Today they cannot do without each other, and the country, which is going through difficult times, cannot do without them together. The Donetsk Obkom plenum moved the report-and-election conference to the beginning of April, so that the demand for immediate resignation now smacks of elementary stubbornness. Of course, it is possible to hold rallies and strikes for the whole of the rest of the month, but it is also possible to use it to far greater advantage by ensuring that persons whom the people trust become conference delegates and members of the new obkom. The present electoral system provides such an opportunity.

But the strike committee urges fellow countrymen to participate in a continuous rally, objectively provoking social and political tension fraught with unpredictable consequences in the city.

Perhaps some of the candidate deputies will be able to win additional points on this wave and increase their popularity. But what can this wave wash away?

The rallies now being called for in Donetsk are unsanctioned. But the position of strength from which they are now trying to speak from the squares is shaky and insecure. The elements are uncontrollable—and even an elementary line for footwear (which has nonetheless been thrown out onto store counters) makes the city militiamen look around nervously. If the line staggers, little good will it do old people, children, women...

The most important point is that the diktat of open squares is just as dangerous as the diktat of tightly closed offices. However paradoxical it may sound, only respect for existing laws can be the paramount condition for very resolute changes. Only on this basis can trust in perestroyka and confidence in tomorrow be strengthened in society. And only on this basis, incidentally, is it possible to improve the laws themselves.

The saving, as it seems to some people, formula—we are all only learning democracy—certainly does not "legalize" violations of the law, whoever violates it. The law is the law because all are equal before it and no one has any privileges—neither the ruling party, nor the society of lovers of refined verbiage, nor the country's president, nor the miners' collective. We must all finally realize that it is precisely the long absence of genuinely working laws that is now rocking our society and arousing in individual groups and sometimes even in entire peoples a desire to resolve the accumulated problems outside the framework of legality, by force.

It is essential to understand that democracy certainly does not mean a total absence of regulations but, on the contrary, it means following them unswervingly.

Our first real parliament is now in the throes of drawing up these regulations before the eyes of the whole country. And it is a bad thing that the "parallel lawmaking" of the squares sometimes threatens to thrust us far back—to where we have, unfortunately, already been.

...I was leaving the Donbass on a difficult day of mourning for all its inhabitants. There was no one holding a rally in the central square of the oblast center—the "minute's silence" was announced before 25 February.

I very much wanted this time to be marked not only by grief for the dead but also by serious and responsible reflections on the times to which we are all indebted.

Today is already 25 February.

Citizens Protest Radar Station in Transcarpathia

LD1602152290 Kiev in Ukrainian to North America 2200 GMT 15 Feb 90

[Excerpt] A session of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet opened today. On the agenda is the ecological situation in the republic. In many regions of the Ukraine the air, water, and ground pollution exceeds the norm by several times. The session has evoked great interest among both the deputies themselves and repesentatives from various regions of the republic. Thus, on his way to the session our correspondent, Oles Bedzyk, saw outside the building of the Council of Ministers a group of people who arrived from faraway Transcarpathia to lobby their deputies. Oles Bedzyk reports:

[Bedzuk] On seeing a group of people outside the Council of Ministers, I stopped. The group has arrived from Transcarpathia. Their posters read: "Instead of radar stations we want holiday resorts, we want to live, off with radar stations, life must flourish in the center of Europe instead of death." This signal is to the government of the Ukraine: "SOS, they want to destroy us or to send us away, to where?, they want to turn our land into a testing ground," and many, many others, calling for an ecological balance and solutions to ecological questions in Transcarpathia. Here are their compliants.

[Unidentified person]...I am from Mukachevo. At a recent session of the rayon executive committee a decision was passed to stop the construction of the radar station in the locality...But according to the eyewitnesses, the construction is going on...

[Bedzyk] I turn to a man who lives in (Zerele). To my knowledge, the oblast soviet adopted a decision to stop the construction of the station.

[Unidentified person] Yes, it has. Nonetheless, the construction is going on at full blast, in three shifts, day and night engines are roaring. We demand it be stopped once and for all. [passage omitted]

Caucasus

Russian Nationalists Call for Peace in Caucasus

90UN0936C Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 90 p 2

[Letter from Russian nationalist groups: "We Do Not Want the Blood of the Sons of Russia To Be Spilled"]

[Text] The process of destruction of the state has entered a new phase. The armed resistance of the nationalists of Azerbaijan and Armenia and the outrages upon the sanctity of the borders in Nakhichevan and Moldavia show that the local authorities have been driven to the point where chaos and political anarchy begin.

The growth of Moslem fundamentalism and the oppression of orthodoxy by Catholic and Protestant activists in the Baltic states and the extremism of the Uniates in the Western Ukraine and Transcarpathian Rus prove that antistate forces are trying to conceal political goals with religious symbols, that is, to introduce politicking into the innermost thoughts of national life. This deception, which has infected all national organisms, is not being unmasked. It is becoming increasingly noticeable that the bright fire of faith is being transformed into the stinking decay of national-religious fanaticism.

Violence is becoming a natural and irrefutable method of proving they are right. Next comes thoughtless and merciless self-annihilation, after which independence of state and national life will come to an end forever.

We are demanding that the central authority remain the authority as long as it has the power and trust. We are demanding effective protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking population in the Transcaucasus. Their vulnerability is yet another insult to Russia from those who want to transform Russia herself into a worldwide Karabakh.

If our demands are not met we are not sure that a Russia-wide campaign will not begin to remove Russian military servicemen from the Transcaucasus. It is a crime to pay for political adventures with Russian blood. It is a crime to pay with Russian blood in the deadly games of the Azeri, Armenian, and other political and economic mafias.

Brother Azeris and brother Armenians! How can you kill one another and kill soldiers?... Where is your wisdom from the centuries, where have you hidden what was left by Nizami and Sayat-Nova?

Bring to account the blind men who dare to lead you into the abyss.

We Russians call you to peace and mutual understanding.
[Signed] United Council of Russia Association;
Association of Russian Artists;
Fund for Restoration of the Temple of Christ the Redeemer.

Azerbaijani Intellectuals Call for End to Strikes

NC2702101390 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 25 Feb 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] It can be said that half of the industrial establishments in Baku and the other cities in Azerbaijan are not working. The means of production are idle. This means that the number of unemployed is increasing, [words indistinct], and the level of the material products required for the well-being of the people is gradually falling. Nothing can replace what the people obtain through their own efforts.

Taking this into consideration, can it be possible to regard strikes as the only way to deal with political matters? Can it be possible to allow healthy thought to be overwhelmed by emotion? It is impossible to view life as separate from work. If, regardless of the pain we feel in our hearts, life continues, then work must continue as well.

In view of this, the democratic union of Azerbaijani intellectuals held a meeting on ways of dealing with the strikes which concern everyone. The participants in the meeting called for the restoration of work in the republic. They also called on the workers to report to work.

The appeal made by the members of the democratic union of Azerbaijani intellectuals to the republic's workers was published in today's newspapers. The view of the representatives of the Azerbaijani intellectuals is as follows: The strikes must be brought to an end, the republic's workers must be helped in their efforts to learn about the situation, and the ways of waging a serious struggle must be determined.

Deputies Comment on Solutions to NKAO Conflicts

NC2702152290 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 25 Feb 90

[Report by ARMENPRES correspondent L. Azroyan: "A Political Solution Is Needed"]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 26 Feb (ARMENPRES)—At their second session on 19 February, the two houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet held a closed-door meeting at which the issue of normalizing the situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia was examined.

We asked a few of the USSR people's deputies for their assessments of the Baku incidents and ways to resolve the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. USSR People's Deputy Colonel M. B. Yetrushenko said:

I, who witnessed the Baku incidents, believe that we cannot allow anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Armenian sentiment to spread in the country.

The root of the barbarities committed against the Armenians, Jews, and Russians during the Baku incidents must be sought in Sumgait. I cannot understand whose interests were served by taking an orchestrated action like this and dividing it into 10 or 12 criminal cases, which were referred to different courts in the Russian Federation. The Supreme Soviet must isolate all these criminal acts and deal with them severely, for it was the feeling of being able to act with impunity and lawlessness that gave rise to the present situation in Baku.

There is another point to consider. I think that the mass media must assume part of the blame for inciting these two union republics against each other and against the center.

Another issue is what is preventing us from taking timely measures. Is this the result of a lack of leadership or is it actually the objective of the leadership? I do not have the answer to this question.

I also cannot understand why we have not received an answer to why the Azerbaijanian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic's Supreme Soviet reacted with leniency to the decision by the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic to withdraw from the Azerbaijan and USSR structure when the same leadership is so vehemently obstructing the withdrawal of the NKAO from the state structure of Azerbaijan.

I do not wish to go into detailed assessment of the Baku incidents because many deputies at the session have already given the correct political evaluation to the (?incidents) which took place in Baku between 13 and 20 February. As to the solution of the NKAO problem, I would say that the NKAO was a mere pretext. Had it not been for the NKAO, another problem would have cropped up. However, since this problem does exist, we must search for solutions.

I think that while accepting the fact that the NKAO has been and is an historically created autonomous entity of Azerbaijan—noting at the same time the right of the Armenian population to develop within the framework of that autonomy, which does not exist today—I propose that the NKAO be taken out of Azerbaijan temporarily and subjected to the center—that is, to Moscow—until Azerbaijan can guarantee tranquillity for the Armenians there. After that negotiations should start on disarmament, hostages, and refugee problems. In other words, any escalation of the conflict must be checked first, after which negotiations should start. The bloodshed can only be stopped by temporarily subjecting the NKAO to Moscow.

A. Plotnikov, a (?worker) at the Kirovo-Chepetskiy Chemical combine in Kirovskaya Oblast, said: The only solution is the removal of the NKAO from Azerbaijani rule and its submission to the center. This must be done if not for its reunification with Armenia, then at the least to enable the population of the NKAO to recover. Armenians cannot live comfortably there at present. This is even admitted by Azerbaijanis themselves when they stress that the interethnic conflict has reached such a point that it will take a long time to normalize the situation. Such normalization is possible only if NKAO is removed from the structure of Azerbaijan. [passage omitted]

Gradual Normalization Occurring in NKAO Rayons

PM2802160390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] Stepanakert, 26 Feb—There is no denying the skill of the anonymous craftsmen whose work—firearms and ammunition—was shown to TASS' correspondent at the oblast Internal Affairs Administration. Many of them were the product of considerable imagination. For example, the homemade pistol with a window latch instead of a pin or the hand grenade built into a porcelain insulator. Nor do we yet know the name of the owner of the skilled hands that sewed the bandolier stuffed with small-caliber bullets.

It is important now, Militia Colonel Ye.V. Paskar, deputy chief of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry's Maintenance of Public Order Main Administration, said, to identify all the means whereby people obtain weapons and ammunition and the places where the cottage industry in arms manufacture is active. This will help identify both the lawbreakers and those who are instigating the crimes.

Common sense is prevailing. This is also evidenced by the peace agreements signed by the elders. It was common sense that enabled the working people of the oblast's Mardakertskiy, Martuninskiy, and Askeranskiy Rayons and the adjoining Mir-Bashirskiy Rayon to carry out—with the assistance of servicemen and specialists of republic ministries and departments—work to restore power, gas, and water supplies to population centers. And was it not common sense that guided those who, eight months on, helped lift the blockade from the highway across the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast into Azerbaijan's Kelbadzharskiy Rayon and ensure deliveries of food and feed and other essential supplies?

There is another report indicative of the gradual normalization of the situation in the area of the state of emergency. A week ago regular flights began from Stepanakert to Baku, Tbilisi, and Mineralnyye Vody by crews from the Azerbaijan Civil Aviation Administration.

NKAO Paper Placed Under 'Military Jurisdiction'

NC0103150290 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Yerevan, 27 Feb (ARMENPRES)—As we already reported, the 31 January 1990 decision of the military commandant of the special situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and adjoining Azerbaijan regions placed the editor and the editorial board of the oblast's paper, KHORHRDAYIN KARABKH, under jurisdiction of its political department. The paper is the organ of the oblast party organization and of the soviets of the people's deputies. The people of the oblast have given strong criticism to the commandant's decision, which is unconstitutional and incompatible with the 15 January USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's decree introducing a state of emergency. The following steps have already been taken:—the editorial board has condemned this illegal and arbitrary decision in a letter to the commandant;—a joint declaration has been issued by the paper's editorial board, the representatives of the NKAO radio and television committee, and of the oblast's branch of the USSR Journalists' Union;—and protest letters have been sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet by bureaus of Stepanakert City Party Committee and Askeranskiy, Gadrutskiy, Mardakertskiy, Martuninskiy Rayon Party Committees; the Executive Committees of the Soviets of People's Deputies; and the USSR People's Deputies Zoriy Balayan, Vagan Gabrielyan, Vache Grigoryan, Boris Dadamyan, and Genrikh Pogosyan.

However, what is most illogical is that readers of KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH, which is published in Armenian and Russian, have no way of knowing about these protest letters. This paper, which is a tool for the policy of openness, is now under military censorship.

Since 12 February, YEREKOYAN YEREVAN has started devoting pages to items which are prepared by KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH's editorial board but which cannot be published in that paper. Its intention is to present some sort of understanding about the current situation in NKAO and to support and express solidarity with its colleagues. [passage omitted]

KHORHRDAYIN KARABAKH's editorial board has given YEREKOYAN YEREVAN the interview that USSR People's Deputy Genrikh Pogosyan granted to journalist Yuriy Apresyan. He commented on important problems disturbing the NKAO and the entire Armenian people. In analyzing the role of the Union Monitoring and Observation Commission, which replaced the Special Administration Committee led by Vladimir Foteyev; Genrikh Pogosyan specifically says: Under Foteyev, the commission's task is to implement the decisions in line with the 28 November 1989 USSR Supreme Soviet resolution. However, Foteyev came to Stepanakert when much water has gone under the bridge and there have been Armenians massacred in Baku. When we met with him again, we learned that the rules on how the commission functions are not concrete, and he does not have a clear picture of his and his colleagues' tasks. Foteyev must have jurisdiction not only over our oblast but, as they say, over its periphery, in order for him to be productive.

In analyzing the 28 November resolution, the people's deputy underlines that creating the Organizational Committee was not the main point. The resolution obliged the Azerbaijani government to ensure the physical security of the Armenian population in the oblast and in other regions of the republic, including Shaumyanovskiy and Khanlarskiy rayons, to lift the blockade, to bring social-economic autonomy to the oblast, to upgrade its status, and finally, another necessary and important demand, to maintain the demographic situation as it was when the resolution was endorsed. [passage omitted]

The situation today is very different than on 28 November when the problem was debated. Considering the way things developed, the Armenians of NKAO cannot recognize the Azerbaijanis' right to administer the oblast. Today, NKAO resembles a child whose hands are held firm by a strong man while another equally strong man beats him. Those two men are the leaders of the country and the Azerbaijan government. They should have realized long ago that the spirit of a people is not judged by how many individuals there are, and the methods they use could hardly achieve their objective. It is possible to eliminate a people, but it is impossible to subjugate a people. [passage omitted]

In conclusion Pogosyan said that the Armenian deputies from NKAO and Armenia must exert every effort to persuade the USSR Supreme Soviet to reconsider its 28 November 1989 resolution. He expressed his conviction that the NKAO problem should be solved through peaceful dialogue.

Economic Consequences of Baku Strikes Discussed

*NC2802111590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri
1700 GMT 26 Feb 90*

[Text] It is common knowledge that a number of the collectives of the republic's unions, establishments, and transportation services have stopped their work either completely or partially as a result of political instability in Azerbaijan. The idle state of the industrial complex is damaging the republic's economy significantly and obstructing the quick settlement of the social problems which have piled up.

According to the information available by 20 February, the loss incurred as a result of the work stoppages amounted to 681,214,000 rubles [R], including R362,918,000 in Baku; R100,452,000 in Sumgait; and R53,982,000 in Gendzha. The loss in construction amounted to R55,800,000, which affects thousands of flats, schools, hospitals, polytechnical schools, and other social installations. It is impossible to make up this loss. Continued work stoppages may distrupt the plans made to effectively realize the republic's views on adopting the regional economy system and establishing Azerbaijan's economic sovereignty.

The collective of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Bank, which is affiliated with the USSR Social Housing Bank [as heard], has called on the true patriots of the republic to report to their work places. Reluctance to work directly affects the supply of consumer goods for the market. Furthermore, it directly affects the rate of turnover of goods. This obstructs the channeling of [word indistinct] cash to the bank. Consequently, its impedes the process of paying wages. The existing laws do not authorize the bank to pay wages to the workers and the employees for the times they do not work.

Claims of Military 'Atrocities' in Baku Deplored

*LD2802172190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Feb 90 First Edition p 3*

[Article by Captain Second Class O. Odnokolenko: "Azerbaijan. Summary Looks Normal"]

[Excerpt] Baku, 24 Feb—[passage omitted] It should be noted that Baku people in general are very sensitive to the written word. Hereabouts it is even important who gets mentioned first when it is a question of refugees—Azerbaijanis or Armenians. The people have many complaints against the central authorities. The questions are the same as before: "Why has it been hidden from everyone for two years that Armenia and Azerbaijan are at war? Why were measures not taken earlier?"

It is probably not that hard to convince an "independent" journalist visiting Baku for a few days of the "atrocities" committed by the military by showing him the bullet holes in the walls of the children's hospital and a bullet-riddled ambulance. But it is hard to deceive an eyewitness. It is hard to mislead someone who saw people shooting out of residential apartments and others shelling a crowded refugee camp from the children's hospital. And the fact that the guerrillas used ambulances has also been established.

So it is hardly noble to blame the soldiers who, incidentally, were not armed with tracer bullets or any kind of special bullets. Would it not be more honest to point to those who fired on the troops, having bussed in women and children beforehand and used them as a barrier?

The summary for today looked normal. There were 46 enterprises working normally, 48 working partially, and 12 not working. The republic's mass media have noted the poor activeness of party committees, which are not taking measures against people hampering normal work.

Update on Industrial Situation in Nakhichevan

*LD2802195690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1630 GMT 28 Feb 90*

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Nakhichevan. After a long interval, work of the industrial, transport, and agrarian complex of the Autonomous Republic has resumed. Lessons have begun in general education schools and in secondary and higher educational institutions.

Workers of the aluminium and glass container factories have been back at work for three days now in their full complement. All the production lines of these industries are operating and the daily production norms are being met. The pace of railroad transportations of construction materials is rising. For the second day now, the Nakhichevan Passenger and Auto Transport Organization [PATO] has been coping with the full volume of passenger and cargo transportations. The transport arteries connecting the capital with all the rayons of the autonomous republics have come back to life. As the oblast committee of the party informed an Azerinform correspondent, labor collectives have developed a plan for making up what has been lost. Part of them have decided to work in three shifts and to lengthen the work schedule. Workers of the locomotive depot have undertaken to bring large-freight trains to their appointed place. However, as yet, not all enterprises have managed to begin work. The lack of raw material is the cause.

Figures for Transcaucasus Freight, Train Movement

NC2802152490 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Text] The press center of the Transcaucasus Railways Yerevan Branch said that on 26 February, 18 trains with 865 freight cars entered the republic through Norashen and Idzhevan stations. They included more than 200 tank cars of mazut, 19 of diesel oil, 16 of benzine, six of aircraft fuel, and seven freight cars of newsprint. They also brought prefabricated houses, construction materials, and industrial goods.

Sixteen trains with 469 freight cars entered from Georgia. The freight includes 46 tank cars of benzine, 67 of mazut and diesel oil, 89 freight cars of flour, 33 of grain, (?12) of sugar, four of meat, and two freight cars of canned food. They also brought other goods. During the day, 1,512 freight cars were unloaded in Armenian stations. The number of unloaded cars is [word indistinct].

Trains Begin To Arrive Regularly in Armenia

LD0103223690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Mar 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We will tell you that at last railway traffic to Armenia from the side of Azerbaijan is getting back to normal. Has the blockade been lifted once and for all?

[Correspondent V. Nazaryan] For almost two months there was a lull at the station at Yeraskh. Here smiles have appeared once again on the faces of the railwaymen. The trains have started moving. This is the ninth day now that trains have been regularly arriving in Armenia through Norashen station on the Azerbaijan railway. Today there were 12 trains, almost 600 railcars. Overall, more than 4,000 freightcars—carrying foodstuffs, construction materials, and fuel have arrived in the republic. The moment the blockade was lifted, unfortunately, such freightcar's also arrive: these are huts for the disaster zone that have been smashed and looted. Such excuses for freight arrived in Armenia from Azerbaijan last year, too, on the days when the blockade was lifted. Here we have it again. Generally, however, the movement of trains between the two republics is getting back to normal, is returning to a normal rhythm. [video shows freight trains, damaged mobile homes]

Central Asia

Kazakh Government-Cooperatives Dialogue Cited

PM0103102190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 1

["Own Information" report: "From Bans—to Dialogue?"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—At an expanded session the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers Presidium examined a number of urgent measures aimed at financial recovery, the improvement of the supply of food and industrial goods to the population, and the solution of other urgent socioeconomic problems.

The most heated disputes were generated by the discussion of the government draft resolution "On Extraordinary Measures to Strengthen Money Circulation and Fill the Republic's Consumer Market in 1990." And in particular the point which bans state enterprises and organizations from using the services of cooperatives in their production activity.

This draft was examined in the republic a month ago. And it immediately generated a keenly negative reaction among cooperative members. The Kazakhstan union of cooperatives, the republican "Soyuz" cooperative association, and the "Birlesu" ("Unification") independent trade union of cooperative workers unanimously considered this measure to be discriminatory and to be in contravention both of the law on the state enterprise and the law on cooperatives in the USSR. They were particularly angered by the fact that some zealous leaders have hastened to executive a government resolution which has not yet been adopted: Thus, the board of the republican Bank for Housing and Municipal Services and Social Development has banned all its subdivisions from accepting the payment vouchers of enterprises and organizations for services rendered by cooperatives. The question was put quite reasonably: In this situation what will happen to those cooperatives which have already concluded contracts with state enterprises for this year and have invested funds in recruiting workers and acquiring raw material and equipment?

At the Council of Ministers session the leaders of the department and the oblast soviet executive committees leveled many complaints against the cooperatives, the main one being that they are destabilizing money turnover in the republic. This destabilization is occurring to a considerable degree because the cooperatives, in concluding contracts with state enterprises, are transforming their non-cash payments into cash. If you consider that the payment for cooperatives' services is often at higher rates and with other violations, then such financial operations, in the opinion of economic leaders, become a powerful incentive to issue money and, as a result, a catalyst of inflation.

In response M. Khurin, chairman of the Kazakhstan cooperatives union, L. Solomin, president of the "Birlesu" independent trade union, and the speakers at the government session cited arguments in favor of the cooperative movement and the need to establish the cooperative sector as an equal sector of the economy. M. Khurin suggested a different formulation to replace the prohibitive one in the draft resolution: All noncash accounts of state enterprises, associations, and organizations be settled only according to legally drawn up contracts and that thus be placed under the control of financial and other organs.

U. Karamanov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, agreed both with many of the complaints leveled against cooperatives and with the arguments of the cooperative members themselves. The head of government proposed that their amendment be considered when preparing the final draft of the Council of Ministers resolution.

Thus, despite the abundance of mutual recriminations, constructive dialogue between the republic's government and the leaders of the cooperative movement nonetheless took place.

New Kazakh KGB Chief Appointed

LD0103145590 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Feb 90

[Text] At the republic's Committee for State Security today Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet, had a meeting with KGB personnel. He spoke about the republic's socioeconomic problems and ways of solving them. He dwelt on the tasks of Kazakhstan's Chekists in present-day conditions for preventing interethnic conflict, combatting organized crime, and protecting the Soviet constitutional structure and the legitimate rights and interests of citizens.

Taking part in the meeting was Ageyev, deputy chairman of the USSR KGB. He announced the appointment of (Vdovin) as chairman of the Kazakh KGB. He has been working as chief of the KGB Administration for East Kazakhstan Oblast. Miroshnik has been released from the office of chairman of the republic's KGB in view of a change of duties.

Further Reportage on Dushanbe Pogroms

Situation Normalizing

LD0103175190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 1 Mar 90

[Correspondent N. Mikulin report from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The capital of Tajikistan appears peaceful and calm today on the first day of spring. In spite of the state of emergency, which is still in force, Dushanbe is living a normal, working life. All industrial enterprises, public transportation, consumer service, and catering enterprises are working at their normal rhythm. Lessons are being held in schools and higher educational institutions, and children's preschool establishments are open. Life has returned to its normal, peaceful channel.

However, the city is still healing the wounds received in those tragic February days. The losses from the pogroms amount to many millions of rubles, but how can one assess the moral loss? Who will return to their families the innocent mother or father, son or daughter, who was killed? [video shows repair work being carried out on buildings]

Who were the perpetrators of the pogroms, the murderers and hooligans? Who incited the young people to commit crimes? Replies to these questions soon will be given by the competent bodies.

[Begin recording] [Tajik Internal Affairs Minister M. Novzhuvanov—identified by screen caption] To date, criminal cases have been brought against 74 people here; 44 of these have been arrested and charged.

[Mikulin] The population is justifiably afraid that those who will be punished are the criminals, the froth on the surface, whom you have detained, but those who incited these disorders, those who—so to say—stood at the head of them, will they not escape responsibility?

[Novzhuvanov] I think not.

[Mikulin] My last question, [words indistinct] The point is that the state of emergency here will not last forever. Today thousands of Dushanbe inhabitants are afraid that when the troops are withdrawn the disorders might break out again. Do the law enforcement bodies have any specific guarantees that this will not happen again?

[Novzhuvanov] At the expense of the local budget we already have an establishment of an extra 500 soldiers in Dushanbe alone. Apart from that, we are going to approach the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and ask them to create a special unit of internal troops in Dushanbe and other regions so that the people should not be worried about our ability to insure complete maintenance of public order and not leave our working people in the lurch. [end recording]

Ongoing Curfew

PM2802095790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent A. Karpov dispatch: "Dushanbe: New Decree in Effect"]

[Text] During the whole of the past week the inhabitants of Dushanbe have been living peacefully. Through the efforts of law enforcement organs and special troops, as well as civil self-defense formations, the situation in the Tajik capital has become normalized and life has gradually resumed its usual course. However, the memory of the tragic events that took place here is still very fresh in people's minds. The city is still in a state of emergency and a curfew is in effect.

The Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium decree "On Strengthening Responsibility for Actions Directed Against Social Order and Citizens' Safety" came into force 19 February. The organs of law and order have established that Sokhia Khuseynova, a graduate of the Tajik State University and her sister Surave, a sixth-year student at the medical institute, telephoned various inhabitants of the city at random from their mother's apartment and spread provocative rumors without saying who they were. Some people panicked as a result of these telephoned rumors. Since the sisters were "playing the fool" before the decree was implemented, they both received an official warning. And even greater "confusion" occurred with M. Nezametdinovaya, a professor at the Baku Institute of Power Engineering Construction, as it appears from a Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs report. The learned lady was detained in the main building of the Tajik Polytechnical Institute as she was circulating inflammatory publications and photographic materials. In a resolution adopted by the Zheleznedorozhniy Rayon Court in Dushanbe she was taken into custody for 10 days in accordance with the letter and spirit of the decree.

The people circulating various types of rumors are unfortunately achieving their ends. In the past few days rather less people have been going to work in enterprises and establishments. Few children are going to school or nursery school.

Party, soviet, and law enforcement organs are taking measures to clarify to situation.

Investigative Action

LD2802092590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 27 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Much to our regret, acute conflicts leading to human casualties are arising in more and more areas of the country. In the middle of February, as you know, tragic events took place in Dushanbe. As reported, dozens of criminal cases have been opened. An investigation is being carried out. The public is following it especially closely. Today this subject was discussed at a press conference at the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. Our correspondents Leonid Lazarevich and Muzafar Madzhidov report:

[begin recording] [Lazarevich] [passage omitted] In Tajikistan now the public are convinced that the mass unrest was organized by someone. Do the detectives share this viewpoint? This question was addressed above all to Gennadiy Stepanovich Mikhaylin, the republic's procurator.

[Mikhaylin] In what direction is the investigation proceeding now? The task posed is this: To expose not only the direct participants, and the people who have directly committed a certain specific crime, for example, connected with plundering, looting, hooliganism, theft, and so on, but also to find out the nature of the mass disturbances, how they were organized, and what motive forces determined the beginning and the course of development of these mass disturbances.

[Madzhidov] [passage omitted] At the press conference, Procurator Mikhaylin reported that today 39 people have been arrested on criminal charges. We had the following question: How many people took part in comitting the crimes from the viewpoint of the procuracy?

[Mikhaylin] The number of those involved in the mass unrest on 12 and 13 February is several thousand. There is no doubt that the degree of participation, the extent of guilt and responsibility among all these people varies radically from person to person. And I can see that I am faced with the task—and I am fully set to tackle it—of carrying out an objective, comprehensive, and full investigation of the crimes. I do not feel that there are any obstacles in the path of investigating this criminal case. Everything else will already depend, no doubt, on our possibilities and skills, of course. I think that overall both our events and the events which took place on the territory of this country in other regions require a very serious political, state, and juridicial assessment as a whole. And I think that it is precisely on the basis of a deep and comprehensive political analysis that appraisals have already been given on the preemptive and preventive measures and actions of the law enforcement bodies, including the KGB and the procuracy. [end recording]

Polling Places Open

PM2802163390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 90 Second Edition p 1

[Tadzhik-TASS report under general heading: "Elections in the Republics"]

[Text] **Tajik SSR**[Soviet Socialist Republic]

At 0600 hours in the morning the curfew introduced in Dushanbe in connection with the mass disturbances in the capital 12 to 14 February ended. And as early as 0700 hours yesterday the doors opened at polling places in the city and throughout the republic.

Voters are to choose the republic's supreme organ of legislative power. The election campaign is over, the time has come to sum up the results. The 230 seats are contested by 1,035 candidate deputies.

The people's deputies are being selected without the "verdict" of okrug meetings. Social organizations are nominating candidates on a common basis [na obshchikh osnovaniyakh]. However, individual representatives of informal organizations are trying to cast doubt on the democratic nature of the elections.

"However the facts refute this," I. Dedov, chairman of the republic electoral commission, said. "After all, only in four okrugs are the elections taking place without an alternative choice (literally on the eve of the voting a number of candidates withdrew their candidacies), while in the remaining okrugs seats are contested by between 2 and 17 candidates.

Possible Afghan Border Infiltration Cited

LD1802204890 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 18 Feb 90

[Text] The situation in Dushanbe, after the recent tragic events there, is fully controlled by the authorities, law enforcement bodies, and troops. On rumors in the city that Afghan rebels were ready to cross into the Soviet Union and help the Dushanbe extremists, the deputy commander of the Central Asian Border District, General (Markevitskiy), spelled out moves to forestall this. His statement has been carried by the trade union newspaper TRUD. The general confirmed that units of the Afghan armed opposition had indeed built up redeployment across a border river and he said there was enough military equipment and forces in the district to guard the national border.

Drug Interdiction on Afghan Border Viewed

LD2802211390

[Editorial report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 2125 GMT on 27 February in its "Television News Service" newscast carries a 2-minute video report by correspondent S. Milyanchikov from the "Green Triangle", the spot at which the three borders of the USSR, Afghanistan, and Iran meet. This area has been used for centuries by Afghan smugglers to get drugs into Iran or the USSR. Hundreds of kilograms of narcotics, especially raw opium, pass through this isolated region. Soviet border troops, in conjunction with their Iranian counterparts, are trying to cut off this smuggling trail. Video shows Soviet border troops patrolling, watchtowers.

Most of the Soviet-Afghan border, however, is "infected" with contraband, and the handover of drugs is carried out in various ways in different places. Video shows a river marking the border between USSR and Afghanistan, and places among the reeds where Afghans hide bundles containing narcotics. These bundles are picked up by Soviet villagers working in the adjoining fields, in exchange for jewellery, money, and valuables. During the harvest, when thousands of people are out in the fields, the fight against smuggling is very difficult indeed.

Results are being achieved, however: A news conference by V. Boyko, head of the KGB investigation administration of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic, displays cash, jewellery, television sets, weapons and cameras confiscated from drug smugglers. Between 1983 and 1988, Boyko says, 1,200 kg of raw opium has been handed over to medical institutions for production of medicines. Boyko holds up a package containing over 500g of raw opium which he says is worth up to 100,000 rubles on the black market.

Uzbek Meeting Condemns 'Demagogues,' 'Intriguers'

PM2702165190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 2

[UZTAG-TASS report: "To Rally Healthy Forces"]

[Text] Tashkent, 24 Feb—A meeting has been held in Tashkent's V.I. Lenin Palace of Peoples' Friendship with the participation of people's deputies of the USSR, the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and local soviets and representatives of the public from Tashkent and the oblast.

Its participants resolutely declared that it is impossible to tolerate the antidemocratic, illegal actions of all kinds of demagogues and political intriguers, their fanning of national dissension, and the fueling in society of enmity, bitterness, alarm, and uncertainty.

The chief thing of concern to the republic's inhabitants today is the ensuring of discipline, order, and safety in the life of everyone, regardless of social class or nationality. It is no coincidence that voters included precisely these demands in their instructions to deputies of republic and local soviets, the elections to which were held 18 February. For this the people's elected representatives must live for the working people's needs and interests and be inseparably linked with the people, the speakers pointed out.

The meeting urged the country's entire population and public and party organizations to consolidate forces and to interact and cooperate closely. Only in this way is it possible to resolve the problems that have accumulated, improve people's lives, and stabilize the situation.

I.A. Karimov, first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, delivered the report at the conference.

A meeting of the labor collective of Tashkent's "Algoritm" Computer Plant was held in the Uzbek capital on the same day. It adopted an appeal to the USSR Supreme Soviet and Government. In it the meeting participants urge them to be imbued with alarm and a sense of responsibility for the fate of tens of thousands of Soviet people who, because of national feuds, have been forced to abandon their homes and roam the country and for the fate of the tens of millions living within national republics who feel unprotected and who are losing confidence in the future.

The meeting participants demanded the urgent adoption of laws on citizens' safety and the elaboration of effective measures to ensure the rights of everyone, whatever his nationality and in whatever corner of the USSR he lives. Very strict sanctions must be applied in respect of extremists, nationalists, and saboteurs.

Procurator Dismisses Uzbek Genocide Claim

WA2702203390 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 8, 21 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by A. Buturlin, deputy procurator of the RSFSR: "Is It the Whole Truth?"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA reprinted an interview, published in the republic newspaper, SELSKAYA PRAVDA, with members of a Congress of USSR People's Deputies Commission, headed by T. Gdlyan, to verify materials relating to the activity of an investigative group from the USSR Procurator's Office. The correspondent presses on the deputies his vision of what happened in the Uzbekistan trials, and he distorts the facts. In the middle of the 1980's, hundreds of investigators from the center and union republics worked in Uzbekistan. The people worked honorably and under very difficult conditions. I object strongly to attempts to confuse the most gross transgressions of the law by Gdlyan's group with the work of other investigative groups.

At first I did not see any reason to distrust Gdlyan and after studying the case I gave approval for the arrest, in particular, of former obkom [oblast party committee] First Secretaries Kamalov and Khudaybergenov, Deputy Minister Kakhramanov, and others. But when the illegal actions committed by Gdlyan began to be uncovered one after the other, our joint work became impossible.

My duties as a procurator of the republic did not include supervision of the activity of the team of union procurators. Nonetheless, I did not consider it possible to reconcile myself to unlawful acts and more than once, starting in 1985, I appealed to the USSR Procurator, and, afterwards, to the CPSU Central Committee as well. I wrote in particular: "Will it not become necessary after a certain time to explain to the public how it could happen that such transgressions of legality were not stopped? It seems that a highly qualified impartial commission, which could check on the work of Gdlyan's investigative group, should be established."

It is already being forgotten now (and some would like to forget) what terrible troubles Rashidovshchina gave rise to. It was in exactly this period that, in close cooperation with local workers and workers of law enforcement organs who arrived in the republic, upward distortions made in the years 1978-1983 of about five million tons of cotton were uncovered, as a result of which hundreds of millions of rubles went into the pockets of plunderers and bribe-takers. The procurator's office and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs of the republic in just three years exposed 20 bandit formations that committed 14,000 crimes, including 180 murders, 1,700 larcenies and armed robberies, and 7,800 thefts. Some 5,000 kilograms of narcotics were confiscated from the criminals. During this time, about 20,000 plunderers of socialist property and bribe-takers, including about 300 employees of law enforcement organs, were exposed. More than R100 million were returned to the state.

I categorically reject fabrications about a "small terror," and about the groundless institution of criminal proceedings in Uzbekistan against masses of innocent people. As confirmation, I can cite at least the fact that the number of those exonerated in the republic was much less than in Moscow, for instance. The figures cited by the correspondent were unreal. I was especially disturbed by the accusation of genocide with respect to the Uzbek people which was lodged against the workers of the law enforcement organs. Is it not really obvious that such accusations, which were repeated immediately after Gdlyan, only led to the stirring up of interethnic dissension? Indeed, how can this be combined with the fact that in this very period the investigative and judicial organs of the republic exonerated several hundred local residents who were convicted by a servile court only because they were unsuitable to Rashidov, Yakhyaev and their clique? We referred about 20,000 participants in upward distortions of plans to unofficial comrades' courts instead of people's courts, taking into account that these people were under the heavy influence of Rashidovshchina.

The accusation of genocide is even more insulting, because the procurator's office of the republic—for the first time in Uzbekistan—adopted real measures to stop child labor on cotton plantations. Here, we employees of the procurator's office not only had to introduce representations and protests, we ourselves were compelled (inasmuch as they deceived us) to continuously drive around the cotton fields in order to take children and juveniles home. And, of course, we severely disciplined the guilty officials.

The procurator's office also expended a lot of effort to eliminate another trouble: The population of the republic was suffering cruelly from the poisonous chemical preparation butifos, which was used in processing cotton. The procurator's office of the republic, incidentally, together with LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, put an end to this evil, and when certain departments tried to begin testing analogs of poison, the procurator's office also prohibited this—I now have in my archives letters of thanks from residents of the republic.

And after this we, the employees of the procurator's office, have to listen to accusations of genocide?! Of law-breaking?

The published interview was titled "Everyone Should Know the Truth. The Whole Truth!" Why then, and to what purpose, is it grossly distorted?